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ABSTRACT 
Spanish rule in Louisiana was bracketed by periods of unrest.  Using the criteria for 
rebellion developed by political scientist Claude E. Welch Jr., in Anatomy of Rebellion to 
compare the 1768 rebellion under Governor Antonio de Ulloa, and demonstrations of discontent 
in the 1790’s under Baron Francisco Luis Carondelet, one is able to draw out similarities, 
contrasts, and continuities in factors causal to political unrest.  The most powerful of these causal 
factors were the economic troubles, geographic marginality, ethnic tensions, weak authority, and 
unsuccessful attempts to reform the colony’s commercial system.  Methods employed by the 
Spanish administrations to contain or mitigate the discontent largely failed, leading to episodes 
of violent popular political contention. 
The roots of Louisiana’s problems ran deep.  By the arrival of the Spaniards, the colony 
had been largely neglected by the French crown.  Suffering shortages of food, and economic 
strife, the colonial elite formed their own alternate, and often illegal, structures of power and 
support.  The 1766 imposition of Spanish rule threatened those structures.  In 1768, discontented 
members of the Louisiana Superior Council staged a coup, driving Spanish governor Antonio de 
Ulloa out of the colony.  Lieutenant General Alejandro O’Reilly restored order to the colony in 
1769.  O’Reilly demonstrated effective means of control over a discontented populace, which 
stood in stark relief to the weaknesses, neglect and disorder of the previous Spanish 
administration. 
In the early 1790’s a number of factors sparked new fears of rebellion in Louisiana.  
Disruptions of trade caused by war with France, attempts to integrate Louisiana into the Spanish 
mercantile system, shifts in agriculture and a shortage of specie backed currency once again 
agitated the colonial elite.  At the same time an influx of revolutionary propaganda from the 
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French Republic threatened to spark old ethnic tensions while tales of the Haitian revolution 
brought fears of slave revolt in the colony.  Baron Carondelet utilized an increased military 
presence, information control, incorporation of colonial leaders into his administrative structure, 
and the fear of slave revolt to contain demonstrations of popular discontent.  While his 
administration saw an increase in political violence, Carondelet prevented widespread rebellion. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Spanish rule provided the Louisiana territory with a period of organization and orderly 
development that sparked colonial growth in a way the previous French administrations never 
had.  Yet, the period of Spanish rule over the Louisiana territory was contentious and bracketed 
by rebellion.  In 1768, three years into the Spanish occupation, French ‘habitants’ challenged the 
rule of Antonio de Ulloa y de la Torre-Guiral, the first Spanish Governor of Louisiana.1  French 
and German settlers rose up and ousted Ulloa from power.  Their interim government sought to 
restore the colony to French control but Spanish reinforcements, led by Alejandro O’Reilly, 
restored Spanish rule.  Toward the end of the Spanish period of Louisiana’s history, the colony 
saw tumults involving French agents, American speculators, colonial planters, merchants and 
rebellious slaves inspired by the French and Haitian Revolutions.  However unlike Ulloa before 
him, Governor Baron Francisco Luis Hector De Carondelet managed to retain power throughout 
the length of his administration, though there were periods when his control was limited. 
This thesis was written to explore several questions related to rebellion during the 
Spanish regime in Louisiana.  Why should one governor seem to fail so thoroughly in 
maintaining order, while another succeeded?  Is there continuity between the rebellions?  And 
were these rebellions purely derived from the peasant revolt tradition, or were they more 
revolutionary in nature?  The hope is that the answers to these questions may inform us about the 
changing character of the colony throughout the Spanish regime. In doing so they may also 
highlight changes in Spanish methods of colonial control, and perhaps give some insight into 
pre-industrial rebellion. 
                                                 
1 The term ‘habitant’ was used by the Spanish to denote a citizen of the Louisiana territory who had French 
heritage.  Additionally ‘Creole’ is often used to describe Frenchmen, born in Louisiana.  During the eighteenth 
century the appellation ‘Acadian’ was used primarily to refer to French colonists from Acadia, who had been forced 
out by the English. 
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Initial inquiries into the two revolts revealed several related causes for the unrest: racial 
and ethnic tensions, economic distress, food and supply shortages, geographic isolation, 
revolutionary zeal, manipulation by outside forces, and the disruption of entrenched cultural 
norms and mores.  Both also showed signs of economic motivation, social strain from a shift in 
commercial practice, and ethnic tension between the French and Spanish.  These economic and 
social factors suggested a connection to the ‘peasant revolt’ or ‘popular revolt’ tradition.  To a 
degree, the rebellions conform to the basic peasant revolt model: a people at the bottom of the 
social order participating in unrest to assert rights considered traditionally theirs, or to protect a 
basic standard of living.   
The author of this thesis obtained unusable results from reading histories of medieval 
rebellions for the purpose of creating a kind of platonic model of peasant revolts to use as a 
“lens” to examine the 1768 revolt and the 1790’s turmoil.  Many of those texts focused on 
specific religious, legal and agricultural innovations which seemed too contextually bound to 
medieval Europe to be of much use.  A broader approach to the subject of rebellion was needed.  
Fortunately, while searching political science texts for insight the author stumbled upon Claude 
E. Welch Jr.’s Anatomy of a Rebellion, which provided a suitable framework.2 
Welch’s model mines the physical, economic, and social setting of a series of revolts for 
indicators of popular political violence.  These indicators included physical setting, the social 
and cultural bases for political action, situational conditions, and actions taken by the dominant 
or ruling authorities which might have had influences on the likelihood of rebellion – for 
example: the imposition of a minority or alien rule over an indigenous people.   
                                                 
2 Claude E. Welch, Jr., Anatomy of a Rebellion, (Albany: State University Press of New York, 1980), 1.  Welch 
analyzes the Taiping Rebellion in China (1850-1964), the Telengana Rebellion in India (1946-1951), the Mau Mau 
Rebellion in Kenya (1952-1956) and the Kwilu Rebellion in Zaire (1963-1965). 
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Physical settings conducive to unrest, rebellion and even revolution include remoteness 
from central power, a borderland situation, the nature of “frontier” societies, the impact that 
repeated natural disasters can have on popular perception of government, and changes in 
agricultural systems.  Authorities find it difficult to control geographically marginal areas.  The 
primary reason for this is often the physical distance, difficulty or travel, or contested zones of 
control which limits the government’s ability to easily reach the people in question.  The limited 
interaction with the central authority often engenders a sense of separation. 
Borderlands prove problematic for the central authority because it is often not able to 
exert its full power there because of an unwillingness to risk conflict with a neighbor state. 
Traits useful to coping with the isolation of frontier life also are likely to foster a sense of 
autonomy, if not hostility to the central authority.  Members of the rural frontier are often 
independent, mobile, resistant to outside influence, and prize self sufficiency.  The result of these 
factors is an area of weak and confused government, conditions that are favorable to the 
fomenting of dissent. 
Experiencing repeated natural disasters that cause repeated large scale losses of life and 
property make populations more prone to rebellion, according to Welch.  Disasters, like any 
other crisis situation, stress the resources available, exacerbating existing tensions and creating 
new ones.  These disasters, when repeated often enough, can encourage a kind of “millenarian 
thinking” – the expectations of large scale, wide spread change, which can broaden the view of 
the populace to accept other radical changes.3    Another large problem with disaster prone areas, 
perhaps one even larger than the strained resources, is that they highlight inefficiencies in the 
government and create the perception of a lack of support for the population.  The government 
                                                 
3 Ibid., 26. 
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often either becomes a scapegoat or is shown in the worst possible light.  This is greatly 
compounded when combined with changes in social values and commerce.4 
Another potential precondition for rebellion in pre-modern societies, especially in 
geographically marginal areas, according to Welch, are changes in their agricultural bases He 
identified land scarcity, inequitable land ownership, and disruptions in social structures caused 
by a change away from subsistence farming to a commercial model as potential sources of 
unrest.  Too, social problems, including organized unrest, also have a tendency to occur when 
population growth outpaces agricultural development.5 
The social and cultural bases for political action and the situational conditions that foster 
discontent and rebellion are complex. Some have already been indicated under the heading of 
geographical marginality. Others arise from the conditions needed for collective action. 
Individual complaints, however valid they may be, Welch contends, are not an adequate 
basis for collective action.  The reasoning behind this seems obvious, if not semantic; individual 
action is individual and by definition collective action requires a group.  In order to successfully 
launch a campaign of collective action, the complaints of inequity or inequality of the individual 
must be generalized and applied to a group.  Often some piece of the existing social structure can 
be used as a means for this generalization.  Welch describes four major means of group self 
ascription, or the establishing of a communal identity, that he found in his studies.  The first is 
through ascribing cultural ties based on ethnicity or language.  Religious beliefs and 
millenarianism are also means for linking individuals.  Economic ties between members of the 
rural poor can also foster solidarity through class awareness and action.  Finally political 
                                                 
4 Ibid., 26-27; Guy Fourquin, The Anatomy of Popular Rebellion in the Middle Ages, (Amsterdam: North 
Holland Publishing Company, 1978), 130. 
5 Welch, 27. 
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boundaries can provide unity at the same time that they set the scope of the action.  Distance 
between individuals can limit the ability of the discontented to act collectively, while at the same 
time strengthening bonds amongst those within close reach of each other.6 
Both discontented agitators and ineffective action by the incumbent governors will have a 
hand in the politicization of discontent.  The most common factor in rebellion, Welch asserts, is 
the perception of relative deprivation - a view the rebels have that they are being denied basic 
rights and/or opportunities that they are entitled to.  Perceived weakness or ineffectual use of 
force by the incumbents can be another force pushing discontented subjects toward 
politicization.  A strong indigenous leadership and strong organization on the side of the 
discontented are both contributing factors as well.  One final major consideration that Welch 
takes account of is the inclusion of justifications for mobilization in the belief structure of the 
indigenous populace.  Such a structure makes political action far likelier.7 
Welch’s model for politicization of discontent loosely follows the following formula.  
Discontent gives rise to a sense of relative deprivation in members of rural communities.  Self 
ascription of like traits begins to allow those discontented to consider themselves part of a larger 
group, or deprived class.  Members of the now more consolidated disaffected groups begin to 
seek meaningful reform to the sources of discontent.  The incumbent government reacts to the 
requests for reform in a way that exacerbates the discontent of the groups – often through 
unnecessary or ineffective force.  The groups then seek an ideological foundation of generalized 
beliefs for their movement, using them to both define their movement and to outline their plan 
for a better society.8 
                                                 
6 Welch, 36. 
7 Ibid., 123-124. 
8 Ibid., 124-125. 
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Because one of the key differences between rebellion and revolution is success, the 
actions of the rulers in attempting to prevent or quiet unrest are also critical. Welch cites four 
maxims for the successful leader to live by.  Firstly, the leader must keep the population from 
gaining political savvy, and keep members of the populace divided.  At the same time the impact 
of the government must be felt as little as possible so as to not give cause to uprising; minimal 
government involvement also lessens the expectations of the people toward the government.  
This maxim is supported by the frequently observed links between rebellion and the imposition 
of new or raised taxes.  The second maxim states that the leader must maintain a system of 
values justifying the stratification of power, and inculcate those values in the populace.  The 
third maxim states the need for the leader to create a means for the indigenous people – in the 
case of empires – to be incorporated into the system.  In doing so the system becomes 
legitimized to the social structure through those who enter into it.  Finally, the leader must be 
able to employ coercion successfully.  However the maxim also cautions that a leader should not 
overuse political and physical force.  Doing so strains relations with the locals and risks exposing 
the minority rulers to a larger force than can be controlled.9 
Ultimately collective political violence is a result of bad governance.  The ignoring or 
misreading of discontent sets the stage for the growth and development of that discontent into 
political action.  What keeps that political action from becoming revolution instead of rebellion?  
Welch suggests four major conditions that need to be met for a revolution.  There needs to be a 
clear social polarization.  The government needs to be inept to a certain degree in recognizing 
and responding to the needs of the populace as well as inept in its ability to control the political 
action.  The insurrection needs to come from a combination of urban and rural dissatisfaction, 
                                                 
9 Ibid., 79-81, 86, 89. 
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and reach across both sections of the society.  Finally the goals of the political action need to be 
incompatible with the existing legal and political means to meet them. Without these conditions 
the collective political action is not likely to evolve into a large scale, radical, lasting change.10 
A factor that Welch overlooks but that is important for understanding the events of 1768 
and the 1790s in Spanish Louisiana is the personalities of the Spanish governors..  His new 
subjects perceived the very first governor of Spanish Louisiana, Antonio de Ulloa, as aloof and 
uninterested in their welfare.  After Ulloa’s failure to control the colony, Alejandro O’Reilly was 
sent by Spain to restore Spanish control.  O’Reilly was forceful but also engaged with the local 
population. His changes in policies and reshaping of colonial law changed and set the colony’s 
Francophone population’s perception of the Spaniards for some time.  Baron Francisco Luis 
Hector De Carondelet, the seventh Spanish governor of the colony, who administered Louisiana 
during the unrest of the 1790’s presented his subjects with a mixture of the traits of Ulloa and 
O’Reilly as well as what seems at this remove to have been a touch of paranoia about the 
revolutionary potential of the population during the most radical phase of the French Revolution 
of 1789-1814. The importance of the personalities of these men will become evident in the 
discussion that follows. 
The thesis is divided into three chapters bracketed by this introduction, which includes a 
brief historiography of topics related to unrest in Spanish Louisiana, and a conclusion.  The first 
chapter is a recounting of the revolt of 1768.  Emphasis is placed on the geographical, social and 
economic strains that sat at the core of the colonists’ discontents.  Care is also taken to study the 
motives, resources and ideologies of the more important of the principal plotters in the Superior 
Council.  Ultimately Governor Ulloa’s failure to hold the colony represents a strong example of 
                                                 
10 Ibid., 314-315, 328-329, 333 -334. 
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poor colonial governance.  Governmental policy that either encouraged discontent or acted to 
pacify the revolt is presented.  Finally, the days of “rebel rule” are studied with an eye toward 
efforts made by the interim regime to ease discontent, it’s implementation of ideology and 
attempts it made to satisfy promises made by the coup leaders. 
 The return of Spanish order signaled by the arrival of Lieutenant General Alejandro 
O’Reilly is the subject of the second chapter.  O’Reilly’s return was met with little resistance and 
the restoration of Spanish rule occurred with almost no bloodshed.  What violence did occur was 
almost entirely the result of orderly trials, and despite the appellation “Bloody O’Reilly”, only 
six lives were taken.  Chapter three is mostly a study of effective means of counter-rebellion as 
practiced by the Lieutenant General.  The measures introduced by O’Reilly to restore order, as 
well as their effectiveness is presented and compared against Welch’s model as a means to 
contrast them with to those employed by Governor Ulloa, and compare them with the more 
successful policies of Carondelet. 
 The third chapter of this thesis is an exploration of the turmoil that gripped Louisiana 
under the administration of Baron Carondelet.  A number of important local and international 
events occurred during Carondelet’s time as governor.  These events, such as the French 
Revolution and subsequent slave revolt in St. Domingue (Haiti), as well as speculators and 
adventurers movements to expand outside of the United States’ borders, serve to show the 
international scope of problems that gripped the colony as well as the fluidity of the region’s 
many borders.  Local issues such as inhospitable terrain, ethnic tensions, lack of specie and 
natural disaster are also treated, as they were in chapter two.  Baron Carondelet’s effectiveness in 
maintaining order in these circumstances is also explored with emphasis on the social and 
political efforts of the Baron. 
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 The conclusion is a comparison of those factors summarized in the previous three 
chapters.  It follows the order of Welch’s criteria for rebellion.  Thus, the conclusion considers 
the physical setting for the rebellions, the bases for collective political action and the steps taken 
to politicize the residents’ discontents.  Incumbent responses as well as an analysis of the rebel 
leadership are presented.  Following that is a summary comparison of the incumbent powers’ 
steps to pacify the subjects. 
There are a number of documentary collections that serve as great resources for 
transcribed letters.  Principle among these is the Annual Report of the American Historical 
Association for the year 1945 in Four Volumes: Spain in the Mississippi Valley, 1765-1794, 
edited by Lawrence Kinnaird.  Kinnaird’s four volume series of translated materials covers a 
wide range of subjects and chronology.  Kinnaird adds insightful introductions to each part and 
the translations themselves contain a reasonable amount of annotation through judicious 
footnotes.  Of particular use to this study were Part I, The Revolutionary Period, 1765-1781, and 
Part III, Problems of Frontier Defense, 1792-1794.  Louis Houck’s two volumes of The Spanish 
Regime in Missouri: A collection of papers and documents relating to upper Louisiana 
principally within the present limits of Missouri during the dominion of Spain, from the Archives 
of the Indies at Seville, etc., translated from the original Spanish into English, and including also 
some papers concerning the supposed grant to Col. George Morgan at the mouth of the Ohio, 
found in the Congressional Library, carries on in a vein similar to Kinnaird’s work, though 
smaller in scope. Other lengthy translations are presented in journal publications, most notably 
issues of the Louisiana Historical Quarterly published by the  Louisiana Historical Society, and 
bound essay collections like John Francis McDermott’s The Spanish in the Mississippi Valley, 
1762-1804. 
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Perhaps the best collection of essays and articles on colonial Louisiana can be found in 
The Louisiana Purchase Bicentennial Series in Louisiana History Volume I, The French 
Experience in Louisiana, edited by Glenn R. Conrad and Volume II, The Spanish Presence in 
Louisiana, edited by Gilbert C. Din.  These essays, taken from a variety of authors, are arranged 
by theme and create a kind of patchwork map to social, economic and political development 
throughout the colonial period. 
This thesis was greatly informed by works of Carl Brasseaux.  Particularly useful were 
his works on the Acadian experience in Louisiana.  Brasseaux’s French, Cajun, Creole, Houma: 
A Primer on Francophone Louisiana, and his The Founding of New Acadia: The Beginnings of 
Acadian Life in Louisiana, 1765-1803 were useful in delineating the differences among the 
unique groups of French-speaking colonists that lived in Louisiana during the Spanish regime.  
The Founding of New Acadia was also useful because of its thoughtful examination of the 
relationship between the Acadians and the French Creoles of the colony, and how each group 
related to the Spanish administration.  Together these works greatly expand the dualistic view of 
Franco-Spanish relations. 
Many early histories, like Charles Gayarré’s History of Louisiana, take a “soup to nuts” 
approach to the history of Louisiana (at least after European settlement).  They begin with the 
French settlement of the territory and progress through early statehood.  This approach lends 
them a “long view” approach which helps contextualize the independent chapters of the state’s 
history in terms of a greater narrative – often told in the progressive terms of advanced reform 
lifting the territory out of a relative social and economic morass.  These earlier histories also tend 
to contain much transcribed and translated material from the French and Spanish archives, 
respectively. 
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With regard to the rebellion of 1768, the early historians of Spanish Louisiana fall into 
one of two camps.  The first set of historians wrote their works based primarily on French 
sources.  Historiography in this camp is usually biased toward the French Creoles and critical of 
the Spaniards.  Such histories as Alcée Fortier’s A History of Louisiana and François Xavier 
Martin’s The History of Louisiana, From the Earliest Period treat the French and Creole subjects 
as martyr heroes.  They also typically demonize the Spaniards – particularly those in command 
of the colony during the periods of French unrest, in often striking, if not purple, prose such as 
Fortier’s description of Lieutenant General Alejandro O’Reilly as “lack[ing] tact,…[and] act[ing] 
with unpardonable duplicity and cruelty in 1769.”11  Later historians, focusing on the extensive 
Spanish records, were kinder to the first two Spanish administrations.  Perhaps the most notable 
of these scholars was Charles Gayarré, whose History of Louisiana presents the Spaniards as 
reformers bogged down by recalcitrant, prejudiced, and, perhaps most importantly, fiercely 
independent French colonists. 
On the whole the bias of these works is easy to work around; one has to look for the 
obvious vituperations and take characterizations with due consideration of the source.  If the 
biases can be looked past, these sources provide a wealth of factual information, and were 
written with a definite sense of closeness to the events described – as in some cases the authors 
(e.g. Martin) are only a generation or two removed. 
Brasseaux’s works are the most in-depth source to date for study of the life of one of the 
principle conspirators in the 1768 revolt: Denis-Nicolas Foucault.  Brasseaux’s contribution to 
the first volume of the The Louisiana Purchase Bicentennial Series in Louisiana History, “Plus 
ça change: Acte Second” briefly explores struggles for status between Foucault and the French 
                                                 
11 Alcée Fortier, A History of Louisiana Vol. II: The Spanish Domination and the Cession to the United States, 
1769-1803, (New York: Manzi, Joyant & Co., 1904), 10. 
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governor Charles Philippe Aubry, which Braseaux argues were contributing factors to Foucault’s 
participation in the 1768 revolt.  Much more detail is given on Foucault’s role before and during 
the rebellion in Brasseaux’s Denis-Nicolas Foucault and the New Orleans Rebellion of 1768.   
Shannon Lee Dawdy presents a nuanced look at the city of New Orleans under the 
French colonial system in Building the Devil’s Empire: French Colonial New Orleans.  It is 
invaluable for understanding the city as it was inherited by the Spaniards.  Her emphasis on how 
the lax control of the French crown led to a alternate authority developing in New Orleans 
amongst the city’s elite, and how the city drifted toward ever more violent methods of conflict 
resolution reinforces notions of how dangerous Governor Ulloa’s reluctance to completely 
establish Spanish authority upon arrival was.  Building the Devil’s Empire also contains, as a 
final chapter, an analysis of the revolt of 1768.  Dawdy’s analysis places emphasis on the 
enlightenment, a developed aversion to regulation on the part of the creole oligarchy and the 
influence of “rogue agents” in the making of the revolution.12  Dawdy seems to show a slight 
sympathy toward the French “martyrs”, and echoes sentiments more strongly voiced by Arthur 
Preston Whitaker in The Spanish-American Frontier: 1783‑1795 that the Spanish regime was 
doomed to fail in Louisiana due to the impossibility of projecting a strong authoritarian 
monarchy across the Atlantic. 
James E. Winston’s “The Cause and Results of the Revolution of 1768 in Louisiana”, 
published in The Louisiana Historical Quarterly, (1932) presents a view on the revolt with more 
emphasis on economic factors and the ambition of the members of the Superior Council coup.  
The most in-depth study of the October rebellion remains John Preston Moore’s Revolt in 
Louisiana: the Spanish occupation, 1766-1770.  Moore’s balanced approach to French and 
                                                 
12 Shannon Lee Dawdy, Building the Devil’s Empire: French Colonial New Orleans, (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2008), 220. 
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Spanish sources and careful scrutiny for bias produced an unbiased detailed recounting of the 
conditions of the colony that contributed to the revolt, and the Spanish reaction to the revolt.  
Moore’s account stands as one of the major sources for this thesis.  Reinhart Kondert examines 
the German settlers’ involvement in the revolt in “The German Involvement in the Rebellion of 
1768”, published in Louisiana History (1985).  Similarly the role of the Acadians is explored by R. 
E. Chandler in “Ulloa and the Acadians”, Louisiana History (1980).  Ulloa’s own account of the 
revolt was translated by R. E. Chandler and presented with an introduction and annotations in 
Louisiana History (1986). 
Hilda S. Krousel’s biography of Governor Antonio de Ulloa y de la Torre-Guiral, 
appropriately entitled Don Antonio De Ulloa: First Spanish Governor to Louisiana, was a useful 
introduction to the governor, his achievements and aspects of his personality that both aided and 
hindered his effectiveness in Louisiana.  Krousel’s biography served both to update and expound 
upon information presented by John Preston Moore, and Arthur P. Whitaker in their biographical 
articles on Ulloa – presented in The Hispanic American Historical Review (1935), and Louisiana 
History, (1967), respectively. 
Similarly David Ker Texada’s Alejandro O'Reilly and the New Orleans Rebels serves as 
an excellent resource for the restoration of Spanish rule and trial of the Superior Council 
members who rebelled.  Texada outlines O’Reilly’s overwhelming force as well as his cagey 
nature and unwillingness to use that force when it was not necessary.  Details of the trial and 
colonial reorganization were also recorded in the letter O’Reilly sent to Count Arriaga, translated 
by R. E. Chandler in , “O'Reilly and the Rebels: Report to Arriaga”, Louisiana History (1982). 
Alejandro O’Reilly introduced Louisiana to the Spanish system of local governance, the 
cabildo system.  The history and significance of that institution is the subject of Gilbert C. Din 
14 
 
and John E. Harkins’ New Orleans Cabildo: Colonial Louisiana's First City Government, 1769–
1803.  Their treatment of the cabildo reveals the role the institution played in bringing the colony 
closer to the Spanish legal and cultural systems through reform of government functions, legal 
systems, economy, trade and the slave system.  It serves as an excellent exploration of how those 
changes impacted the colony and had a lasting effect on the development of institutions native to 
Louisiana. 
Din’s article “Carondelet, the Cabildo, and Slaves: Louisiana in 1795”, published in 
Louisiana History (1997) examines the use of slave reform as a method of keeping the slave 
population pacified, including disagreement over the same between Baron Carondelet and the 
important planter members of the cabildo.  
Race and the slave system in Spanish Louisiana is a focus of another of Din’s books: 
Spaniards, Planters and Slaves: The Spanish regulation of Slavery in Louisiana, 1763-1803.  
Spaniards, Planters and Slaves treats the divisions among white colonists over how to handle 
slaves, with respect to the French system of harsh treatment and the Spanish system which was 
relatively more lax.  Among other things Din’s work is useful for its keen insights into the 
interplay between the planter’s position of ultimate authority on the plantation and his position as 
subordinate to colonial authority – particularly how those two positions occasionally conflicted.  
It also treats the divisions among and between slaves and free people of color in Louisiana.  In 
this respect, and with regard to the Spanish attitudes and policies toward slavery, the work is 
thought to be somewhat more nuanced than another recent treatment of slaves in Louisiana - 
Gwendolyn Hall’s Africans in Colonial Louisiana: The Development of Afro-Creole Culture in 
the Eighteenth Century. However Halls’s coverage of the Point Coupee rebellions (1793,1795) is 
quite useful.  Printed only in  Spanish, Juan José Andreu Ocariz’ Movimientos rebeldes de los 
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esclavos negros durante el dominio español en Luisiana is another well thought of, though 
remarkably hard to find, source for information on rebellious slaves and maroonage in the 
colony. 
There are a couple of works that deal with rebellion and control directly, usually as it 
applies to native or slave populations.  Choice, Persuasion and Coercion: Social Control on 
Spain’s North American Frontier, edited by Jesús F. de la Teja and Ross Frank, delivers a series 
of essays which deal with various aspects of social control in the New World.  The touchy 
relationship between Spaniard and French Creoles is discussed, as are slave relations.  A good 
number of the essays deal with issues of controlling native tribes.  For Native American relations 
there are a number of other works available.  Indians, Settlers, & Slaves in a Frontier Exchange 
Economy: the Lower Mississippi Valley Before 1783, by Daniel H. Usner, Jr., is a valuable look 
at cultural, social and economic exchange between groups often thought of in adversarial terms, 
but mostly covers the years before 1768. 
There are surprisingly few studies dedicated solely to the impact of the French 
Revolution in colonial Louisiana, though the subject is quite frequently mentioned in histories of 
Louisiana and the Spanish colonial efforts in America.  This is particularly true regarding the 
series of small revolts that occurred in New Orleans and the rural countryside of the colony.  The 
most complete single study to date remains Ernst Liljegren’s “Jacobinism in Spanish Louisana, 
1792-1797”, published in The Louisiana Historical Quarterly, (1939).  Carondelet’s 
administration as a whole is the subject of Thomas Marc Fiehrer’s Ph.D. dissertation from 
Tulane: "The  Baron  of  Carondelet  as  Agent  of  Bourbon  Reform:  A  Study  of  Spanish  
Colonial  Administration  in  the  Years  of  the  French Revolution," (1977).   
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A major exception to this lack of dedicated coverage would be the Point Coupee slave 
revolt which receives periodic attention.  In addition to the following books below, which treat 
the slave revolt in more depth, an updated interpretation of Carondelet’s relationship to the revolt 
can be found in Gilbert C. Din’s “Carondelet, the Cabildo, and Slaves: Louisiana in 1795”, 
published in Louisiana History: (1997). 
The impact of the Haitian revolution on African slaves is the subject of Revolution, 
Romanticism, and the Afro-Creole Protest Tradition in Louisiana 1718-1868, by Caryn Cossé 
Bell.  The first few chapters deal with the French and Spanish regimes in Louisiana, though the 
work has been criticized for over emphasizing the role that religion played in regulating slave 
masters as well as the role of free people of color in New Orleans as a supporting element of the 
Spanish administrations.  A far broader treatment of the impact of the Haitian revolt on slaves in 
America, is David Barry Gaspar and David Patrick Geggus’ A Turbulent Time: The French 
Revolution and the Greater Caribbean.  The treatment Louisiana receives highlights the split 
nature of both white and slave society, and the two-way nature of (actual and rumored) slave 
reform as influence on slave revolt, as well as the impact slave revolts had on slave reform in the 
colony. 
 In Gwendolyn Midlo Hall’s Africans in Colonial Louisiana: The Development of Afro-
Creole Culture in the Eighteenth Century, she places a great deal of influence on the French 
Revolution as a contributing factor in slave revolts.  Hall goes so far as to place the 1795 slave 
revolt as a vanguard action for the invasion of Spanish Louisiana.  She also asserts that there 
were abolitionist Spanish soldiers who were sympathetic to the African slaves.13  Gilbert C. Din, 
in Spaniards, Planters and Slaves: The Spanish regulation of Slavery in Louisiana, 1763-1803, 
                                                 
13 Gwendolyn Midlo Hall, Africans in Colonial Louisiana: The Development of Afro-Creole Culture in the 
Eighteenth Century, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1992), 372-374. 
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challenges Hall’s conclusions on these points.  Din argues that there is little evidence to support 
either the slave revolts as part of a French invasion, or the notion that there was much of an 
abolitionist movement in Louisiana at the time.14 
The Many-Headed Hydra: Sailors, Slaves, Commoners, and the Hidden History of the 
Revolutionary Atlantic, by Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker, displays the radicalizing and 
liberalizing influence found in many of the circumstances that accompanied colonial life.  The 
distance from European power centers allowed “discreetly free” trade and encouraged cultural 
exchange to the detriment of proto-national hegemony.  The rise of capitalism disrupted 
traditional social structures, and created an economic discontent which helped fuel the push for 
natural rights associated with the Enlightenment.  Linebaugh and Rediker discuss in detail how 
trade routes acted as avenues for the dissemination of revolutionary sentiment – thus allowing a 
traceable “vector” for the spread of revolutionary zeal from France and Haiti. 
Colonial Louisiana was almost never profitable for the major powers that she served.  
The economics of the colony under the Spaniards, as well as the role that economics played in 
the colonial development under the French and Spanish is covered to great depth, and with great 
sensitivity in John G. Clark’s New Orleans, 1718-1812: An Economic History.  Noted Louisiana 
historian Jack D. L. Holmes covers some of the same ground in his study of the colonial 
economy during the Spanish period “Some Economic Problems of Spanish Governors of 
Louisiana” published in The Hispanic American Historical Review, (1962).  Ralph Lee 
Woodward, Jr. takes another approach to the colonial economy with his more recent look in 
“Spanish Commercial Policy in Louisiana, 1763-1803” published in Louisiana History (2003). 
                                                 
14 Gilbert C. Din, Spaniards, Planters and Slaves: The Spanish Regulation of Slavery in Louisiana, 1763-1803, 
(College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1999), 175-176. 
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The two most recent movements to shape the study of Spanish colonial Louisiana are 
borderlands studies and Atlantic studies.  A series of impressive works have come out of both 
areas of study recently, which improve upon the early models of understanding the relationship 
between Spain, Britain and US in America.  The borderland studies should be understood in part 
as reactions to frontier studies that came before them.  Arthur Preston Whitaker’s early work 
dealing with the border, The Spanish-American Frontier, 1783‑1795: The Westward Movement 
and the Spanish Retreat in the Mississippi Valley, has an unapologetically American-“Frontier 
Thesis”-inspired view of the relationship between Spain and America across the shared border.  
To Whitaker the Spanish model of colonialism was doomed, as the British model had been for 
the thirteen colonies.  With John Francis Bannon’s The Spanish Borderlands Frontier 1523-1821 
the nature of the relationship between Spain and the US is presented very differently.  Bannon 
deals with the Spanish advance across America in terms of malleable and porous borders, open 
to cultural exchange and adaptation – not hard frontiers which pitted closed “state-systems” in 
competition for space.  More recent treatments of the same subject include David Weber’s work, 
The Spanish Frontier in North America.  Weber uses the idea of frontier exchange to explore the 
myriad of views and influences that shaped the Spanish colonial holdings in North America, and 
which continue to influence America in those regions.  Most recently, J. C. A. Stagg’s 
Borderlines in Borderlands: James Madison and the Spanish-American Frontier, 1766-1821 
takes a more diplomatically and politically informed approach to the borderlands.  Stagg reveals 
how policy at national and local levels played a role in the eventual US ascendancy over Spain in 
North America.   
The Atlantic Studies movement is important to re-contextualizing the American 
experience as one wholly related to events in Europe and the Caribbean.  There are a number of 
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great recent works that have come out of the Atlantic movement recently.  J. H. Elliott just 
released a new synthesis text on the competition between the Spanish and English empires in the 
New World.  Empires of the Atlantic World: Britain and Spain in America, 1492-1830 is a 
wonderful overview of the tensions, contrasts and similarities between the two Atlantic super 
powers of the eighteenth-century that somewhat blurs the lines between borderland history and 
Atlantic history.  Andrew McMichael’s Atlantic Loyalties: Americans in Spanish West Florida, 
1785-1810, outlines exactly the kind of trans-Atlantic trade and influence that helped shape 
reality in the Spanish American colonies.  The Many-Headed Hydra: Sailors, Slaves, 
Commoners, and the Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic, by Peter Linebaugh and 
Marcus Rediker, explores merchant routes as avenues for cultural exchange and the spread of 
revolutionary sentiment across the Atlantic. 
Theory, and modeling borrowed from the discipline of political science played an 
important role in the creation of this thesis.  A few texts stand out as particularly useful. Claude 
E. Welch Jr.’s Anatomy of a Rebellion was an incredible resource for this thesis and informs both 
the questions it asks and to a lesser degree its structure.  Welch’s methodology and conclusions 
will be examined in chapter one.  The works of Charles Tilly, particularly The Politics of 
Collective Violence, and The Dynamics of Contention, co-written with Doug McAdam and 
Sidney Tarrow, help to define political science terminology and present both abstract theories of 
violence and classification systems useful for categorizing societies and societal change.  George 
Rudé’s Ideology and Popular Protest helped delineate the role and place of ideology in 
rebellion.  Guy Fourquin’s The Anatomy of Popular Rebellion in the Middle Ages provided a 
series of medieval examples of rebellion, useful for seeking out long established European trends 
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in the Louisiana revolts.  The author of this thesis found Michael Mollat and Philippe Wolff’s 
The Popular Revolutions of the Late Middle Ages to be useful for much the same reasons. 
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CHAPTER I 
ULLOA AND THE LOSS OF SPANISH CONTROL 
In late October of 1768, a small cabal of prominent Louisianans led a coup against the 
incumbent government and ousted the Spanish governor, Antonio de Ulloa y de la Torre-Guiral.  
These men, many of whom were members of the Superior Council, which acted as the main 
legislative and administrative body in the colony, held positions of influence in the 
Spanish/French administration of the colony – though with time, and the advancement of 
Spanish interest in the colony that influence was likely to diminish.  The conspirators used their 
high position in colonial society to harness popular discontent with the Spanish regime and rally 
a combined group of French, Creole, Acadian and German militias to storm the colonial capital 
of New Orleans.  The coup was bloodless, and Governor Ulloa fled New Orleans within three 
days of the gathering.  The Rebels’ goal was to then hold the colony under the administration of 
the Superior Council alone, until such a time as they could convince his most Christian Majesty, 
King Louis XV of France, to take control of the colony.  The methods the rebels used as well as 
the extent and underlying reasons for popular support of this rebellion present recurring themes, 
important throughout the Spanish experience in the Louisiana colony. 
Far from the centers of European power and control, colonial Louisiana, from its 
inception under French rule, proved itself a troublesome and “disorderly” place – particularly the 
city of New Orleans.15  The French government lacked a strong presence in the colony, due in 
large part to geographic factors such as distance, porous borders, and difficult travel.  This lack 
of control (and support) led to a large amount of independence for French Louisianans.16  When 
                                                 
15 For a discussion on how New Orleans in particular was viewed in tropes of “disorder” due largely to the 
failure of the colony to conform to the desires of the mother country, see: Dawdy, 28-31. 
16 Ibid., 196. 
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challenged by metropolitan authority, that independence would often lead the French settlers to 
rebellious action.  Often rebellion manifested itself as smuggling, however occasionally it did 
manifest as conflict.  Such was the case in 1760, when French commissaire-ordonnateur (the 
official in charge of finances in the colony) Vincent de Rochemore took retribution on Governor 
Louis Billouart de Kerlerec for the reform minded Governor’s having blocked a profiteering 
scam Rochemore was involved with.  Rochemere hampered Kerlerec by refusing the Governor 
needed funds (for paying soldiers, among other things), and refusing to follow the Governors’ 
orders regarding price fixing – thus sowing discontent and casting dispersion on the Governor’s 
effectiveness and authority.17  Rochemore also accused Kerlerec of “violations of the king’s 
orders”, by permitting smuggling, – a charge which led to a formal investigation of the Governor 
(which eventually found him innocent).18 
Likewise, during the rebellion of 1768, the geography, and geographic marginality, of 
Louisiana played a definite role in the ability of the rebel faction to organize without threat of 
discovery, and in forming their sense of collective self-ascription.  The geography also 
negatively impacted Governor Ulloa’s ability to maintain control.  The land of lower Louisiana 
was swampy, crossed with bayous, and could be difficult to traverse, lending slightly remote 
settlements an increased isolation and autonomy.19  The Mississippi river and its tributaries 
flowed through the colony, providing conduits of rapid transport down-river.  However transport 
                                                 
17 Carl A. Brasseaux, “Confusion, Conflict, and Currency: An Introduction to the Rebellion of 1768?”, 
Louisiana History 18, no. 2 (Spring, 1977): 161-162; Carl A. Brasseaux, Denis-Nicolas Foucalt and the New 
Orleans Rebellion of 1768, (Ruston, LA: McGinty Publicantions, 1987), 15-16. 
18 Walter G. Cowan & Jack B. McGuire, Louisiana Governors: Rulers, Rascals, and Reformers, (Jackson : 
University Press of Mississippi, 2008), 31-32. 
19 N. M. Miller Surrey, “The Development of Industries in Louisiana During the French Regime, 1673-1763” in 
The Louisiana Purchase Bicentennial Series in Louisiana History, Vol. I: The French Experience in Louisiana, ed. 
by Glenn R. Conrad, (Lafayette: USL Center for Louisiana Studies,1995), 539; Carl A. Brasseaux, The Founding of 
New Acadia: The Beginnings of Acadian Life in Louisiana, 1765-1803, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University 
Press, 1987), 110. 
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upriver was considerably slower and the center of Spanish control was in the southern tip of the 
colony.  Up or down river, the trip was fraught with danger from eddies, snags, submerged trees, 
and sand bars.20 Furthermore the relative size of the area he had to maintain was itself a problem.  
Ulloa simply did not have enough men to adequately project his influence too far from his 
location: be that New Orleans or the fort at Balize.  Governor Ulloa planned a defensive fort on 
an island, near Balize, at the mouth of the Mississippi river and at times he grew engrossed with 
the fort’s planning (as well as scientific experiments that he conducted there).21 
The geographic marginality of the Louisiana colony played a part in the Spanish regime’s 
susceptibility to revolt.  It should be noted however, that the members of the 1768 conspiracy 
met near New Orleans, either at the home of Denis-Nicolas Foucault, the French Commissaire-
ordonnateur and one of the principal plotters, or the house of Balthazar Masan, a retired captain 
of the French infantry.22  Upon occasion they met outside the city, but nearby, at the residence of 
Foucault’s neighbor, friend, and, for a time after the death of her husband the Chevalier Jean-
Baptiste de Pradel, his romantic interest, Mme. Alexandrine de Pradel.23  From these locations 
the rebels were certainly near enough to provide influence and affect change in the behaviors of 
the citizenry of New Orleans, which means that they were also near enough that they could not 
rely upon distance for their safety.  They could rely on secrecy, which the cabal maintained until 
days before they put the plot into action. 
                                                 
20 Surrey, 539. 
21 John Preston Moore, “Antonio de Ulloa: A Profile of the First Spanish Governor of Louisiana”, Louisiana 
History 8, no. 3 (Summer, 1967): 205-206. 
22 The role of Commissaire-ordonnateur was a kind of administrative head, commissary and treasurer of funds 
for the French colonial government. Brasseaux, Denis-Nicolas Foucault ,10. 
23 Charles Gayarré, History of Louisiana, Vol. II, (New York: William J. Widdleton, 1867), 187-188; John 
Preston Moore, Revolt in Louisiana: The Spanish Occupation, 1766-1770, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University 
Press, 1976), 146-147; Brasseaux, Denis-Nicolas Foucault , 28, 48. 
24 
 
The ease of access that Ulloa should have had to the major conspirators should not 
overshadow the role geographic marginality played as a precondition for the rebellion of 1768.  
Within the colony, the relative isolation of the German Coast and Acadian settlements reinforced 
their independence and self-ascription.  Indeed the distance at which Ulloa wished to settle 
Acadians from their “relations” at Point Coupee was a continuing source of friction between the 
Acadians and the Spanish regime.24  Such distance kept them from forming large communal ties.  
Governor Ulloa was conscious of this, and Carl A. Brasseaux suggests in The Founding of New 
Acadia: The Beginnings of Acadian Life in Louisiana, 1765-1803 that Ulloa wished to settle the 
Acadians at Natchez to prevent the formation of a large Francophile power bloc so close to the 
administrative center at New Orleans as well as for the defense they would provide against the 
British and native tribes.25   
Ulloa's opponents used another distance against him. Ulloa's seeming retreat to Balize 
was used to geographically inform and reinforce the already present perception of Spanish 
Castillian "snobbery".26  The plotters insinuated that Ulloa felt himself too good to mix with the 
French Creoles, and so had removed himself from their presence. 
Distance between settlements and terrain that impeded travel were not the only elements 
of the Louisiana geography contributing to the colony’s geographic marginality.  The wilderness 
of the colony was also dangerous.  Violent weather in the late summer could be devastating to 
crops, buildings, and colonists alike.  Disease outbreaks, particularly yellow fever, threatened the 
colonists yearly, and occasionally acted to prohibit travel and the visitation of relatives or 
                                                 
24 Brasseaux, The Founding of New Acadia, 73, 78, 80-81, 83, 86. 
25 Ibid., 73, 78, 80-81, 83, 86. 
26 Moore, Revolt in Louisiana, 70. 
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friends.27  Colonists also frequently felt themselves at risk of attack by wild animals, (at times) 
British raiders, or native tribes. This threat of attack constituted a much larger and seemingly real 
threat to settlers living too far apart to rely on each other for aid.  This self reliance, a necessity 
of isolation, contributed to the development of an independent spirit and indifference to Spanish 
authority. 
Louisiana was a borderland, and suffered the limitations on authority normally associated 
with them.  A number of factors contributed to this border-land status.  The British in West 
Florida constituted a national border with all of the legal vagaries and governmental niceties that 
one entailed.  Fear of British involvement did somewhat limit Ulloa’s range of action when 
dealing with smugglers, many of which were British.  On the other hand, the fear that his 
subjects might desert to the British forts across the Mississippi river was one of the reasons Ulloa 
was relatively reluctant to use force to establish his authority.  Throughout 1766 and 1768 
Governor Ulloa settled Acadian newcomers in strategic military locations to form a counter to 
the threat of possible British encroachment.28  That decision was wildly unpopular to the 
Acadians, who wished to settle near earlier Acadian settlements on the Acadian coast, Attakapas 
and Opelousas.  The New Orleans French were quick to play on that discontent and spread 
rumors of Governor Ulloa’s cruelty and barbarity.29  These rumors, such as Governor Ulloa’s 
intending to sell the Acadians into slavery, undermined the loyalty that Ulloa may have 
otherwise developed through his relatively generous support of the Acadian settlers by linking 
Spanish rule with unreasoning despotism.  Ulloa’s inability to enforce the settlement of Acadians 
into strategic positions provided a display of weakened strength that threatened his authority. 
                                                 
27 Charles Gayarré, History of Louisiana, Vol. II, (New York: William J. Widdleton, 1867), 133. 
28 Brasseaux, The Founding of New Acadia, 78-81, 83, 86. 
29 R. E. Chandler, “Ulloa and the Acadians”, Louisiana History 21, no. 1 (Winter, 1980): 88-90. 
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The Acadians were also less than pleased with the prospect of sharing borders with 
Spain’s other neighbors: tribes of Native Americans including the Natchez, Houma, Creek, 
Choctaw, Caddo, Osage, Tensas and Chickasaw.30  The Acadians and Native tribes had a 
troubled relationship from the start.  The Natives were fearful that they were going to be 
displaced by the new settlers both in terms of territory, and as allies of the Spaniards.  For their 
part, the Acadians Ulloa settled near the border feared that the Natives, encouraged by the 
British, would engage in raids on their farms and settlements.31  The Acadian settlements were 
far enough from Spanish forts that they had little hope of finding refuge there in the face of such 
an attack.   
The Acadians were not the only ones fearful of native raiding sorties. Governor Ulloa 
was convinced of the need to continue gift giving to the local native tribes to prevent them from 
allying with the British, though he wished to limit the drain such gifts placed on the colony’s 
treasury by limiting gift giving to prescribed special occasions.32  These gifts were an expensive 
drain on colonial resources that could have been used to shore up food supplies or assuage the 
hardships of the government or colonists in a myriad of other ways.  Occasionally Ulloa lost 
more than money.  Some settlers would periodically “go native”, and run off to spend time with 
local tribes.  Even if those colonists returned, they often did so with less appreciation for colonial 
authority and community norms.  In this way the borderlands shared with the native tribes acted 
                                                 
30 Brasseaux, The Founding of New Acadia, 78-79; Carl A. Brasseaux, French, Cajun, Creole, Houma: A 
Primer on Francophone Louisiana, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2005), 121-123. 
31 Brasseaux, The Founding of New Acadia, 181. 
32 F. Todd Smith, “A Native Response to the Transfer of Louisiana: The Red River Caddos and Spain, 1762-
1803”, Louisiana History 37, no. 2 (1996): 170-171; Daniel H. Usner, Jr., Indians, Settlers & Slaves in a Frontier 
Exchange Economy: The Lower Mississippi Valley Before 1783, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press,1990), 132. 
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as both an economic depressor, cultural dilutant and cause of anxiety.  All three of these sources 
of discontent played a role in colonial restlessness. 
However, the most important border to consider did not lie on any map.  The dual 
Spanish/French government presented a kind of internal borderland, especially in the colonial 
hinterlands beyond New Orleans.  The confusion of law, obligation, and loyalty that this created 
in the citizenry is a constantly recurring theme in many histories of this period and one of the 
leading contributing factors to the revolt.  Due in large part to the confusion generated by a 
government that had in effect two administrative heads, the citizens of Louisiana were not sure if 
the Spanish government had really taken control, and, if it had, whether the Spaniards would 
retain control for a long period of time.33  The reluctance Ulloa showed in replacing the French 
Superior Council with a Spanish administrative body further confused the issue, and gave the 
French creoles cause to hope for a return to French control. 
Perhaps the key concern for many of the French subjects of Spanish Louisiana was the 
colony’s economy.  Uncertainty in the new Spanish government and the tenacity with which 
some French creoles held on to the belief that France would retrocede the colony, led many 
French creoles to doubt the Spanish economic system and the colony’s place in it.34  This doubt 
compounded the fear many French creoles held that the new Spanish government would not be 
able to, or willing to, honor their depreciated paper currency.35  The net effect was that the 
citizens retained their attachments to France and the French system, while at the same time the 
                                                 
33 James E. Winston, “The Cause and Results of the Revolution of 1768 in Louisiana”, The Louisiana Historical 
Quarterly 15, no. 2 (April, 1932): 204-205. 
34 John G. Clark, New Orleans 1718-1812: An Economic History, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University 
Press, 1970), 160. 
35 Vera Lee Brown, “Spain in America, 1763-1770”, The Hispanic American Historical Review 5, no. 3 (Aug., 
1922): 346. 
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confusion of law allowed for a justification of illegal or quasi-legal activities.  As will be seen, 
this is particularly true for violation of unpopular trade restrictions that were eventually 
introduced by Ulloa’s new regime in an effort to stabilize the colonial economy, and bring her 
more fully into the Spanish mercantile system.36  Perhaps if Ulloa had been more direct, 
ostentatious, and immediate with displays of Spanish control, instead of relying on the former 
French governor Aubry’s aid, there would have been less “grey area” which allowed the 
rebellious subjects “room” to maneuver. 
But geographic marginality must not be thought of solely in “intra-colony” terms.  In the 
larger context, the distance of Louisiana from Spain and, perhaps even more importantly, Spain's 
closer and more established colonial holdings played a huge role not only in Ulloa's inability to 
support the colony, but also in his inability to control her.  The distance from New Orleans to 
Havana is nearly 700 miles, which meant that the flow of information and support both in terms 
of money and military assistance from Spain and Mexico (typically through Cuba) was slow and 
subject to dangerous storms.  The difficulty and risk involved in the long sea voyage had a 
chilling effect on Spanish support of the colony.  It was rendered less frequently than it perhaps 
could have been. Specie and money were slow to travel to the colony, leading to an increased 
feeling of marginality and weak Spanish authority; as well as allowing the already dismal 
economic situation to further decline into outright depression and inflation.  Frequently such 
support arrived much later than anticipated, leading Ulloa to begin asking for money with which 
to build a “buffer” against continued late arrivals.37  It was in part the distance of the colony and 
                                                 
36 Jack D.L. Holmes, “Some Economic Problems of Spanish Governors of Louisiana”, The Hispanic American 
Historical Review 42, no. 4 (Nov., 1962): 521-524. 
37 Governor Ulloa, “Ulloa to Buccareli, March 5, 1767, No. 15”, Translated and reprinted in Louisiana, Office 
of the Governor, Survey of Federal Archives in Louisiana, Despatches of the Spanish Governors of Louisiana 1766-
1792, (New Orleans:Survey of Federal Archives in Louisiana, 1937-1941) , 17. 
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danger in sailing to her that delayed the deployment of the Fixed Louisiana Battalion of troops 
for over two years thereby weakening the perceived strength of Spanish rule in French creole 
eyes. 
Changes in the social order and economy constitute an important component of the 
setting for rebellion.  The arrival of Ulloa heralded the possibility of dangerous changes for many 
of the French creoles.  On the economic front, established colonists were fearful that the 
devalued currency they held would not be honored by the Spaniards at face value.  Ulloa 
intended to allow the paper currency to be redeemed at a rate of sixty-five percent of its face 
value.  This was a better rate than the colonists had any right to expect.  The value of the notes 
were worth about twenty-five percent of par, and ultimately the rate that Ulloa offered was a 
better rate than the sixty percent that later Governor O’Reilly eventually established.  However 
many colonists, particularly those who had purchased notes on speculation that their value would 
increase, felt cheated by the rate and chose not to redeem.38  By failing to resolve the glut of 
devalued paper currency, Ulloa allowed the colony to remain mired in an economic depression.  
What little specie entered the colony hemorrhaged outward to satisfy debts to outsiders who were 
loathe to accept the nearly worthless paper notes.39  This depressed economy exacerbated other 
social problems, as well as created quite a bit of discontent in and of itself.  Another source of 
this exacerbation, particularly among the “better sort” in the colony, was the threat of social 
displacement by the Spaniards as well as the potential and real imposition of Spanish cultural 
norms to replace those of the French. 
                                                 
38 Clark, New Orleans 1718-1812, 160-161; Holmes, “Some Economic Problems”, 523. 
39 Ulloa, “Ulloa to Buccareli, February 2, 1768, No. 46”, Despatches, 52-53.  In this letter Ulloa calls for more 
specie to be shipped to the colony for, among other things, but listed first the payment of debts to foreign merchants. 
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Under the French regime, the merchants of New Orleans developed an alternate economy 
to the rigid mercantile system.  This alternate economy relied on smuggling and internal trade.40  
The alternate economy also relied on (and in turn fueled) the relative independence that 
Louisianans enjoyed.    The colony relied increasingly on such smuggling since the period 
shortly before the Seven Years War (1756-1763), after British privateers inflicted severe losses 
on the French merchant marine in 1755.  England’s decisive naval victory over France cut the 
colony off from French supply and all but ensured that New Orleans would not be able to receive 
necessary goods without resorting to illicit imports – often from British ships.41  In time such 
smuggling became so ingrained in the colonial system of French Louisiana that it is now hard to 
draw concrete distinctions between what was legal and illegal trade at the time.42  As the reality 
of Spanish control began to “sink in”, many colonists also feared that Spain would fold 
Louisiana into Spain’s established mercantile system, a move which would potentially damage 
Louisiana trade by cutting off traditional trade partners- the English, the French and the French 
Caribbean Islands.  With regard to imports, the English in particular were valuable trade partners 
for the colony, and supplied many colonial staples, the most important of which was flour.   
During the period of French rule, the merchants of New Orleans enjoyed trade with the 
American British colonies, the French island colonies and even the Spanish holdings in the 
Caribbean and South America.  The colony never prospered tremendously from the trade.  It was 
the case, as John G. Clark said that “Silver flowed through New Orleans, not to New Orleans.”43  
However that is not to say that the trade was not valued; one could go so far as to say that 
                                                 
40 Dawdy, 102-103, 115-117. 
41 Clark, New Orleans 1718-1812, 150-151. 
42 Dawdy, 115. 
43 Clark, New Orleans 1718-1812, 146. 
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external trade was necessary to the existence of the Louisiana colony.  New Orleans was a 
commercial center into which goods and trade flowed - not only locally, but along the rivers and 
native trails through the Mississippi valley, the Caribbean and Gulf Coast colonies, from Africa 
and Europe.44  This commercial shipping provided access to necessary goods and materials, as 
well as provided a livelihood for a merchant “class” of some power. 
Governor Ulloa’s attempts to eliminate, or at least reduce, smuggling brought trepidation 
to many local traders and merchants who relied on smugglers to receive and ship goods, 
including the British flour which was nearly always in short supply.45  In the 1763 Treaty of 
Paris, which ended the Seven Years War (French and Indian War), the British won navigation 
rights to the Mississippi river; however, they did not have rights to make landing on or utilize 
either bank of the river in Spanish territory.  Traditionally a “blind eye” was turned to British 
trade, as the goods offered were necessary to the success of the colony and generally unavailable 
from other sources.  By attempting to restrict that trade, and failing, Ulloa not only was seen as 
responsible for limiting the colonists’ access to necessary, and customary goods, he was shown 
to be incapable of enforcing the law – again revealing the limits of his authority.46  The 
importance of British trade increased dramatically in 1765 alongside the arrival of the 
Acadians.47  The need for food and other staples in short supply spiked just prior to the arrival of 
Governor Ulloa - at a moment when the colony was undergoing a period of significant change.48  
The shortages greatly aggravated the stresses produced by the change of colonial governments.  
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Governor Ulloa recognized the role that supply shortages and economic depression played in the 
willingness of “these people [to] start insurrections, even without any cause, as it has happened 
many times before.”49  But the colony drained resources faster than Spain would (or perhaps 
even could) supply them. 
In a letter to Spanish Foreign Minister Pablo Jerónimo de Grimaldi y Pallavicini, Marquis 
de Grimaldi, dated October 10, 1768, Governor Ulloa complained of British ships violating the 
terms of the 1763 Treaty of Paris by utilizing the Mississippi river banks.  In this letter Ulloa 
outlined his need to have had the Volante fire on British ships bringing “flour, meat, and other 
provisions for this city [New Orleans]”, which had tied up “on the opposite bank without first 
presenting permission in writing” from him.50  Contrary to popular fears, Ulloa did not object to 
the import of supplies that were direly needed out of malice or indifference.  In fact Ulloa 
complained frequently to his immediate superior, the Spanish Captain General of Cuba, Senõr 
Don Antonio Buccareli, of the impoverished conditions in the colony, and pleaded for money 
with which to rejuvenate the economy and improve the colonial infrastructure.51   Ulloa wished 
to inspect foreign vessels before granting them permission to dock so that he would be able to 
properly assess and collect taxes on imports, and make certain that the ships were not harboring 
deserters.  Nonetheless Ulloa’s slight restriction on British trade, trade which included valuable 
foodstuffs, angered and worried the merchants of New Orleans who both needed the food, and 
wished to keep prices as low as possible. 
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It is hard to overestimate the importance of such British trade and merchants to New 
Orleans, and the colony as a whole.  Louisianans consumed imported British foods like flour and 
pork, which supplemented their own home grown edibles.  These British imports also allowed 
planters and merchants to build a surplus of food with which to feed slaves and thus increase the 
means of production on the plantations.  Imported foodstuffs were also an important component 
of the colonial export economy.  Spanish merchants resold imported British food as an export to 
Spanish gulf colonies like Havana, and other Atlantic and Caribbean coastal colonies.  As a trade 
good, the exported food provided a means of communication and “brought with them credit, 
shipping, and contacts with New York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore.”52   
The British merchants did not limit their contribution to the economy of Louisiana to just 
food and staple goods.  British merchants also brought the first large shipments of slaves to New 
Orleans since 1743.  In doing so they were incredibly important to the plantations which relied 
on that slave labor.53   
John G. Clark argues that for these reasons, in the early years of the Spanish reign, this 
British trade made England far more important than France or even Spain to the growth and 
stability of the colony.54  This made the restriction (much less rejection) of British trade a 
dangerous and almost impossible position for Governor Ulloa to maintain.  Governor Ulloa was 
aware of this, and proceeded with caution and concern over the commercial well-being of his 
subjects as much as he could.  While cognizant of corruption and disapproving of smuggling, 
Ulloa moved slowly to reform.  But ultimately, Louisiana was a Spanish colony, and from the 
Spanish perspective needed to pay its way.  The colony would contribute to the wealth of the 
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Spanish empire by entering more fully into the mercantile system.  Given the importance of non-
Spanish trade to the colony, it is no surprise that citizens, particularly merchants and planters, 
were greatly concerned and discontented over what many believed to be inevitable and harmful 
Spanish trade restrictions. 
These economic concerns came to a head over the adoption of the Royal Decree of 
March 23, 1768, which while greatly liberalizing trade, also brought Louisiana more completely 
“in line” with the economic system of the Spaniards.55  The decree imposed seventeen 
regulations on trade in Louisiana.  As they are important to understanding the nature of the 
complaint that the citizens had against the Spanish government, they will be summarized 
individually here.  The first of these regulations limited trade in the colony to nine Spanish ports: 
Cadiz, Sevilla, Alicante, Cartagena, Málaga, Barcelona, Santander, Coruña, and Gijón (I).  
Certain taxes and duties were not levied on ships, however the shipping of foreign wine was 
prohibited (II).  Ships must be of Spanish construction and belong to Spaniards as well as have a 
crew consisting two-thirds of Spaniards, which Ulloa noticed caused considerable consternation 
even after he declared the citizens of Louisiana to be naturalized Spanish citizens, thus 
qualifying them (III).56  Ships sailing to Louisiana had to sail directly from the approved ports 
above to Louisiana with no prior stops in America or the adjacent islands, unless forced to stop 
due to weather or other uncontrollable circumstance (IV).  The administrators of the 
customhouses were to establish a record of items carried to Louisiana and their values (V).  No 
duty was to be collected on goods shipped to Louisiana, be they of foreign or Spanish origin 
(VI).  Goods shipped from the above mentioned ports must have been shipped into them, and 
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thus had their duties paid (VII).  Ship captains must keep sealed registers of goods loaded for 
shipment to Louisiana, and put forth a bond of ten percent of their value that they would ship the 
recorded goods to the colony (VIII).  If by accident a captain should need to arrive at another 
port en route to Louisiana, he might sell his goods there if necessary, provided he showed proof 
that he was forced to that port. He would forfeit the bond on his goods to fulfill export duties 
(IX).  Receipts must be tendered to the customhouse at departure, that the value of the bond 
might be cancelled (X).  Upon arrival to Louisiana, the captain must present the ship’s register to 
the minister of the royal treasury; who would then permit unloading of goods without import 
duty, or any other charge save anchorage in the river or other municipal duty (XI).  After 
unloading cargo, the minister of the treasury would present the captain with a receipt of goods 
(XII).  Goods taken on in Louisiana must originate from Louisiana (XIII).  A list of goods and 
money taken on in Louisiana must be presented to the minister of the royal treasury (XIV).  That 
same list must be presented to the customhouse of his next port in order that his bond for these 
goods might be cancelled (XV).  Goods taken from Louisiana must pay the four percent import 
duty (XVI).  And finally, if the goods shipped from Louisiana to the approved ports of Spain 
could not be sold at those ports, the captain might then take them freely to another country for 
sale without export duties (XVII).57 
Although through setting relatively minor taxation and import fees, and the increase of 
available Spanish ports, the Royal Decree of March 23, 1768 greatly improved the colony’s legal 
trade position, it was seen as repressive and a signal that the colony was subject to Spanish 
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“tyranny”.58  So much so, that the Superior Council cited fear of integration into the Spanish 
mercantile system as one of their primary concerns and a major cause of their actions to remove 
the Spanish authority during the coup of October 28th, 1768.  New Orleans relied on relatively 
free trade as its “greatest economic advantage”, and many merchants feared ruin would follow 
entry into the restrictive Spanish mercantile system.59  Nicolas-Chauvin Lafrénière, one of the 
principal leaders of the rebellion, couched his speech to the Superior Council in the terms of 
bringing to the (ostensibly French) citizens a “return of ancient liberties and rights”, specifically 
with regard to freedom of trade with traditional trade partners, which had been abrogated by the 
Spaniards.60  The text of the Superior Council’s justification of the revolt leaves little doubt that 
economics were a major factor.   
The council justified the rebellion with a list of concerns over the new regulations and 
infringements that they felt they had to redress.  Many of these concerns relate directly to the 
constraints on trade outlined in the Royal Decree of March 23, 1768.  The council listed as the 
first of the issues they wished to bring before French court the restoration of the commercial 
liberties enjoyed by the colony since the cession without the introduction of “innovations” which 
might “interrupt their course and disturb the security of the citizens.”61  The second request the 
council made was that passports be granted to captains travelling to France or America.  The 
council requested that all ships sailing from any port in France or America be given free 
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entrance, regardless of whether or not they sailed directly into the colony, or came from another 
port.  The fourth request was that freedom of trade be extended to all nations “under the 
government of his most Christian Majesty.”62  These requests show that the Superior Council, 
and ostensibly the more influential colonists (merchants and large planters) who would have 
been able to have made their opinions felt by the council, desired a return to the less restrictive 
“laissez-faire” trade, as it was carried out under the last years of the French regime.  The 
increased discontent caused by the removal of this free trade was a motivating factor in the 
decision made to move toward rebellion. 
The fifth point of the Superior Council’s Decree was a general airing of grievances 
against Governor Ulloa.  The overall theme to these grievances is that Governor Ulloa acted 
without legitimate authority in the colony.  In the eyes of the Superior Council, the last legitimate 
laws were those in place under French Governor Jean-Jacques Blaise D’Abbadie.63  With regard 
to trade, the Superior Council specifically charged that Ulloa, “of his own accord, by his own 
private authority, insisted upon captains being detained with their ships in the port without any 
cause”.64  Those charges generally support the theory that confusion over the legitimacy of 
Spanish rule played a large role in the ideology of the revolt.   
The sixth and final request made by the council was that all Spanish officials and soldiers 
be ordered to quit their posts and leave the colony, and that copies of the decree to that effect be 
printed and disbursed to the various posts of the colony.65 
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There were three large groups of colonists that comprised the bulk of the rioters who 
participated in the rebellion, and provided the force which convinced Governors Ulloa and 
Aubry that it was not safe for Ulloa to remain: French creoles from New Orleans, colonists from 
the German Coast and disgruntled Acadian immigrants.  The members of these groups had 
legitimate cause for discontent with the Spanish regime, however as will be seen, without the 
manipulation of members of the conspiracy the Germans and Acadians would probably not have 
marched on New Orleans.  The interests of those communities and how they were manipulated 
into action by members of the conspiracy are important points to consider when examining the 
rebellion.  Recurring themes of discontent, both those which occurred “organically” and those 
manufactured by agents of the conspiracy, need to be identified should they be useful in 
revealing a correlation, or continuity of perceived discontent tying the 1768 rebellion with the 
discontent of the 1790’s. 
Although the controls of the Spanish commercial system would ultimately benefit the 
German Coast residents, the trade restrictions imposed by Governor Ulloa also had an immediate 
negative impact on the perceived financial security of the Louisianans of the German Coast.  The 
German Coast settlers had come to count on the export of indigo, tobacco, cotton and cypress 
timber to French, English and Spanish holdings.66  By restricting trade to select Spanish ports, 
the decree of March 23, 1768 made much of this established German coastal trade illegal.  This 
gave the Louisianans of the German Coast cause to fear the loss of trade that supplemented their 
(in some cases subsistence) farming.  As Commandant of the German Coast, Charles Frederick 
D’Arensbourg would have been receptive to the complaints and financial interests of those 
settlers.  It would have been a matter of honor and prestige for those under him to prosper.  No 
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doubt his personal standing and financial well being would have also been impacted by the new 
trade regulation and restrictions that Ulloa implemented. 
Commandant D’Arensbourg, had other personal reasons for fearing the commercial 
policies of the Spaniards.  D’Arensbourg was a close family friend of the Attorney General, 
Nicolas Chauvin de Lafrénière, and grandfather of Lafrénière’s wife.  Lafrénière’s son-in-law, 
Jean-Baptiste Noyen, had been making rumblings that his dissatisfaction with the Spanish 
economic policies was so great that he was selling his estate and “moving with his family and 
slaves to Cayenne (French Guiana).” In fact, Noyen had begun to make preparations to do just 
that.67  D’Arensbourg was worried that the departure of the Attorney General’s son-in-law would 
cause a great deal of tumult in his own family and personal dealings.68  This belief led 
D’Arensbourg to support the rebel cause with little hesitation, lending the rebels an influential 
presence on the German Coast. 
D’Arensbourg’s support was important to what short term success the rebellion enjoyed.  
D’Arensbourg gave the order allowing Captain Josephe Villeré, head of the German Coast 
militia of as many as 400 men to march on New Orleans with some pretense of legitimacy.69  
D’Arensbourg also played a key role in preventing Ulloa from mollifying German Coast 
discontent.  On October 25th, 1768 Governor Ulloa, after having learned of the mounting 
dissention amongst the German coast settlers, sent Antoine Gilbert de St. Maxent to the German 
Coast with fifteen hundred pesos with which to pay D’Arensbourg for grain which had been 
appropriated to feed a recent wave of Acadian immigrants, and by doing so pacify the German 
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farmers and merchants.  Commandant D’Arensbourg, upon meeting with St. Maxent, not only 
refused to accept payment for the grain but also refused to accept any apology or “gesture of 
good will from the Spanish authorities.”70 
D’Arensbourg then had Villeré arrest St. Maxent, either at D’Arensbourg’s home or on 
the route back, and hold him at the Cantrelle Plantation.  Villeré then took the money sent with 
St. Maxent for the German goods and dispersed most of it himself through the German Coast 
settlement.71  By taking this decisive step against the interests of Governor Ulloa, D’Arensbourg, 
drove the discontent and financial uncertainty of the German Coast settlers to the point where 
they were willing to enter into collective political action.  D’Aresnbourg not only robbed Ulloa 
of a method to reconcile himself with the German Coast; he later lent his good name and the 
esteem that he had built as Commandant and judge to the settlers of the area to the rebellious 
faction and in doing so was instrumental in the decision of the German Coast Militia to march on 
New Orleans. 
On October, 28th 1768, around four hundred members of the German Coast militia joined 
forces with a larger force comprised of some six hundred of the French and other militias at the 
house of François Chauvin de Lery.72  There, plied with wine and armed with muskets, they 
reassured each other of the justness of their cause and the courage they possessed.  The total 
force of the rebels measured around a thousand men.  There were only one hundred Spanish and 
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loyal French guards in the city to check them.73  At ten to one odds, it must have seemed that the 
Spanish forces would not have stood long against the gathered militias had the potentially riotous 
mobs turned violent.  But, aside from a few street patrols and the spiking of the New Orleans 
cannons (on the previous evening), that first night the primary aim of the militias seemed to be 
that of arming themselves and drinking “the good wine of Bordeaux”.74  For the conspirators the 
presence of a large element of popular support was all that was necessary at the moment.  Such a 
sufficient display of potential force was enough to roust the Spanish presence before 
reinforcements could be sent for from Havana. 
The next morning the combined militias received orders to marshal near Governor 
Ulloa’s residence.  That first night was important to the rebels as it served to build camaraderie 
and shared ascription as enemies of the Spanish regime.  It allowed a symbolic connection to 
develop in the disparate groups of colonists, prompted by the shared experience of dissatisfaction 
with Ulloa; fear of the coming Spanish mercantile system; longing for the laissez-faire of the 
French government; and finally, one can imagine, heady talk bolstered by wine and a sense of 
courage stemming from the company of armed like-minded men.  That first night at the home of 
François Chauvin de Lery was a bonding experience that channeled the various economic and 
social interests of Acadians, Germans and French of New Orleans to a desire to fulfill the goal of 
the conspirators.  It was perhaps the moment that allowed distinct situations of unrest and 
discontent to ferment together into a single instance of collective political action. 
The relative non-violence of the gathering is important to understanding the character of 
the revolt.  At this stage is seems more like a demonstration of dissatisfaction and concern; 
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almost something more akin to a workers’ strike than a rebellion.  There must have been either 
exemplary control on the part of the mob “leaders”, or a general lack of will to do violence on 
the part of the mob.  This lack of violence speaks to the ends that the rebels wished to attain.  
The rebels wanted a rejection of the “innovations” of Spanish regime in favor of a return to the 
traditional ways of the French.  Their rejection was, to a degree, orderly.  That orderliness 
suggests that (with the possible exception of Pierre Marquis – who favored the formation of an 
independent republic) the rebels wanted more of a reformation than a revolution - a return to 
comfortable French tradition, rather than any radical or revolutionary change in governmental 
systems.75  To a degree the relative quietness of the mob speaks to the level of manipulation that 
the cabal leaders held over them.  This was not a mob twisted to murderous outrage over the 
Spanish rule.  Members most certainly held strong feelings – many worried about Spanish trade 
restrictions or motivated by ethnic tension - but their primary motivation was the collection of 
debt and redemption of paper currency.  It took the charismatic leaders of the conspiracy to turn 
those economic desires into rebellion. 
The principal conspirators, as listed by Charles Gayarré, were: “[Nicholas Chauvin de ] 
Lafrénière, the king's Attorney-General;[Denis-Nicolas] Foucault, the Intendant Commissary; 
[Balthazar de] Masan [alternately Mason], a retired captain of infantry, a wealthy planter, and a 
knight of St. Louis; [Pierre] Marquis, a captain in the Swiss troops enlisted in the service of 
France; [Jean Baptiste de] Noyan, a retired captain of cavalry; and Bienville Noyan, a lieutenant 
in the navy, both the nephews of Jean-Baptiste Le Moyne de Bienville, the founder and a 
repeated governor, of the colony; [Julien Jerome] Doucet, a distinguished lawyer; Jean and 
Joseph Milhet; [Pierre] Caresse; [Joseph] Petit; and [Pierre] Poupet, who were among the 
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principal merchants; [Pierre] Hardy [alternately Hardi] de Boisblanc, a former member of the 
Superior Council; and a planter of note, [Joseph] Villeré, the commander of the German 
Coast.”76  Of these notable members of society, Governor Ulloa believed that the principle, as 
well as most important and influential of the conspirators were the Attorney General Nicholas 
Chauvin de Lafrénière, and Denis-Nicolas Foucault, the French commissaire-ordonateur, or 
commissary.77 
Most historiography of the revolt holds that Denis-Nicolas Foucault’s motives for 
rebellion were largely personal and financial.  Like most of the French colonists, Foucault had 
some reservations about working with Ulloa and the changes that the new Spanish regime would 
bring.  Also like many of his peers he found Ulloa to be standoffish and impersonal.  It would be 
fair to say that by the time of the rebellion Foucault also bore considerable reservations about, if 
not ill will toward, acting French governor Charles Philippe Aubry, perhaps fueled by the sharp 
contrasts in their lifestyles and personalities.  While Aubry maintained a position of power in the 
colony, he was at a lack for funds in part due to Foucault’s refusal to augment his funding, and 
was forced to live in a style he felt beneath his station as governor.  By contrast, Foucault was 
able to live quite comfortably and maintained appearances perhaps above his station.  Carl 
Brasseaux suggests that the disparity between the lifestyles and status of the two gentlemen as 
well as a particular blend of political reliance on each other to effectively run the colony and 
competition with each other for status within the colony bred enmity between them.78  Years of 
struggle with officials of the prior French administration, many of whom felt Foucault to be low-
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class, may very well have prepared Foucault to be more sensitive to perceived slights.  Likewise, 
rapid shifts in the political system and turns of political alliance that took place in the 1760’s 
may have caused Foucault to be considerably more focused on self-preservation and personal 
advancement.  In any event, the enmity between Foucault and both governors of Louisiana 
intensified as the Spanish economic regulations were put in place.79 
Regardless of any speculation as to the source of his discontentment with the joint 
Spanish/French regime, there is no doubt that Denis-Nicolas Foucault disagreed strongly with 
the Spanish government on its policies of redeeming French paper currency at seventy-five 
percent of face value.  Historians have not reached a firm consensus as to a specific dominant 
cause of this disagreement.  A number of contributing causes have emerged.  Some historians 
like, John Preston Moore, feel that Foucault was speculating in the paper currency, and needed 
the Spaniards to redeem the notes at a higher value in order to secure his personal fortune.80  Carl 
Brasseaux is quite a bit more sympathetic to Foucault when ascertaining his motives.  In 
Brasseaux’s estimation, while Foucault certainly stood to lose money by the exchange, and other 
Spanish regulatory policies, his disparagement of the Spanish system was not based on personal 
matters alone.  Brasseaux asserts that Foucault was understandably concerned about the impact 
of a less than total face-value revaluation of the paper currency on the cash flow of the 
government, and ability to procure supplies for incoming Acadian settlers, for which and whom 
he was in part responsible.81  Lack of funds provided by the Spaniards forced Foucault to take 
loans from local merchants – putting him in the delicate position of owing money to those over 
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whom he had political authority.  Furthermore if neither the Spanish nor French governments 
reimbursed Foucault, he could be liable for debt he could not repay.82 
Ultimately, irrespective of whether Foucault’s motives were being driven by personal 
enmity and desire to profit, or concern over the well-being of the colony and his ability to 
minister to its economic good, Foucault did play a role in the Superior Council’s conspiracy 
against Governor Ulloa.  Foucault became a sympathizer and supporter of the rebellion.  
Brasseaux characterizes this support as mostly passive.  However by refusing to perform, or 
slowly performing, certain routine administrative duties, Foucault was able to engender 
dissatisfaction with the government in many colonists, particularly those of prominence who 
would have had business dealings that Foucault’s obstructionist actions would have impacted.83  
During the rebellion, Foucault “was negligent in allowing the printing of anti-Spanish literature 
in New Orleans, failed to notify the acting governor of the circulation of the petition [to remove 
Ulloa from the colony], and entertained his fellow councilors after they had approved the illegal 
petition during the special session.”84 
Carl Brasseuax also places an indirect responsibility for the revolt on the disagreements 
and quarreling between the French offices of governor, which was held by Charles Philippe 
Aubry (jointly with Governor Ulloa), and the offices of commissaire-ordonnateur, held by 
Denis-Nicolas Foucault.  In the “build-up” to the rebellion, this quarreling effectively “paralyzed 
the provincial administration, creating a leadership vacuum which the New Orleans rebels would 
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ultimately fill.”85  Perhaps Foucault’s most important contribution to the rebellion was his 
consistent deferral to the will of Attorney General Nicholas Chauvin de Lafrénière.86  With these 
consistent deferrals of legal opinion Foucault removed himself as a check on Lafrénière, and 
greatly increased Lafrénière’s prestige and political power, thus allowing Lafrénière to more 
completely fill the role of opposition leader. 
Popular, powerful, imposing, and charming, Attorney General Nicholas Chauvin de 
Lafrénière played the role of charismatic leader in the rebellion - swaying the Superior Council 
and those others among the colonists who felt the malaise of dissatisfaction with the Spaniards to 
actively participate in the cause of the rebellion.87  In terms of physical and social presence, 
Lafrénière was everything that Governor Ulloa was not – dashing, eloquent, energetic, and 
masculine.  So commanding was Lafrénière that R. E. Chandler, in his notes to “Ulloa's Account 
of the 1768 Revolt”, suggests that Lafrénière was able to use his “spell-binding oratory” not only 
to seduce officials and prominent citizens to the rebel’s cause, but also to verbally dominate and 
over-rule the wishes of acting governor Aubry.88   
His powerful presence, positive reputation and political status as Attorney General and 
member of the Superior Council enabled Lafrénière to spread discontent amongst the “common” 
citizenry using the tools of gossip and slander.  The Attorney General also played a role in 
undermining the Spanish authority by exerting political pressure on the French members of the 
dual colonial government against the Spanish interests, and projecting himself forward into the 
minds of the citizenry by “assuming leadership at assemblies called to discuss the most 
                                                 
85 Brasseaux, “Plus ça change”, 603-604. 
86 Brasseaux, Denis-Nicolas Foucault, 57-61. 
87 Moore, Revolt in Louisiana, 40; Chandler, “Ulloa's Account”, 410. 
88 Ibid. 
47 
 
momentous decisions of the day” - often at the political expense of the Spanish regime.89  
Lafrénière also acted as a galvanizing presence behind which the dispossessed French could 
rally.  His orations before the Superior Council neatly address the complaints of merchants and 
traders, and combined them with the complaints and anxieties (exaggerated by the conspirators) 
of the Acadian settlers and German coast farmers.  Lafrénière, possibly through his legal 
training, correspondence or visitation with European thinkers, developed skill with expressing 
the language of enlightenment philosophy which would have provided a method of initial 
indoctrination.90 
Perhaps the most important aspect of his role as ring-leader was the attorney general’s 
recruiting of influential men who could provide popular support from disparate groups.  It was 
Lafrénière who persuaded Commandant Roget de Villeré to convince the settlers on the German 
coast that they needed to march on New Orleans in order to force Governor Ulloa to pay for the 
goods, fruits, and vegetables that were purchased from them throughout the year (primarily to 
feed the Acadians).91  Likewise, Lafrénière was instrumental in convincing militia captains 
Judice and André Veret to rally Acadian immigrants to New Orleans under the pretense that 
Governor Ulloa held a store of silver which he could be pressured into using to back the 
worthless paper notes that many of the Acadians had carried with them from Canada.92 
In contrast to Brasseaux’s characterization of Foucault, Jo Ann Carrigan characterizes 
Nicholas Chauvin de Lafrénière’s motives as personal ambition and, to a degree, the quest for 
visible status, tempered by an opposition to a Spanish system Lafrénière believed to be “arbitrary 
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government and mercantilism.”93  Lafrénière is another figure that the historiography has viewed 
through lenses biased toward either the French or Spanish point of view, and with 
correspondingly heroic or villainous overtones.  Some historians, such as John Preston Moore 
James E. Winston, and Shannon Lee Dawdy, speculate that because of Lafrénière’s European 
travels, there may have been some Enlightenment ideology behind his decision to enter into 
revolt against the Spaniards.94 Winston maintains a high regard for the impact of philosophy on 
Lafrénière, however Moore ultimately concludes that Lafrénière’s motives were likely driven 
more by the threat to his personal status and influence, which a more completely implemented 
Spanish regime represented, than by idealism.95 
Lafrénière’s character, and presence were sharply contrasted by those of Governor Ulloa.  
Ulloa, fifty years old by the time he was made governor, was a man of diverse interests and 
accomplishments.  While serving Spain as a colonial administrator and naval officer Ulloa was 
also an explorer, engineer, author of several manuscripts, and a scientist noted in the disciplines 
of astronomy, mathematics, biology and chemistry.96  Although Ulloa’s many scientific 
accomplishments cemented his status as an intellectual giant, he was not physically imposing.  
Described as small, stooped, thin and pale; it is noted that Ulloa was hardly the physical presence 
needed to inspire the lax and fearful French colonists, who worried that they had been forgotten 
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or cast aside.97  Ulloa’s physical appearance and bookish demeanor complicated his relationship 
with the French subjects.   
Ulloa possessed a number of qualifications for the position, not the least of which was 
experience in the climate of the new world and an understanding of the French language.  He 
was also keenly intelligent, an experienced colonial administrator, a scientific genius, a naval 
officer, and fiercely loyal to the crown.98  Ulloa also possessed a host of other character traits 
which made him less than ideally suited for his post.  John Preston Moore lists a number of 
these.  Ulloa was overly concerned with regulation, matters of honor and the minutiae of political 
niceties.  He could be brusque and short with those he was trying to communicate with.  At times 
he was too quick to discount the opinions of others.99  The French governor Aubry said that 
Ulloa was “sometimes too punctilious and often makes problems out of things that are scarcely 
worth the trouble to bother with.”100  Least kind (and bearing an obvious bias against the Spanish 
regime), Jean Bochart Champigny characterized Ulloa as “Obstinate… violent… imperious… 
arrogant… timid… inconsiderate… and destitute of dignity.”101  But physical appearance and 
somewhat odious character traits were not the largest factors at play in Ulloa’s failure to 
maintain control of the Louisiana colony. 
Nor was the manner of Ulloa’s arrival, though it also proved to be detrimental to his 
success as governor in the colony.  Stormy weather both prevented large crowds from gathering 
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to witness Ulloa’s arrival and played a part in Ulloa’s decision to sail into the harbor in a small 
packet ship – the Volante, rather than a larger, more impressive vessel.102  Likewise the small 
force of ninety Spanish soldiers that arrived with Ulloa was hardly a force suited to strike an 
impression of force and control.  Ulloa made a critical misstep during his arrival – he did not 
raise the Spanish flag.  What he interpreted from his orders to be a necessary step to ease the 
colony from French to Spanish control only served to confuse the citizenry, and give the 
conspirators a powerful visual icon to use as a foothold from which to launch accusations of the 
invalidity of the Spanish regime.103  While Ulloa continued to allow the French flag to fly instead 
of the Spanish, the situation continued to deteriorate.   
Ulloa’s reliance on French troops for support during his administration added to the 
perception that the Spanish regime was weak and lessened his authority.  However, despite 
repeated requests to Viceroy Buccarreli for Spanish officers and soldiers, Ulloa had to use the 
French troops still garrisoned in Louisiana, as well as local militias.104  This was problematic for 
a few reasons.  Not only was this a sign of Spanish impermanence or possibly even illegitimacy,  
it was also draining on the French troops who believed themselves likely to be recalled at any 
time to France, with their terms of service in the colony over.105  Ulloa also believed those 
French troops to be extremely unreliable and lazy.  He complained in a letter to Viceroy 
Buccarreli that they “refused to do anything that is for the service of his Royal Majesty, asking 
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for extra wages for everything they do.”106  The net effect was that Ulloa failed to make a 
suitable impression of Spanish rule. 
This was compounded by Ulloa’s dislike of public display.107  That dislike prevented him 
from establishing the Spanish presence in the grand way expected by the French colonists.  This 
not only served to rob the Spanish regime of legitimacy by stripping it of what would have been 
viewed as the trappings of legitimacy, it also served to engender hostility from the entrenched 
“better classes” in the colony, who viewed Ulloa as snobbish or stand-offish.  That perception of 
Ulloa was strengthened by his frequent trips from the social center of New Orleans to the site 
which would become the newly constructed southern fort at Balize.  Ulloa visited Balize in order 
to shore up defenses there against a possible invasion from the British, which he viewed as an 
urgent if not imminent threat (and to conduct scientific experiments).108  However his visits were 
interpreted by the French colonists as a desire to supplant or circumvent New Orleans society by 
moving the capital of government to a new location.109  This seeming disregard for traditional 
French social structures and mores both lent credence to some aspects of the “Black Legend” 
related to supposed Spanish aloofness and cruelty, but also fostered the kind of social disconnect 
that facilitates rebellion – the weakening of inherited norms and traditions that act to reinforce 
stability in society.110 
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In June of 1767 Governor Ulloa married Doña Francísca Ramirez de Larada y Encalda.  
This union only complicated matters in Louisiana for the governor.111   Ulloa chose to take the 
young, well connected and wealthy Chilean lady as his bride, possibly angering many of the 
local Louisiana elite who would have preferred the governor to marry from within the colony, 
thus solidifying political alliances there.  Additionally, Ulloa chose to have his marriage 
ceremony away from New Orleans, in Balize, which caused the colonial elite, who by and large 
resided in New Orleans, to feel snubbed all over again.112  In a similar manner the pregnancy of 
Lady Ulloa led to more social misunderstandings.  The customary feting by visitors and well 
wishers of the mother-to-be was not to the liking of Ulloa or his bride, nor was worshipping in 
public, primarily because of health concerns.113 
Ulloa also simply did not communicate well with the colonists, a failing that contributed 
greatly to the accumulation of problems leading to rebellion.  In part this was a function of the 
conspirators residing in the government at a level between Ulloa and the populace.  They were 
able to put negative interpretation and/or connotation to Ulloa’s policies, and effectively control 
perception of Ulloa through uncontested rumor and misinformation.  Practically since Spain 
gained control of the colony, rumors regarding potential Spanish reforms played a role in the 
popular dissatisfaction with the regime.114  Had Ulloa managed to create a direct channel of 
official information, he would have avoided a lot of ill will from the colonists who were 
genuinely uninformed or misinformed of the governor’s problems and plans.  However, Ulloa 
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did not create such a channel of information and as a result he and his policies were susceptible 
to the machinations of those who would slander them.   
The involvement of French officials in the process of governing often caused 
announcements contradictory or mitigating to Spanish intent to be made alongside official 
proclamations.  This was the case in 1766, when Governor Aubry speculated that the Spaniards 
would not enforce the trade restrictions passed earlier that year.115  Such speculation acted to cast 
a cloud of weakness or incompetence on Governor Ulloa, and one of illegitimacy on the Spanish 
government.  In a similar vein, the involvement of the French Superior Council in the governing 
process perpetuated a sense of doubt in the Spanish government.  It is entirely possible that the 
relationship that powerful merchants and planters had with the members of the Superior Council 
gave them avenues of information outside of those which the Spanish government controlled.  
Through these channels the conspirators in the council were able to challenge Spanish 
legitimacy. 
A lack of information was another of Ulloa’s principle problems.  Ulloa lacked a reliable 
source of information.  The information he received was often from French soldiers, many of 
whom were disgruntled over not being allowed to return to France, had loyalties and connections 
to their regional commandants, or were sympathetic to the conspirators.  The conspirators were 
able to organize themselves, grow their ranks, and even sign petitions for Ulloa’s removal – all 
seemingly with Ulloa none the wiser.116  Ulloa also overlooked good intelligence when it was 
presented to him, often because he believed the information to be unsubstantiated or from a 
biased source.  This was the case on the twenty-first of October, 1768, when a colonist, angered 
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by a Superior Council decision, brought to Ulloa allegations that members of the council were 
fomenting discontent along the German Coast.  The allegations were true, but Ulloa disregarded 
them as they came from a source which he considered to be biased and therefore untrustworthy – 
his sense of honor, a product of his upper class Andalusian upbringing, and well honed during 
his time in the Spanish navy, ruled his behavior when a suspicious nature would have been more 
prudent.117 
By contrast the conspirators were in positions to know much about Governor Ulloa, as 
well as his plans for governance, and they were able to selectively release and color that 
information in ways that cast the governor in the poorest light possible.  The conspirators also 
held great influence over the colony through appointment, relationship, reputation and status.  
The conspirators used their positions, through societal status, inter-relationships, and 
governmental appointment to control to a great degree how the governor was perceived by the 
populace.  Foucault was able to slow down official business, creating an air of incompetence or 
snobbish disdain with affairs of state.  He was also able to put leverage through the Association 
of Merchants on potential members of the coup plot.118  Lafrénière was able to use his 
considerable charm and connections to circumvent Spanish efforts to maintain calm in the 
colony, and generate resentment against the alien government. 
Relationships played a remarkably strong role in the organization of the rebellion.  
Lafrénière alone was related to nearly half of the other main conspirators through blood or 
marriage.  Governor Ulloa made a listing of several familial connections in his account of the 
revolt.  Joseph Villeré, the Captain of the German coast, was Lafrénière’s brother in law.  
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Captain François La Barre, a militia captain at English Turn and member of the Superior 
Council, was a cousin by marriage.  François Chauvin de Lery, the Commandant of 
Tchapitoulas, was Lafrénière’s cousin.  Piere Marquis, was attached to Lafrénière through an 
unspecified relation to Lafrénière’s wife.119  The prominent businessman and planter Jean-
Baptiste Noyan was Lafrénière’s son-in-law.  Finally, as previously mentioned, Commandant 
Charles Fredereick D’Arensbourg was the grandfather of Lafrénière’s wife.120  D’Arensbourg 
himself acted as a sort of social “spoke” in connecting the conspirators.  Through his descendants 
a number of prominent families were connected, including “Lafrénière, Noyan, Bienville, 
Massan, Villeré, and de Lery.”121 
These bonds served to allow for a very tight-knit cabal, contributing to the lack of 
information the Spanish Governor was able to obtain.  Those relationships also provided 
reasonable cover for meetings and ready access to the exchange of information, propaganda, and 
mobilization without fear of internal betrayal.  As previously shown, Lafrénière convinced 
Judice and Andre Veret to gather the Acadians in New Orleans under the pretense that they were 
to have their worthless Canadian paper currency redeemed by Ulloa who maintained a secret 
horde of Spanish coin.122  Lafrénière was also able to convince Commandant D’Arensbourg and 
Captain Joseph de Villiere to create rumor that Ulloa would not honor debts for foodstuffs, then 
engineer a shortfall of that payment to garner the support of the German Coast settlers.  Though 
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the elder Baltasar Villeré refused to join with the conspiracy, he was not in a position to reveal 
the conspiracy to Ulloa.123 
If there is one recurring theme in the events that led up to the revolt of 1768, it is 
instability.  Among the contributing elements were the financial disruptions of inflation, lack of 
specie along with the concomitant variety of greatly depressed paper monies, irregularity of aid 
from Europe, changes in commercial policy, potential changes in the governing body, political 
infighting, confusion over the legitimacy of Spanish rule, the composite French and Spanish 
government, and a weak central government attempting to enforce unpopular regulations.124  
This instability exacerbated ethnic tensions, and gave the conspirators a “cause célèbre” they 
could draw upon for an almost instant credibility: the “poisonous wine from Catalonia.”125  The 
conspirators used this credibility, ethnic tension, and an almost ever present unease over the 
worsening economic circumstances to build a powerful coalition against the new Spanish 
government out of the disparate interests and factions. 
The overriding themes that presented themselves after the coup had been launched were 
confusion, and delay.  As just mentioned, Governor Ulloa was slow to react to rumors that there 
was a mounting conspiracy against him.  The governor’s lax control over the colony allowed the 
conspirators to easily not only circumvent his measures to contain the problem, by preventing the 
payment of owed money to the German Coast farmers, but they also were able to turn those 
efforts to their own ends, by utilizing the money sent.  Upon hearing of the detained St. Maxent, 
and the loss of the money meant to pay the German Coast farmers, Ulloa held a conference with 
Governor Aubry to determine the best course of action.  Aubry advised that Governor Ulloa do 
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nothing, which was the approach that Ulloa initially took.  Aubry’s reason for this was that he 
felt that the situation was far less harmful that it turned out to be.  He thought that a formal 
protest was all that would come of the gathering force against the Spanish governor. 126  Had 
Ulloa acted with force, Aubry believed, he might have provided the spark which would have 
turned the protest into revolt.   
On October twenty-seventh, Governor Aubry approached Foucault and Lafrénière with a 
polite request that they cease agitating the public against Ulloa.  The conspirators refused.  This 
proved the wrong approach to take, and Aubry’s overture for a peaceful resolution, and his lack 
of willingness to project force to maintain the Spanish regime were seen as a signs of weakness 
by the conspirators.127  Lafrénière and Foucault informed Governor Aubry that it was their 
intention to have Ulloa removed from the colony within three days “with the least possible 
disturbance because things had gone so far that it was impossible to draw back.”128  Pierre 
Marquis, recently appointed Colonel by the Superior Council, maintained a militia five 
companies strong and loyal to the conspirators.  The number of the rebels roughly doubled as a 
force of some five hundred Germans and Acadians led by Villeré and Noyan respectively 
marched into New Orleans and gathered for the first night of the rebellion at the home of 
François Chauvin de Lery.129  By the morning of the twenty-eighth of October, roughly one 
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thousand insurgents under the command of Pierre Marquis patrolled the streets of New Orleans 
unopposed.130 
On the eve of the rebellion Ulloa felt that he did not have the men to handle the situation.  
With only one hundred or so men at his disposal against a crowd which is estimated to have 
numbered in the hundreds, in all probability, he did not.  After consulting with Aubry – in whom 
Governor Ulloa still had faith to resolve the situation peacefully, Ulloa made the decision to 
retreat with his pregnant wife and child to the packet ship Volante, accompanied by “all Spanish 
military personnel, with all those of Spanish descent or sympathizers among the French welcome 
to join the defense of the boat”, as a precautionary measure he ordered all important papers to be 
destroyed and the ship’s guns readied for defense against the rebels.131   
For his part, Governor Aubry sent an additional twenty soldiers to join Ulloa on the 
Volante, detached another thirty to the central square, and kept the remainder to rally a small 
force of seventy to eighty men should a confrontation with the forces of the Superior Council be 
necessary.132  Following this, Governor Aubry made another appeal to Foucault and Lafrénière 
to abandon the conspiracy, insisting to them that they stood to risk everything for little chance of 
any gain.133  As before, Aubry’s appeals to the conspirators had little effect, other than perhaps 
contributing to Denis-Nicolas Foucault’s decision to take a more passive and cautious role in the 
rebellion from that point forward.134 
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The following day, October twenty-ninth, the Superior Council met at Foucault’s 
residence in New Orleans to compile a list of grievances against Governor Ulloa.  To prevent 
any disruption from Governor Aubry’s small force that remained in the city, the Superior 
Council arranged patrols of militia and gatherings of supporters shouting angrily for removal of 
the Spaniard.135  At Ulloa’s behest Aubry was present, and again offered a remonstration against 
the conspirators but “neither prayer nor threats could produce any impression, except on two or 
three, who seemed to be moderate, and that the rest allowed themselves to be swayed by the 
sentiments of Lafrénière.”136  It was clear to Ulloa at least that at this point his most powerful 
ally, Aubry, had lost all influence with the Superior Council, if not the majority of the French 
populace.137  After deliberating, the Council prepared their petition of six points to be sent to the 
king of France. 
The proclamation listed grievances and attacks against the character of Governor Ulloa as 
evidence of the perfidy committed by the same and justification for his removal.  Through their 
complaints, the Superior Council systematically attacked the legitimacy of the Spanish regime in 
Louisiana by claiming that no Spanish policy had lawfully replaced the pre-existing French 
policies.   
In large part their basis for this claim was that “Mr. Ulloa” failed to show proof that the 
colony was ceded to Spain.  John Preston Moore points out that Lafrénière was correct on the 
point that Governor Ulloa did not follow the formal protocol for accepting the colony, but 
hastens to add that in accepting Spanish money and following Spanish directives, Louisiana had 
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been a Spanish colony nonetheless.138  However, regardless of the validity of the Attorney 
General’s claims, the council delivered these points at a time when the conspirators had shown 
that the Spanish forces under Ulloa could not hold the colony through force.  As they had in the 
past with Governor Kerlerec, “the leaders of the conspiracy turned once again to force as a 
solution to their economic and social ills.”139  Emboldened by popular support, ideological 
grounds, and strength of arms the Superior Council (minus only the dissenting voice of Govenor 
Aubry, and moderating voice of Foucault who wished Governor Ulloa removed from power but 
not expelled) demanded the removal of Governor Ulloa within three days of the proclamation 
date, October 29th, 1768, on “whatever ship he shall think proper”.140 
By early afternoon on the twenty-ninth, the Superior Council had a copy of the 
proclamation delivered to Ulloa.  Upon receiving it, Ulloa ordered the Spanish Commissary 
Loyola to end all funds meant for French soldiers and officials in the colony and to halt the 
purchase of all gifts meant as presents for native tribes.  He also ordered all Spanish troops in the 
colony be recalled to Havana.141  Governor Ulloa used the three days allotted to him by the 
Superior Council to purchase passage on a French merchant vessel, the frigate Cesár, as the 
packet ship Volante was in need of repairs and not seaworthy.  He left New Orleans at the end of 
his allotted time.142  The Cesár delayed a short while in Balize for re-supply, and to wait out 
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weather not fit for sailing.  Then the Cesár proceeded south across the Gulf to Havana and 
arrived in the Cuban capital on December 3rd, 1768.143 
Though Governor Ulloa had it in mind that he would return to New Orleans both with the 
battalion which had been assembling in Havana for his use and with additional Spanish support, 
he was never to see that city or any of Louisiana again.  In the brief interim wherein the rebels 
held power, Aubry was still nominally the acting Governor of the colony.  However, as he 
complained to the French court, he held little power and considered the nature of his tenure as 
one of continued indignity to the office of Governor.144  This is not to say that Aubry held no 
power in the colony, however.  Aubry, for a time, using threats of force and forceful appeals to 
the Council, was able to prevent Lafrénière and Foucault from removing the Volante from the 
river.  From its position, the Volante was able to fire on ships moving into New Orleans and kept 
smuggling, which the Superior Council depended on for finance after Ulloa’s departure, at a 
reduced level thus contributing to the malaise and enervation suffered by the Superior Council’s 
temporary government.145  Aubry’s remaining vestiges of command aside, the real driving force 
behind governance at this time was the Superior Council, and it’s most prominent and powerful 
member the Attorney General Nicolas Chauvin de Lafrénière.  Denis-Nicolas Foucault remained 
a strong presence “behind the scenes” but wished to limit the visible extent of his involvement as 
he was wary of how the European powers would view the revolt and wished to protect his 
career.146 
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After the crescendo of October twenty-eighth and ninth the new administration lost a lot 
of momentum and a degree of popular support.  In part this was because it was, at heart, a 
reactionary movement.  It is hard to keep up enthusiasm for a return to the status quo once it has 
been restored.  The conspirators proved themselves to be better adept at overthrowing a 
government than running one themselves.  In general the rebels maintained a hope that the 
colony would be welcomed back by the French king.  However they had no clear plan as to how 
to maintain the government in the meantime or, other than the republican leanings of Pierre 
Marquis, no clear inclination of what to do if the French king refused to accept them.147  In an 
attempt to maintain control, solidify popular support, and justify their actions to the European 
monarch they wished to rejoin, the conspirators published a list of their grievances and 
condemnations of Governor Ulloa and as well as their forceful rejection of the Spanish 
mercantile system for the colony.148   
They also began appointing syndics from the ranks of men who were well connected and 
had supported the rebellion.149  The office of syndic was a French innovation in which honored 
or distinguished gentlemen acted as a kind of intermediary between the citizenry and the 
government.  That measure expanded the powerbase of the insurgents by incorporating 
sympathizers into the power structure.  But printed propaganda and the appointment of syndics 
was not enough to maintain popular support.  What the people wanted most was a sense of 
security.  After the departure of Ulloa, the Superior Council saw a small reversal of popularity 
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with Governor Aubry rising in the eyes of many French soldiers and the Council losing the 
support of the German Coast settlers, though the German Coast proved to be resistant to the 
acceptance of Spanish rule upon the arrival of Lieutenant General Alejandro O’Reilly, almost 
certainly for economic reasons.150 
There is little evidence that the revolt actually acted to improve the conditions causing 
discomfort to the colonists.  Lack of financial means caused a great degree of their difficulty.   
Governor Aubry had a hand in this as it was his stern refusal to allow the Volante to be removed 
that prevented the flow of trade into the city which the Superior Council depended on to finance 
their new government.  The Superior Council had a far larger problem in the lack of funds from 
either the Spanish or French crowns – money the colony had always needed to function.  With a 
lack of funding and no clear direction to move the new government, a complacency and sense of 
ennui set in.151  
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CHAPTER II 
O’REILLY RESTORES ORDER 
The awaited, and feared, Spanish response to the rebellion came in the form of the arrival 
of Lieutenant General Don Alejandro O’Reilly, nearly nine months after the removal of 
Governor Ulloa.  Alejandro O’Reilly was an Irish soldier of fortune in service to Spain, who had 
served with honor and distinction in His Most Catholic Majesty’s army since the age of ten, 
some 37 years before the Louisiana revolt.152  He was recognized for bravery, skill and valor in 
the wars of Austrian Succession, the Seven Years War, and most recently during the 1766 riots 
in Madrid, when he oversaw the protection of Charles III’s royal palace from angry mobs.153  In 
addition to his bravery, talent and martial skills, O’Reilly proved to have the insight of a sharp 
colonial administrator in his short time in Cuba assessing and re-organizing the army.  While 
there he made several prudent observations and recommendations toward improving security and 
efficiency.154  This experience, and his deep personal respect for the Lieutenant General, 
convinced King Charles III that O’Reilly was the right man for the job of restoring order in 
Louisiana.155   
The arrival of O’Reilly represents the final stage of Welch’s model – the end of the 
rebellion.  The Lieutenant General Alejandro O’Reilly’s actions in Louisiana show how a 
mixture of repression and conciliation effectively pacify a populace.  From the start of his 
administration, O’Reilly displayed an overwhelming force that denied the Louisiana rebels the 
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hope of being able to withstand a direct confrontation.  O’Reilly backed that force up with 
sensible policies and reforms that made life better for colonists, and addressed many of their 
concerns.  While doing so he made sure to drive a wedge between those members of the 
conspiracy who directed action against the government and those who followed.  This split 
allowed O’Reilly the means to reconcile the majority of colonists with the Spanish government 
while excising from the colony the most dangerous rebels. 
On July 24, 1769, news of O’Reilly’s imminent arrival reached Governor Aubry, who 
was overwhelmed with joy at the return of Spanish order (and funds).156  Many of the colonists 
echoed Aubry’s sense of relief – regardless of the manner of the Spanish return, Spanish rule 
would be more orderly, and the economic situation could hardly be less prosperous than it had 
been under the interim government.157     
But there was more to the lack of resistance to O’Reilly than a cooling passion for revolt, 
general confusion as to the direction of governance, and slowed momentum.  O’Reilly brought 
several powerful tools to combat insurgency.  First he brought a great deal of money to the 
colony.   Financial aid helped to reduce the discontent of the subjects and lessen the economic 
crisis.  O’Reilly brought measures to reform the governmental and economic systems to bring 
them into clear and well delineated and productive forms.  Finally O’Reilly brought an 
overwhelming force coupled with the skill and acumen to use that force judiciously, lest it 
become a point of instigation rather than a deterrent.  Even had O’Reilly not possessed a forceful 
personality, powerful public presence, tactful approach to diplomacy and keen mind, any two of 
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these factors would likely have been enough to settle the uprising and prevent any future 
outbreaks.158 
Lieutenant General Alejandro O’Reilly set out to Louisiana with a force that would 
overwhelm the rebels, either awing them into submission or defeating them without challenge.  
His aim was not only to suppress the revolt, but also to impress upon the revolutionaries the 
majesty, grandeur, and might of His Most Catholic Majesty.  O’Reilly brought with him to 
Louisiana 2,700 soldiers sailing on 27 ships.159  The force consisted of “a Battalion from Lisbon, 
another from the troops at Havana; eighty men from a Company of Grenadiers from each of the 
three militia corps at Havana; 150 artillerymen; 40 dragoons and 50 soldiers from the cavalry 
militia from Havana; and 150 Catalan riflemen”, as well as 50 pieces of artillery, and the 
armaments on the ships themselves.160  In contrast to the Louisiana militias, these were highly 
trained professional soldiers – many of the units selected were either chosen by O’Reilly himself 
for this duty or formed as part of the Fixed Louisiana Infantry Battalion that had been slowly 
growing in Havana for the use of Governor Ulloa.161  The Lieutenant General developed a 
training program under which local militia units would be trained under Spanish soldiers.  He 
meant this force of militias to supplement the Fixed Infantry Battalion as the colony’s major 
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defensive (and policing) force.  By the time O’Reilly left Louisiana (taking the bulk of his 
Spanish regulars with him), the Fixed Louisiana Infantry Battalion number over 500 men – 412 
Spaniards and at least 100 foreign troops, mostly French.162 
In addition to these considerable forces, Governor Aubry pledged the full support of 
himself and his troops to O’Reilly.163   The fighting men loyal to the Superior Council 
meanwhile had dwindled in the period of malaise after the initial thrilling spasm of revolution.  
Though there is not a reliable source of information on the total number of fighting men left to 
the rebels on the eve of O’Reilly’s arrival, O’Reilly in all likelihood enjoyed a far greater than 
three to one advantage.  With the disparity between the number, training, morale, and equipment 
of the troops between the two forces, it must have seemed obvious that O’Reilly’s soldiers would 
have easily won any conflict. 
In addition to overwhelming force, O’Reilly also brought an air of authority the 
Louisianans found lacking in Governor Ulloa.  In terms of physical and social presence, 
Lieutenant General O’Reilly was everything that Ulloa was not.  O’Reilly was “physically stout, 
well formed and taller than average” with a slight limp due to a wound received in a military 
action.164  Of his personality it was said that he was “energetic, firm in his opinions, and 
confident to the point of arrogance” – the last trait tempered by his “intelligence and lofty 
ambition”, skill with duplicity, and years of court life in Madrid, during which he developed a 
“certain polish and courtesy.”165  The demeanor he assumed when dealing with the rebels was 
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stern and austere.  Accounts attribute to him an air of solemnity, dignity, and authority.  When 
O’Reilly had the rebels summoned to meet with him, he adopted an appearance of magnanimity 
bordering on sympathy.   
During his meeting with the delegates from the Superior Council, O’Reilly chose his 
words carefully, allowing Nicolas Chauvin Lafrénière, Pierre Marquis and Joseph Milhet to 
believe that he would not seek to punish them for their roles in the rebellion.  There is some 
debate as to whether this constituted some sort of deceit on his part, an act to mollify the rebels 
and lure them from any consideration of flight.166  Given O’Reilly’s willingness to use deception 
when necessary, and intent to prevent either another revolt or worse, an exodus to British Florida 
which would have robbed the colony of valuable citizens, it is entirely likely that O’Reilly meant 
to deceive the conspirators into believing that they had nothing to fear from his investigations, 
but in doing so was careful to avoid any outright lies.167  Whether O’Reilly lied, evaded the truth, 
or spoke honestly and earnestly without intent to deceive the result was certainly in line with his 
wishes.  A relative calm settled in at New Orleans, and none of the rebel leadership attempted to 
flee Spanish justice. 
After a consultation with Governor Aubry, on August 21st, Lieutenant General Alejandro 
O’Reilly summoned those considered to be the ring-leaders of the insurrection for their trial.  
O’Reilly had arrested the following twelve members of the rebellion’s leadership: Nicolas 
Chauvin de Lafrénière, Jean Baptiste de Noyan, Joseph Villeré, Pierre Caresse, Pierre Marquis, 
Joseph Milhet, Jean Milhet, Joseph Petit, Balthasar de Masan, Julien Jerome Doucet, Pierre 
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Poupet, and Hardy de Boisblanc.168  The arrests caused a stir in the city of New Orleans, and 
O’Reilly, fearing a desertion of citizens to the English colonies, ordered a proclamation stating: 
In the name of the King, 
We, Alexander O'Reilly, Commander of Benfayan in the order of 
Alcantara, Major General and Inspector General of the armies of his Catholic 
Majesty, Captain General and Governor of the Province of Louisiana, in virtue of 
his Catholic Majesty's orders, and of the powers with which we are invested, 
declare to all the inhabitants of the Province of Louisiana, that, whatever just 
cause past events may have given his Majesty to make them feel his indignation, 
yet his majesty's intention is to listen only to the inspirations of his royal 
clemency, because he is persuaded that the inhabitants of Louisiana would not 
have committed the offence of which they are guilty, if they had not been seduced 
by the intrigues of some ambitious, fanatic, and evil-minded men, who had the 
temerity to make a criminal use of the ignorance, and excessive credulity of their 
fellow citizens. These men alone will answer for their crime, and will be judged in 
accordance with the laws. 
So generous an act on the part of his Majesty must be a pledge to him that 
his new subjects will endeavor, every day of their lives, to deserve by their 
fidelity, zeal and obedience, the pardon and protection which he grants them from 
this moment.169 
 
This proclamation, posted in various positions throughout New Orleans had the desired effect of 
calming the populace and preventing any mass panic.   
The proclamation also drew a sharp distinction between the actions of those caught up in 
the confusion of the moment, or seduced by the conspirators, and the criminalized actions of the 
conspirators.  In doing so the proclamation stripped the revolt of any nobility or shared purpose 
which its ideological grounds might have granted it.  In this way the proclamation also 
introduced a wedge between the people who had supported the rebellion and their leadership, 
thus dramatically reducing the possibility of further civil disobedience in support of the leaders 
of the coup.  The proclamation also cast a shadow of criminality and illegitimacy on the revolt as 
it would be recorded and thus remembered, and so potentially reduced its power as an inspiration 
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to any future malcontents.  It is debatable, to say the least, that O’Reilly intended the 
proclamation to be an exercise in public relations to future generations.  However it certainly was 
in his interests to make sure the leaders of the coup were not remembered as either heroes of the 
people, or as martyrs to a greater cause. 
 The trial was swift – lasting only two months.  On October 24th, 1769, the court had 
reached its verdicts for the accused - all guilty.170  Nicolas Chauvin Lafrénière was found guilty 
of abusing his position of Attorney General and inspiring the populace to sedition.  His sentence 
was death.171  Felix del Rey accused Jean-Baptiste Noyan of inciting the Acadians to take up 
arms, spreading complaints against Governor Ulloa, urging the Superior Council to have Ulloa 
expelled, and refusing to accept Spanish rule.172  For his crimes Noyan also received a penalty of 
death.  Pierre Marquis also received a death sentence for his crimes of inciting the militia to 
revolt against Ulloa, accepting a position in the illegal government, advocating the institution of 
a republic in Louisiana, and for voting to approve the “Memorial” against the Spanish 
administration of Louisiana.173  Pierre Caresse likewise received a death sentence for his crimes 
of leading an armed militia in the revolt, his part in the drafting of the “Memorial” and for 
“spreading among the colonists the seeds of sedition”, and for helping to form the Bank of 
Monte Pio in the illegal government.174  Del Rey accused Joseph Milhet of sedition, accepting a 
position in the new government, and soliciting money to help pay for the new government.  
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Milhet also received a penalty of death.175  Joseph Villeré was posthumously accused of treason 
and sedition as well as held accountable for his role in preventing St. Maxent from delivering 
money to the Acadians and Germans of the German Coast.176  Had it not been for the fact that he 
had already died while a prisoner aboard the Volante, allegedly from wounds gained while 
resisting arrest, Villeré would have most assuredly received a death sentence.177  As there were 
no hangmen in New Orleans at the time, the death sentences of the conspirators were to be 
carried out by firing squads composed of Spanish soldiers.178 
 The rest of the accused were found to have committed less serious offenses, and did not 
receive the death penalty.  Joseph Petit received a sentence of “perpetual exile in prison” for his 
crimes of speaking publicly against Spanish commercial regulations, his part in calling for the 
ousting of Ulloa and the forcing of the departure of the Volante, as well as his willingness to set 
out for Balize and actively resist O’Reilly.179  Del Rey accused Balthasar Masan of forcing 
citizens to sign the Council’s petition to the King of France asking for the retrocession of the 
colony, refusing to assist Aubry in maintaining control, and aiding the rebels.  He received a 
sentence of ten years imprisonment.180  Julien Jeromé Doucet also received ten years for 
collaborating with the rebels in the drawing up of the “Memorial” and other documents as well 
as helping them to justify the rebellion.181  Joseph Milhet’s brother Jean received charges of 
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speaking out against Spanish regulations, supporting the Superior Council’s “Memorial”, and 
leading a section of the militia during the actual rebellion itself.  Despite the seriousness of these 
charges, Jean Milhet was considered a minor accomplice and received only six years 
imprisonment for his role in the revolt.182  Another minor accomplice, Pierre Poupet was charged 
with being the treasurer for the rebels after the rebellion had occurred.  For this he also received 
six years imprisonment.183  Pierre Hardi de Boisblanc also received a six year prison term for 
being a minor accomplice.  Boisblanc was charged by del Rey with setting up the Bank of Monte 
Pio for the rebels as well as for having had a “conspiratorial association with Lafrénière and 
Foucault.”184  The prisoners were shortly thereafter sent to Havana, Cuba to fulfill their various 
sentences.185  All of those sentenced to death and imprisonment also had their property forfeited 
to the Crown. 
In addition to these twelve conspirators there were others who acted sympathetically to 
the rebellion.  While not an immediate threat, those sympathizers might have produced trouble 
for Spanish authority in the colony.  Therefore O’Reilly decided to have them removed from the 
colony and their return barred.  The total number banished in this way was 27, including one Mr. 
Lessassier, who was already in France at the time and three Jews, who, in the only incident of the 
whole trial which brought the “black legend” to mind, were expelled for their religion, and 
suspect business practices.186  Despite the impressive force he brought, O’Reilly fully realized 
that he could not reconcile the colony to Spanish rule by force alone. 
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To help show the colonists of Louisiana the benefits of Spanish rule, Alejandro O’Reilly 
also brought a large amount of money with him to Louisiana.  On top of the payment for his 
soldiers, he brought an expense account of 150,000 pesos.  Jack D.L. Holmes estimates that 
O’Reilly spent over 260,000 pesos before ever reaching Louisiana.187  O’Reilly also moved 
quickly to resume the flow of Spanish funds, make sure that French soldiers in service received 
their back pay, and sought to redeem 100,000 pesos worth of paper currency with specie.188  In 
addition to confirming French land grants, and implementing a legal basis for land titles, 
O’Reilly continued Ulloa’s land grant and aid programs to increase the settlement of the colonial 
interior.  Immigrants received land as well as food, tools and money to ease their transition into 
the colony.189  Such programs could not have helped but to allay fears over the “tyranny” of the 
Spaniards.   
O’Reilly streamlined government operations and trimmed wasteful and inefficient 
spending.  He reduced the number of posts with stores in the colony, and the personnel required 
to fully man them.190  To prevent inflation from accompanying the Spanish monies into 
Louisiana, O’Reilly fixed the prices of food, wood and some basic services such as cartage.191  In 
addition to the regulation of inflation, these set prices helped to lessen discontent due to 
shortages of staple foods by preventing price gouging by unscrupulous merchants.  Taxes were 
imposed on “taverns, inns, billiard parlors, and butcher stalls”, which along with proceeds from 
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renting royal property, paid for “the conduct of city business.”192  Funds were also generated 
through the levying of duties on anchorage at New Orleans and “special taxes” on imported 
brandy.193  To revive the flagging colonial trade O’Reilly suggested that the colony be allowed to 
operate under relaxed trade restrictions and granted open trade with Spain and Havana, provided 
the appropriate duties were paid.   By January of 1770, Louisianans were able to export and 
import duty free from the port of Havana.194 
In addition to trade reforms, O’Reilly spent a considerable amount of time reforming the 
legislative, executive and judicial functions of the government.  To begin with, as soon as his 
fleet could be sailed up from New Orleans, O’Reilly arranged for a suitably impressive 
ceremony in which, after volleys of cannon fire and a parade of his soldiers, he lowered the 
French flag and raised the Spanish.195  This act ended the “government of two heads” and left no 
doubt as to the seriousness of the Spanish intent – from that point onward, there would be no 
grounds for confusion as to which Royal Majesty owned Louisiana.196   
Perhaps O’Reilly’s largest step along the path to unifying the colonial government was 
the dissolution of the Superior Council and creation of the Spanish Cabildo in New Orleans on 
November 25, 1769. O’Reilly intended to institute the Cabildo system in the colony as soon as 
possible, and had minutes of the organization recorded as early as August 18th, when he first 
arrived in the city – well before the system was implemented and the body had its first official 
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meeting on December 1st, 1769.197  O’Reilly needed the Spanish instrument of law and 
governance implemented to phase out the laws and customs of France and usher the Spanish 
legal system into the colony.198  The Cabildo also served as a much preferred alternative to the 
Superior Council, an administrative and legislative body which had proven itself both ineffective 
in governing and dangerous through its members’ involvement in, and the Council’s position as 
a French institution during, the Revolt of 1768. 
After dissolving the Superior Council O’Reilly began integrating the colony into the 
Spanish legal system. He appointed two of the lawyers he had used in the trials of the insurgents: 
the prosecutor Felix Del Rey, and Judge Advocate Manuel José de Urrutia to draft the collection 
of reforms, regulations and compilations of legal abstracts commonly known as the Code 
O’Reilly.199   This code was then made available in both the Spanish and French languages in 
order that the citizens could learn their new laws.   
O’Reilly realized it was critical that he impart an understanding, if not appreciation, for 
Spanish law and custom in the Louisianan subjects if the colony was to be successfully 
reconciled to Spanish rule.  To that end, and to the end of securing colonial loyalty, O’Reilly 
placed five of the wealthier planters who had remained loyal during the rebellion on the Cabildo 
as regidores, or councilors.200  A sixth seat went to Denis Braud, the French printer who had 
gone to trial for his printing of the memoirs of the Superior Council.201  This integration of 
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interested and respected locals, he hoped, would help to attach the new government to the people 
it governed and place governance in the trust of respectable people who had a vested tie to the 
welfare of the colony through the value of their personal property. 
Lieutenant General Alejandro O’Reilly turned over the administration of Louisiana to 
Governor Luis de Unzaga y Amezaga December 1st, 1769.202  Having effectively put down the 
rebellion, and restored order to the colony in his time there, O’Reilly left Louisiana with 
distinction.  His blend of the threat of overwhelming military force, judiciously used punishment, 
amnesty, and meaningful reform could serve as a text on how to effectively pacify collective 
political violence.  O’Reilly replaced the French laws, official language, commercial policies and 
administrative forms – cutting Louisiana’s ties to France significantly, if not completely.  This 
was reinforced by the introduction of Spanish as the official language, as well as the pomp and 
ceremony that O’Reilly used to solidify the Spanish regime as legitimate.  He used selective 
punishment and forgiveness as well as incorporating the local elite into the Spanish 
governmental system to effectively isolate and criminalize the rebel faction – turning the basis 
for revolt back from the collective to the personal. 
His legal and commercial reforms energized the colonial economy, alleviating that as a 
source of discontent. 203  It is important to note that these changes were made with a large degree 
of transparency allowing the colonists to see how Spanish rule benefitted them – a marked 
change from the quiet work of Governor Ulloa.  The increased budget from Spain that O’Reilly 
took with him also acted to lessen the discomfort and fears of the populace of Louisiana.  
Finally, the considerable military force he left behind provided a deterrent to further incidents of 
                                                 
202 Reeves, 25. 
203 Moore, Revolt in Louisiana, 218. 
77 
 
rebellion.  This is not to say that French sympathy, and a certain degree of distrust of the 
Spaniards, was not left in the colony.  After the poor start with Governor Ulloa, and the 
rebellion, neither Spaniard nor creole could entirely trust the other.  However, O’Reilly’s mix of 
repression through implied force, enforced laws and concession through amnesty and meaningful 
reform went a long way toward unifying those two factions within the colony to a peaceful, if not 
always completely happy whole. 
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CHAPTER III 
CARONDELET’S TENUOUS PEACE 
The peace and stability brought to Louisiana by Lieutenant O’Reilly would not last for 
long.  Twenty three years after the rebellion under Ulloa, economic woes, natural disasters, 
pressure from the United States, ethnic tension and revolutionary ideologies brought the 
possibility of collective political violence to the administration of Francisco Luis Hector, Baron 
de Carondelet.  Carondelet announced his arrival as military and civil governor of the province 
of Louisiana on December 29, 1791.204  The strength of his familial connections and his 
command of the French language from his childhood, considered important given the amount of 
French still spoken in the colony, may have accounted in part for why he was chosen for the 
governorship of Louisiana. 205  Carondelet was also a skilled administrator who had through 
“ability and unremitting exertions and zeal, risen to rank and importance in the service of 
Spain.”206  Despite his qualifications and troubles, Carondelet has received a fair amount of 
criticism as a colonial leader. 
The historiography on colonial Spanish Louisiana largely castigates Carondelet for 
overreacting to the threat of revolution and damaging the diplomatic position of Spain versus the 
United States (especially with regards to his Indian policies).207  Arthur P. Whitaker found him 
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shortsighted and militaristic.  Ernst Liljegren and later Gilbert C. Din criticize Carondelet for 
lacking prudence, character, good judgment, and being unable to accurately discern the scope of 
the various dangers the colony faced.208  Perhaps to a certain extent this is a just assessment of 
him.  Baron Carondelet enacted a number of measures meant to save Louisiana for the Spanish 
crown, but in the end some of his choices hurt the Spanish effort.  In any event, he certainly did 
not single handedly save Louisiana for Spain.  Ultimately that would have required significant 
Spanish support, and the colony did not produce enough to justify the massive expense Spain 
would have to have laid out to keep her.   
It must be considered that Carondelet did what he could to assuage the populace of his 
colony during troubled times by providing them access to necessary staples.  Also, it should be 
said in his defense that there is ample evidence that Carondelet recognized that economic 
dependence and demographic ties were the forces that would pull Louisiana from Spain and to 
the United States.  However he was limited by his resources and was constantly distracted from 
attending to the long-term viability of the colony by immediate threats.  One must keep in mind 
that for the duration of his stay in Louisiana Baron Carondelet was able to successfully keep a 
large degree of control, and though there were periods of unrest, a large scale popular revolt 
never broke out in the colony. 
Throughout Baron Carondelet’s governorship, Louisiana’s distance from Spain and close 
proximity to the United States made the colony difficult to control.  Though there were 
significant internal threats to security, as well as European intrigues; the colony’s proximity to 
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the relatively free Americans was almost always a factor to some degree.  Carondelet found a 
number of causes to fear for American invasion, or colonial revolt spurred on by American aid.   
Particularly in the Kentucky territory and along the Georgia frontier, American settlers looked to 
expand into territory claimed by Spain.  At the same time ‘Citizen’ Edmund Genet was agitating 
(from America) for the French ‘habitants’ of Spanish Louisiana to revolt - promising American 
assistance.209  Jacobin propaganda printed in Philadelphia found its way into New Orleans by 
ships sailing from American ports.  Carondelet’s spies repeatedly advised him that America 
might invade, and that his defenses were weak in the north of the colony.210  This pushed him to 
try to settle northern or sparse areas of the colony such as New Madrid, Natchez or Nogales, and 
make risky alliances with native tribes.211  Especially during the wars with France (1793-1795) 
and Great Britain (1796-1808) – when Louisiana needed her more as a trade ally, America was a 
powerful force in shaping the nature of Spanish policy. 
Despite a lack of commitment to invasion by the American Government (which opposed 
any kind of invasion into Spanish Louisiana), there were a number of reasons that Baron 
Carondelet believed that an invasion of American frontiersmen very well could be imminent.212  
Foremost among those was that occasionally Americans would plan to invade Louisiana.  In 
1797, Senator William Blount of Tennessee was involved with such an invasion plan.  Blount, 
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with American frontiersmen, British, and Indian allies, intended to lead a three pronged invasion 
into New Madrid, New Orleans and Pensacola.213   
As far as Carondelet was concerned, that was neither a new, nor isolated incident.  
Among the more important of the earlier invasion threats was Citizen Edmund Charles Genet, 
official minister to the United States from the French Republic during 1793.  Genet was a loud 
and forceful proponent of an American invasion of Louisiana.  He wanted to stage such an 
invasion alongside a simultaneous revolt of the French habitants.  French Foreign Minister Pierre 
Lebrun dispatched Citizen Genet to the United States with secret orders to foment rebellion 
within Louisiana and to promote American filibusters into the Spanish colonies of Florida and 
Louisiana.214  Genet’s ‘secret’ invasion raised the specter of insecurity that haunted Carondelet 
for the majority of his term.215   
Carondelet’s concern over Genet stemmed in part from a pamphlet that Genet published 
in America.  This pamphlet, entitled Liberty, Equality.  The Freemen of France to their brothers 
in Louisiana: 2d year of the French Republic, compares the economic misfortune of the 
Louisiana colony under the Spanish regime to the success of the free men in the “province of 
Kentucky… rapidly increasing its population and wealth, and already presaging a prosperity 
which causes the Spanish government to tremble.”216  Thus establishing the reasons for a 
justified ire with the Spanish regime, the pamphlet moves on to prompt immediate action, calling 
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on the French ‘habitants’ to remember their mother country and be ready to rise against the 
Spaniards.  Lest they be afraid for the success of his cause, Genet promises “that the republicans 
of the western portion of the United States are ready to come down the Ohio and Mississippi in 
company with a considerable number of French republicans, and rush to your assistance under 
the banners of France and liberty”.217   
In broad strokes, Genet’s pamphlet encapsulated the entirety of Carondelet’s problems.  It 
not only trumpeted the threat of American invasion (though that invasion never materialized); it 
also showed that the highly regulated Spanish colonial system was perceived to be stagnant when 
compared to the free system of the United States’ frontier.  This was exactly the kind of 
ideological hook that could catch hold with the discontented and spark another revolt among the 
French “habitants”. 
Alongside the appearance of the pamphlet were reports from Spanish spies that Genet 
was massing a small army of Americans to march into Louisiana. These reports indicated 
additional reasons that Genet was providing to the discontented on the American side of the 
frontier.218  Throughout April of 1794 Carondelet wrote secret letters to the Captain General of 
Cuba, Don Louis de las Casas alerting him to the creation of a French army in America, led by 
“Jorge Clark Commander-in-chief of the French against the upper settlements of Luisiana”; 
Jorge Clark was the American General George Rogers Clark.219  Carondelet included with this 
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letter a translation of Clark’s proposal offering men who would fight with him at least one 
thousand acres of land.  The stated purposes of the invasion were “a reduction of the Spanish 
posts of the Mississippi, for the purpose of opening the navigation and commerce of said River, 
and giving liberty to its inhabitants”.220  These reports gave Carondelet a plausible motive for a 
Franco-American alliance – navigation of the Mississippi (America) and liberty for the French 
inhabitants of Louisiana (France).  Sent alongside that report was a translation of a report given 
by a Chickasaw chieftain, Ugula Yucabe.  That translation reports a massing of white men, either 
Americans or Frenchmen, who were constructing boats to carry men and pieces of artillery down 
the Mississippi river to New Orleans.221 
The shared border between Spanish Louisiana and the United States acted to erode 
Spanish authority, economic importance, and cultural cohesiveness in much the same way that 
the Spanish/British border did in the 1760’s.  Throughout the 1790’s the United States gained a 
significant advantage over Spain in terms of trade, immigration, lands gained through diplomatic 
concessions, and economic dependence.  Importantly, the Spaniards were not as successful as the 
United States in recruiting and securing the loyalties of the frontiersmen.  To use A.P. 
Whitaker’s terminology, Spain and the United States were waging a war of incorporation along 
the frontier borderlands, and the United States was winning.222  That is, the Spanish colonial 
model could not withstand direct competition with the more robust model of trade and expansion 
fostered by the Americans.  Carondelet’s administration – a remote arm of a distant centralized 
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power, Spain, could not compete with America - a local and decentralized (thus more flexible) 
power.223   
The American threat to Spanish colonial Louisiana was not just a military, or ideological 
one, it was a demographic and economic one.  Baron Carondelet recognized this.  However, 
whether he was focused on military defenses or civil administration, he did not have the means 
to turn that tide.  In fact it seems that many of the short term measures necessary to keep the 
peace served to strengthen Louisiana’s reliance on Americans and thus pull her away from 
Spain.  This reliance on the nearby foreign power only served to exacerbate other problems of 
control which Carondelet’s administration routinely encountered. 
While not as significant a split as that between the French and Spanish populations of 
Louisiana, an “internal border” was developing in Louisiana between the Spanish, habitant, and 
American settlers.  By the time of Carondelet’s governorship, the Louisiana colony had already 
absorbed a number of American immigrants.  Prior to Carondelet, Governor Miro instituted a 
generous immigration policy designed to bring Americans into Louisiana, “Hispanize” them, 
convert them to Catholicism and secure their allegiance to Spain, such that they would defend 
her even against other Americans.224  Miro’s immigration policies saw initial success.  The rate 
of increase threatened to overwhelm the existing free population of the colony.  Americans made 
up a large number of the white immigrants who entered Louisiana between the years 1782 and 
1792.  According to David Weber’s numbers, American immigrants into the colony “helped 
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swell its population from some 20,000 in 1782 to 45,000 a decade later.”225  Immigrants from 
that period would have accounted for half the population of the colony by 1792.  However that 
growth would not last.  By 1803, the population of the colony had grown only by another 5,000 
persons.226 
By the mid 1790’s Miro’s plan was failing for a number of reasons.  Miro’s immigration 
plan required a relatively peaceful period to concentrate the energies of the state on importing 
and converting the Americans.227  Spain did not enjoy any such period of peace for long during 
Carondelet’s term.  Furthermore American immigrants had a tendency not to assimilate to 
Spanish rule.  This again, as in the 1760s, created an “internal border” of ethnic allegiances 
within the colony.  While recognizing that colonists leaving the American western frontier would 
weaken the United States, Carondelet distrusted the new American immigrants, whom he 
considered to be republicans.  Early in his administration he acted to curtail the rather generous 
immigration policies of Governor Miro.228   
Carondelet’s writings show ample evidence that during the first few years of his rule he 
believed that American immigrants posed a significant threat, not in their strength of arms, but in 
the rapidity with which they settled, and the virulence of their ideas.  In the aforementioned 
report to the Duke de la Alcudia, dated November 24, 1794, he refers to them as a “vast and 
restless population, progressively driving the Indian tribes before them and upon us, seek[ing] to 
possess themselves of all the vast regions which the Indians occupy between the Ohio and 
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Misisipi [sic] rivers, the Gulf of Mexico and the Apalache mountains”.229  Once the Americans 
were allowed to cross the Mississippi and Missouri rivers they would spread colonies throughout 
the Spanish holdings, enticing Spanish subjects into disloyalty by “offering them their help and 
protection for the securing of independence, self-government and self-taxation”.230  If they are 
allowed to spread into Louisiana, American frontiersmen “will flatter them [the inhabitants] with 
the spirit of liberty, [and] the hope of free, extensive and lucrative commerce”.231  Carondelet’s 
eventual restrictions on written materials coming from abroad show that he also recognized that 
American (and French) cultural contact was a threat to the colony.  Carondelet feared that 
contact with Americans would breed fervor for liberty, and that contact with the French would 
renew old ties.  In both instances the “Spanish” character of the colony, and thus Spain’s hold on 
her, would be lessened by the other influences and the potential for political unrest would 
increase.232 
In addition to border tension and distance from Spain, Louisiana suffered from a number 
of economic troubles – many similar to those of the 1760’s.  Parts of the colony could not be 
considered self sufficient.  Food scarcity continued to be a problem that plagued Carondelet 
throughout his term as governor, just as it had the governors before him and would the governors 
after.  Under the administration of Bernardo de Galvez, the rarity of food caused a Cedula to be 
passed in 1782 which allowed trade to the United States for flour and supplies, and lessened the 
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trade restrictions with France.233  That opening of trade to Americans made Baron Carondelet 
quite nervous because he feared that American spies would make use of the freedom of travel in 
the province, as alleged spy Don Midad Mitchel did in 1793. 234  Even more than American 
spies, Carondelet feared that rumors were true that such trade with Americans would give slaves 
an opportunity to escape to America, where they would be given freedom and that specie would 
be traded out of the province.   
Another issue for Carondelet was the perpetual scarcity of money backed by precious 
metals.  The desire to keep what little coin was in the colony was so great that exportation of 
specie from New Orleans was, in fact, illegal except when it was used as payment for slaves.235  
From time to time the colonial administration introduced paper money as a stop-gap substitute in 
order that some form of currency would be available for trade.  Traders valued such paper money 
very little compared to specie and would avoid using it when they could do so.  There are letters 
by the trader Juan Batista McCarty in 1784 noting that the cost of flour or African slaves doubled 
when they were purchased with paper money.  He further asserted that there was no reason to 
accept paper currency.  McCarty advised accepting bills of exchange to be honored at the 
treasury at Vera Cruz rather than deal with any non-specie backed currency from Louisiana.236   
Such paper money issuances led to rampant inflation.  In 1791 there was a petition to the 
Cabildo to have the monies allotted to prisons upped by ½ real per day to account for inflation.237  
Likewise in April of 1792 bailiffs appointed by the Cabildo complained that their salaries were 
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no longer sufficient and were a cause of disrespect, which was impeding their ability to carry out 
their duties.238  On June 13th of 1794 the head constable had to request that several cabarets be 
opened in order that the fines and taxes from those cabarets pay the salaries for more deputy 
constables.239  Many of these cabarets were closed not because of the threat to public order or the 
morale and morals of the general population. Rather they were closed because there was a fear 
that escaped and rebellious slaves were using the cabarets as black markets to purchase 
munitions and liquor at night and successfully avoiding the slave patrols.  That these would be 
re-opened is a telling indication of both how dire the need for more deputy constables must have 
been as well as an indication of a complete lack of money in the colony with which to pay 
them.240 
A shift in agriculture was part of the economic instability.  Planters were replacing indigo 
and tobacco with cotton and sugar as the main colonial exports.  In the ten years between 1784 
and 1793, the production of indigo bound for Europe dropped from 220,000 lbs to less than 
5,000 lbs.241  A number of conditions contributed to the decline.  Blights, vermin and/or flooding 
devastated colonial indigo crops in the years 1793, 1794, and 1796.242  This combined with 
decreases in the costs of East Indian indigo, general European preferences for the same, the 
increasing costs of slaves – of which a large number were needed for indigo production-- 
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combined to cement the downward spiral of indigo as a viable commercial crop.243  Baron 
Carondelet considered, and attempted, several schemes to incentivise Louisiana indigo but the 
market was dropping out from under the crop, which must have made the effort seem some 
Louisiana planters to be foolish and thus potentially damaging to the prestige and authority of his 
office. 244 
Tobacco exports, likewise, saw a huge drop when the Spanish tobacco monopoly stopped 
buying in 1790.  There were a number of reasons for the collapse of the Louisiana tobacco 
market.  The quality of Louisiana tobacco was inferior to that of Mexico, Cuba, and the 
Caribbean Islands.  Planter fraud led to conflicts with Spanish regulators. For example, General 
Wilkinson maneuvered to break the Louisiana monopoly of tobacco with Spain, opening Spanish 
markets to tobacco from Kentucky.  Finally, a building surplus in New Orleans led to a decline 
in the demand for new leaf there – reducing the amount purchased by the state monopoly from 
2,000,000 lbs. to a mere 40,000 lbs. in 1790.245  Such a relatively rapid decline ruined farmers 
who had speculated heavily on tobacco cultivation, betting that the market would keep rising (or 
even remain relatively stable).  Many who lost big on tobacco correctly blamed the Spanish 
commercial policies for their reversed fortunes. 
The rise of cotton and sugar as replacement exports took time.  Sugar did not really take 
off until the mid 1790’s after the proven success of Etienne de Borés granulation process in 1795 
and the collapse of the Caribbean sugar plantations of St. Domingue.  Early European 
monopolies limited the import of sugar to that produced in the Caribbean colonies, thus limiting 
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the viability of Louisiana sugar.  It was not until the mid 1790’s that many of these restrictions 
were lifted, due in part to the Haitian revolution which limited the production of Caribbean sugar 
and led to the immigration of many experienced sugar planters from the island to Louisiana.246  
However, even after sugar began to replace indigo as a crop there were significant barriers to 
sugar planting which prevented many failing indigo planters from making the transition.  Sugar 
planting required a large initial outlay of capital for the slaves to work the fields, as well as the 
equipment and fuel necessary to process the cane (often cords of wood, or, once in operation, the 
pressed remnants of unused cane), and the cane shoots themselves.247  This outlay, and the 
limited season for sugar growing and production (the available sugar cane varieties would not 
stand frost either during growth or before grinding) prevented many planters from making the 
indigo to sugar transition.   
Cotton was not an effective crop until the mid 1790’s, after the adoption of Eli Whitney’s 
cotton gin and the increased immigration of American settlers and slaves into Spanish 
Louisiana.248   
In sum, the agricultural disruption caused by a shift in the relative value of commercial 
crops lead to discontent in city and country alike, as farmers and merchants both suffered under 
weight of export crops with shrinking markets – leading to widespread financial insecurity.   
Farmers often expressed their discontent “in the form of dissatisfaction from Spanish 
rule”, and felt that a French acquisition of the colony would not only allow them to explore 
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markets denied to them by the Spanish mercantile system, but also absolve them of prior debt 
and allow them the freedom to re-tool their plantations to take advantage of sugar or cotton.249   
The colony also had to contend with food production that was hardly sufficient to its 
needs.  John Clark, in New Orleans: An Economic History, 1718-1812, calculated that the 
Missouri country produced 38,000 to 45,000 bushels of wheat a year in the 1790’s.  This was 
enough wheat to generate around 7,000 to 9,000 barrels of flour.250  Of this amount, farmers 
would have shipped perhaps half to New Orleans for consumption.  Given that New Orleans’ 
population alone was around 8,000 and the lower valley held between 35,000 to 40,000 souls 
during the 1790’s, the amount of flour produced was problematic.  That amount of flour was not 
nearly enough to satisfy the demands of the city, to say nothing of the rest of the colony.251  Such 
shortages created discontent – hunger being a significant impediment to happiness. 
War with France prompted the colonial officials to press the king for more trade rights 
with America.  Previously the province had maintained trade with France, and a stable trade ally 
was needed for the colony in order to prevent the colony from running low on critical supplies 
and staples, and to ease tensions caused by the sudden loss of trade.  During the war with France, 
America was considered a ‘Friendly Nation’ to Spain, allowing it to be a trade partner for the 
duration of the war under the trade allowances of the edict of June 9th, 1793.252  The supplies 
from America came with a cost to the Governor.  As mentioned, Carondelet was very suspicious 
of potential expansion by American frontiersmen and the increase in trade with America made 
Carondelet more nervous about the security of the colony. 
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The close attention Spanish officials normally paid to persons and written materials 
imported into Louisiana stood in contrast to the rather lax enforcement of shipping laws 
concerning the import of foodstuffs.  In addition to food shortages, New Orleans was almost 
always short of supplies.  To satisfy the need for goods, colonial officials were willing to ignore 
the entry of smugglers, particularly the smuggling of taxable food into New Orleans.253  In July 
of 1791 a Royal Decree pardoned those in the colony accused of smuggling.254  It is likely that 
the attachment to (if not outright dependence on) American shipping as the main source of 
sustenance of the colony was in the long term a greater problem for Spanish retention of the 
colony than republican frenzy spurred on by Jacobin propaganda. That trade created ties to 
America; at the same time ties to Spain were weakening through the loss of Spanish trade.  
Stronger ties to Spain would have helped prevent discontent from being politicized as it was in 
the 1768 revolt.  Furthermore, direct external trade to foreign powers also contributed to the 
colony being a net loss for Spain.  Illegal and duty-free trade out of New Orleans was a financial 
blow to the colony.  Charles Gayarré demonstrates this deficit by citing “a dispatch of the 
Intendant Rendon, dated on the 28th of April, 1795, that the expenses of the province had 
amounted in 1794 to $864,126, and that the custom-house revenue had not given more than 
$57,506.”255 
Devastation from natural disasters as well as man-made disasters deepened the economic 
hole that New Orleans, the economic center of the province, was in.  On Oct. 10, 1794 Attorney 
General Don Juan Bautista Labatut wrote to the king asking for aide to the province.  He cited a 
number of troubles.  Amongst those troubles were: repeated scarcity from war, hurricanes, the 
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Cuban administration’s confiscation of silver meant for the province, little to no trade to Europe, 
poor trade to the United States, and no goods coming from the other Spanish American 
colonies.256  On December 19th of that same year, Labatut wrote the king again asking for a loan 
of 1,000,000 pesos.  He cited the following reasons that the loan was justified: five hurricanes, 
floods too numerous to count, two great fires and the sudden withdrawal of paper money.  He 
claimed that those factors had greatly weakened commercial production, nearly to the point of 
destruction, and lead to an imminent threat of mass immigration from the colony.257  Not all of 
these great disasters happened during the governorship of Baron Carondelet; however he 
certainly had to deal with their effects, particularly the heightening of distress and unrest 
amongst the citizens of New Orleans and the colony as a whole that accompanied and followed 
economic depression. 
To some planters there was an upside to the disasters that plagued the colony.  Some 
disasters brought the planters and colonial administration to work more closely together.  Slaves 
were often loaned out to the governor to work in repairing damage caused by natural disasters 
such as damage to levees due to flooding.258  Some planters preferred this as a method of 
disposing of slaves who were caught committing crimes.  Planters could loan their slaves out to 
the governor for periods of time, rather than risk losing the investment to deportation.259  This 
arrangement, in a way turned the normally stressing condition of natural disasters (at least 
hurricanes, and floods) to one that fostered a tighter relationship between the administration and 
one of the more important classes of colonists. 
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For the most part, however, Louisiana planters preferred to have free reign to run their 
plantations and slaves as they saw fit.  This preference to run their own affairs, running against 
the wary policies of Carondelet, may itself have engendered feelings of resentment that the 
Governor may have interpreted as Jacobin leanings.  Such resentment of government 
interference, as well as observations of the American success to the north, and sympathies to 
their French ties may have indeed bred sympathy in some for the Jacobin cause – although that 
sympathy would always be tempered by the anti-slavery views espoused by some of the 
Jacobins.  Baron Carondelet hinted in the 1795 decree that he believed there were enemies of the 
crown and his personal political enemies at work undermining his efforts.260  Carondelet believed 
these personal enemies to be the French, and Jacobins in the northern part of the Louisiana 
province, near Ohio, and along the Mississippi river, men who could not defeat Spain in the 
open.  He believed they used local sympathizers and agent provocateurs to slander him and claim 
that he maneuvered to position slave against master and actively hoped for a slave revolt in order 
to spread dissatisfaction with him amongst the habitants.261  That belief was not entirely without 
merit. 
There were, in 1793, one hundred and fifty subjects of the colony who petitioned the 
French government to reclaim Louisiana.  In March of that year a delegation of fifty merchants 
from New Orleans sent deputies to the French convention with gifts.  Rumors circulated that this 
same group of men conspired to have Baron Carondelet removed as Governor-General of the 
colony.262  These petitions circulated in a period of exuberant popular mania for all things French 
which occurred in the city of New Orleans in the early 1790’s.  At that time, the colonists 
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celebrated their French heritage in a manner which occasionally seemed threatening to the 
Spanish governor.263 
Carondelet also had to contend with rural discontent.  The Natchitoches revolt led by 
Father Delvaux is an extreme example of the occasional rural unrest in Carondelet’s Louisiana, 
as well as of some weaknesses of the syndic system for maintaining order.  Ernest Liljegren’s 
take on events holds that Father Jean Delvaux, a parish priest in Natchitoches had as his flock a 
number of old French families that had “degenerated” in status during the Spanish rule of 
Louisiana.264  Delvaux developed a penchant for negatively commenting on Spanish rule, and 
promoting the French.  Eventually word of this reached back to New Orleans.  For inciting the 
populace of Natchitoches to anti-Spanish sentiment, Baron Carondelet requested the replacement 
of Delvaux, and the Vicar-General granted the governor’s request.  Delvaux’s flock refused to 
accept his relocation out of the parish, and when the local syndic, François Bossie, refused to 
sign their petition to prevent Delvaux’s removal, Delvaux’s supporters informed him (Bossie) 
that they would no longer recognize him as syndic.265  They took to harassing those in the 
community that would not sign the petition, and split the town into two opposed factions.  One 
faction was composed of the supporters of Delvaux, who adopted revolutionary ideology and 
agitated in the streets; in the other were the loyal citizens who were largely afraid to leave their 
homes. 
When Carondelet denied the parishioners’ petition they formed a drunken “Compagnie 
des Revenants” and demonstrated against Spanish rule – singing revolutionary songs and loudly 
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criticizing both Carondelet and the syndic system.266  In H. Sophie Burton & F. Todd Smith’s 
Colonial Natchitoches: A Creole Community on the Louisiana-Texas Frontier, the impetus for 
the creation of the Revenants is revealed to be the negative impact that the Spanish cancellation 
of Natchitoches’ tobacco contracts had on the young men within the area, rather than republican 
teachings by Delvaux – though Burton and Smith do acknowledge that Delvaux was a 
contributing factor to the unrest.  Many planters in the Natchitoches area were still heavily vested 
in tobacco after many other areas left the crop, and suffered a great economic hardship when the 
Spanish demand for Louisiana tobacco plummeted in 1790.  Many farmers blamed Spanish 
officials for this sudden decline in their personal fortunes and the Revenants were a group of 
young men expressing their discontent with the economic environment and what they believed to 
be Spanish mismanagement of the Louisiana colony.267 
Patrols raised by the surrounding syndics did not have the confidence of the area, and 
could not maintain control.  The Revenants harassed, insulted and beat those with whom they 
disagreed with seeming impunity.  Even after Carondelet had Delvaux removed he still remained 
a source of agitation in the community by writing letters to his supporters urging them to 
continue their efforts against Spanish authority and claiming that the French were on their way to 
reclaim the colony.268  Fearing for his reputation and that these events would damage the case he 
was making for using Louisiana settlers as a barrier between the United States and Mexico, 
Carondelet decided to quell the rebellion.  On January 14,1794, Captain Antonio Argote of the 
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Baton Rouge militia took a company of fifteen men and easily restored order in Nacthitoches ,  
with only a few punitive measures taken against the former Revenants.269 
The Natchitoches rebellion serves as an example of how local discontent wholly 
unrelated to the ideology of the French Revolution borrowed its slogans.  Delvaux’s discontent 
was personal, or perhaps professional.  Economic troubles due to the sudden lack of Spanish 
interest in tobacco produced in Natchitoches and the removal of Delvaux caused most of the 
discontent felt by his followers.270  Like the 1768 coup, the Natchitoches revolt was directed by a 
small, yet influential segment of the local population.  And similar to, and even more 
exaggerated than the 1768 coup, there was no clear agenda after the removal of the local source 
of authority.271  Delvaux simply wished to resist the Spanish authority until the time that the 
French arrived. 
Historian Ernst Liljegren took Carondelet’s (allegedly wildly exaggerated) reports of the 
Nacthitoches demonstrations as proof of wide-scale discontent and political violence.  After 
examining Liljegren’s sources, historian Gilbert C. Din came to a different conclusion about the 
incident.  Comparing Carondelet’s reports to his superiors with those to his subordinates led Din 
to the conclusion that in many reports to those superiors Carondelet exaggerated the opposition 
he faced, perhaps in an attempt to ensure more resources and minimize any possible reprimand 
for failure.272  Carondelet’s exaggerated reports led Liljegren to overstate the problems in 
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Nacthitoches and the rest of the rural Louisiana countryside as well as Carondelet’s inability to 
deal with the problems at hand.273 
More than the French military, Baron Carondelet feared French ideological influence.  
Carondelet had good reason to fear the spread of Jacobinism in the city of New Orleans as well 
as in remote areas such as Natchitoches.  In May of 1795 songs defaming him, and calling for the 
guillotining of notables within the city, including the governor, were heard at night in the 
streets.274  The anthem of the French republic, the ‘Marseillaise’ was played alongside other 
Jacobin songs in some theatres.275  At the same time the French phrase ‘Cochon du lait’, meaning 
‘suckling pig’, began to see use as a derogatory rhyming slang for Carondelet in the streets of 
New Orleans.276  There are mentions in the deliberations of the Cabildo on May 2nd 1795 of 
“rumors and calumnies against the person of his lordship”.  The rumors complained that 
Carondelet purposefully kept the city in a state of defense as a pretense to enforce more draconic 
and tyrannical laws against the people, and furthermore that he used methods proscribed by law 
to investigate and punish those who insulted the persons who governed.  Carondelet vehemently 
denied these rumors and vowed to spare no expense to investigate them.277 
Arson had gotten to be a problem in New Orleans.  Some feared that rebellious slaves 
were behind the conflagrations of 1788 and 1792 that burned a large portion of the city.278  In 
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1795 arsonists set a series of small fires around the city of New Orleans.  These came at the same 
time as a resurgence of Jacobin sentiment, expressed through “revolutionary songs…and 
incendiary papers” appearing in the city.  Jacobin mobs used the fires as gathering places, and 
Carondelet feared that attempts to disperse them would instigate violent action.279  For the same 
reason he felt that policing such areas was dangerous.  This is not to say that he abandoned all 
attempts to control the situation; Carondelet posted a reward of 500 pesos to any person who 
could provide information leading to the capture of the arsonist or arsonists.280 
All of this concern about Jacobinism and Carondolet’s rule came to a head in 1795 during 
the months following the April 9th report of a planned slave revolt in Point Coupée.  A group of 
Point Coupée slaves, perhaps inspired by French republican propaganda originating from France 
and Saint Domingue, plotted to revolt and burn their master, Julien Poydras’ estate.281  Once the 
fire had started, the slaves planned on ambushing and killing the neighboring planters who would 
rush to Poydras’ assistance.  The conspirators then would take up the arms of the killed planters 
and launch a large revolt, killing both colonial whites and slaves who refused to join their 
rebellion.282 
Once alerted to the danger, Militia Captian Alejandro LeBlanc reported to his post 
commandant Guillermo Duparc and sent a patrol to uncover more information.283  The initial 
patrol was not successful in doing so.  However, Duparc launched his own defensive measures, 
including an increase of armed patrols.  Local planters armed themselves in preparation for a 
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revolt.  Not long thereafter two slaves, Juan Batista and María Luisa, provided specific 
information regarding the planned slave insurrection.  Two Tunica tribeswomen, Francisca and 
Magdalena, confirmed their story – fearing that should the slave revolt succeed, they would 
suffer retribution alongside the slaves.284  Duparc, with the aid of Lt. William McIntosh, who had 
been dispatched with a company of militia to assist, began a thorough search of the slave cabins. 
This uncovered more conspirators, and some of their arms.  Planters and syndics uncovered the 
shocking revelation that there were whites among the Point Coupée conspirators as well.285 
Throughout April and into May the numbers of uncovered conspirators grew.  
Commandant Duparc began to believe that the conspiracy was an attempt by “indigenous people 
amongst the pro-French, anti-Spanish elements of the colony or outside agitators” to either 
overthrow the colony or disgrace governor Carondelet.286  By May 15th authorities had arrested 
60 conspirators: 57 slaves and 3 whites.287  After a series of trials the conspirators received a 
variety of punishments.  Advisor to the intendancy Manuel Serrano sentenced twenty three to 
twenty six of the slaves to hang.288  Another twenty-two were sentenced to 10 years service in 
the presidio system of fortresses.  Nine of the slaves received shorter sentences of 5 years in the 
presidios.  Serrano had one slave and one of the whites banished.  The other two whites received 
sentences of 6 years presidio duty.289   
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During the later stages of the investigation there was some disagreement between 
Carondelet and the New Orleans Cabildo over which of them should have handled the matter, 
and what actions were to be taken to secure the colony.  The Cabildo sent representatives to 
Point Coupee to investigate at the same time that Carondelet sent a small military detachment for 
the same purpose.290  Carondelet viewed this act with some suspicion.  On May 1st, Carondelet 
took care to explain his actions to the Cabildo with emphasis on how he strove to secure the 
colony.  Given that Carondelet wrote, secretly, to Luis de la Casas in Cuba that he believed some 
on the Cabildo to be Jacobin sympathizers, the explanation of his actions that he presented to the 
Cabildo may have been an attempt to protect his reputation from Jacobin slander in that body.291 
Baron Carondelet issued a decree on June 1st encapsulating his thoughts on a variety of 
issues as well as a defense of his actions.  This decree starts out with Carondelet’s thoughts on 
the current political climate: “The astonishing success, with which some disaffected, restless 
enthusiasts, have promulgated injurious reports, tending to introduce distrust, and jealousy, 
between Government and the habitants, that would inevitably expose the Province to all the 
Horrors that have ruined the French Colonies, has engaged us to form Regulations, calculated to 
re-establish throughout this Province good order, Police and Public tranquility.”292  This passage 
begins to outline the suspicions that Baron Carondelet had that there were conspiracies behind 
the social problems in the Province.  Slaves were not simply driven into revolt by mere 
dissatisfaction with their lives; they were incited by European events.  Crimes were not 
committed by the hungry and desperate, they were products of propaganda from “restless 
enthusiasts”.   
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The June 1st decree, which also broadened the role of the syndics, and tightened the 
police duties, had a section on slave treatment.  Carondelet ordered slave owners to exercise 
extreme care over the conduct of their slaves and to make sure that they were kept contented and 
subordinate.  The stated concern was that the recent war might have put them in a state ready to 
be incited to rebellion.  The goal was then to “banish from their minds the notion of acquiring a 
liberty that has caused the effusion of so much blood to those of St. Domingo.”293  A set of 31 
rules and guidelines for the treatment and conduct of slaves followed this declaration.  They were 
meant to keep the slaves contented enough not to want to rebell, yet not indulged enough to 
begin to be tempted to insubordination.  The 1795 decree presented again a philosophy of 
moderation, and while far more restrictive than was usual before the Pointe Coupee revolt, it still 
to a certain extent called for appeasement of the slaves.  As such, Carondelet’s policies were still 
not the most popular with planters, who openly blamed Carondelet and the lenient slave policies 
before the revolt for it.294 
Baron Carondelet understood the dire need for defense, security, and measures of control 
in Louisiana well before he issued the June 1st decree of 1795.  Early in his tenure, he 
implemented a number of safety and security measures meant both to reinforce Spanish control 
and to protect the colony against the machinations of its enemies: the French, Americans, British, 
Jacobins, criminals and rebellious slaves.  In October of 1792 he called for the property owning 
citizenry of New Orleans to put money together for the purchase of reflectors to be installed on 
street lamps.  That would have allowed for much better lighting in the city and reduced crime.295  
More street lamps, ordered from Philadelphia, arrived in April of 1794.  Carondelet instituted a 
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nine real per annum tax on the chimneys of the city to pay for city lighting.  He was concerned 
about burdening (or agitating) the poor, and taxing the chimneys would limit the tax to 
reasonably wealthy citizens.296  In order to root out any potential spies or agents provocateur 
Carondelet made it the law that any immigrants to the colony after 1790 had to swear allegiance 
to Spain.  Any person who refused to do so had a choice of being deported to the United States 
or the Danish Islands.297   
 Baron Carondelet also tried to be responsive to the complaints and requests of the 
subjects.298  In particular, he responded to the feeling of many of the important planters and 
merchants that they were being left out of the administration of the colony in favor of outsiders 
from Spain. He had already re-introduced the Syndics in 1792.  Now, on April the 25th 1794, 
Governor Carondelet wrote to the King asking for the appointment of more locals to 
judgeships.299  This would not only have given Carondelet more judges under him, but also 
would have helped to garner for Carondelet support from the local community by involving more 
of the local elite in government.   
 To the same end, Carondelet, as part of the Decree of 1795, more clearly defined the 
roles of the Syndics.300  The Syndics were a French institution in which a series of men were 
chosen from the locals, stationed every three leagues or so and asked to act as reporters and 
                                                 
296 Ibid., 128, 147.  At least those were the reasons given for levying the new tax on chimneys.  Perhaps, though, 
one shouldn’t make too much of this altruism.  It stands to reason that only those wealthy enough to have homes, 
and thus chimneys, would be able to pay the 9 reals per year asked of them. 
297 Liljegren, 54. 
298 Clark, “The New Orleans Cabildo”, 142-143. 
299 Louisiana Cabildo, Vol. 3 No. 3, 129.  
300 Din and Harkins, 119-120. 
104 
 
intermediaries for the post commandants.301  These Syndics were to act as a kind of front men to 
the commandant of the district in which they lived.  The local habitants were, under threat of 
punishment, to report any crime they had knowledge of to the nearest Syndic.  They also were to 
bring to the attention of the Syndic “all seditious reports, or such as tend to alarm and disturb the 
minds of the people…under the penalty of one Hundred Dollars”.302  This move was calculated 
not only to reinforce order by creating a tighter network of information, but also (as has been 
noted above)  to engender in the habitants a sense of belonging to the system by increasing their 
involvement in the system.  At the same time the Syndic was under orders to report to the 
commandant any meeting of eight or more habitants intending “to treat upon Public Affairs.”303  
The Syndics thus also acted as informants within the habitant community, introducing an 
element of risk to potentially seditious gatherings similar, perhaps, in effect to living in a 
panopticon like environment.  Syndics were also expected to be agents of information 
dissemination in order that the population received trustworthy and controlled information rather 
than hearsay and rumor, thus in theory preventing agitating news from spreading and alarming 
the habitants.304 
Carondelet was keenly aware that information control was about more than preventing 
unfavorable rumor and reports from circulating; he knew that he needed to put his own message 
out to the people. The reinstituted French Syndic system in part was intended for the 
dissemination of “good intelligence” to the people, in order that the populace had the “correct” 
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idea of what is going on in the colony.305  But the Baron went further.  In March 1794 he 
spearheaded the publication of the first newspaper printed in Louisiana.  Le Moniteur de la 
Louisianne. It began its print run in March of 1794, on Louis Duclot’s New Orleans press and 
was unabashedly an organ of Spanish government.306   
Carondelet attempted to use these means of information to portray the French revolution 
as a disorganized mass mob action, and to suggest that if the revolution spread to the colony it 
would be followed by “looting and depradations.”  Furthermore he asserted that any French 
uprising in the colony would bring about a slave revolt like the one that had occurred in Saint 
Domingue.  Early in his reign this propaganda was largely successful and fear of slave revolt 
helped to sway the large planters against openly supporting revolution.  Those planters feared at 
first that the slaves would be set free by the French government following a successful transition 
of the colony, and this kept them loyal to the Spanish government to an extent. 307 
Another component to Carondelet’s ideological defense planning was screening traffic to 
keep out propaganda materials, spies, and provocateurs.  Particularly after the slave revolts in St. 
Domingue, Carondelet was fearful of outside agitators in Louisiana.  This fear was based on “the 
astonishing success with which some disaffected restless enthusiasts have promulgated injurious 
reports tending to introduce distrust and jealousy between government and the inhabitants that 
would inevitably expose the province to all the horrors that have ruined the French colonies”.308  
Even before the slave unrest, with circulars like Genet’s “Liberty, Equality” pamphlet, 
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Carondelet found ready cause to blame unrest on outside factors; perhaps distracting him from 
legitimate internal failings, which if corrected might have contributed to the success of the 
colony.309   
Another major issue Carondelet had to face was the importation and conduct of slaves. 
Since the August 22nd, 1791, revolt in St. Domingue, many in Louisiana, including Carondelet, 
justifiably feared a slave revolt occurring in the colony – spread to Louisiana by the importation 
of African slaves “tainted” in the French islands by revolutionary thought or brought by the 
house slaves of fleeing Haitian planters.310  To prevent such a revolt from occurring in Louisiana, 
he felt it was necessary to enforce the Spanish slave system as it was written – which would 
prevent slaves from becoming desperate enough to revolt.  In doing so he constantly struggled 
against the planter class, including some members of the Cabildo, who felt that he was intruding 
too often in the affairs of the planters and their treatment of their property.311  The large planters 
did not appreciate this meddling.  Many of them resented the relatively lax slave codes of the 
Spaniards, and longed for the older French code.312  Others objected to the myriad requirements 
of the Royal Cedula on the Education, Treatment, and Occupations of Slaves passed in 1789, and 
felt that they would be ruined by the expense of keeping up with them.313 Almost all of the 
planters resented the intrusion of the Spanish governor into the social structure of the plantation 
on behalf of slaves – that kind of meddling lost the master of the plantation a certain degree of 
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autonomy, status, and upset “the symbolic relationship of planters and their families to the slaves 
themselves.”314 
As much as the planters feared an increase in the expense of maintaining slaves, they also 
feared that the importation of slaves would be restricted.  Restricted importation would mean a 
limitation on their ability to grow their businesses and profites.  Those fears were completely 
justified.  Over the course of Carondelet’s reign as governor, he placed numerous and repeated 
restrictions on the importation of slaves.   
Carondelet announced his bando de buen gobeirno (proclamation of good government) 
on January 22nd of 1792.  One of the proscriptions of the bando prevented the importation of 
Caribbean slaves in order to prevent potential contact with slaves who may have had exposure to 
the revolutionary ideas of the French West Indies or Jamaica.315 Within three years, this part of 
the decree ceased to be observed and the year 1795 saw a marked increase in imported slaves.316  
So on February 19, 1796 Baron Carondelet again temporarily banned the introduction of slaves 
into the colony being “neither Spanish nor foreign”.317  On February 22nd of that same year, the 
Attorney General of the Cabildo, along with the Secretary, inspected a ship with a cargo of fifty 
Africans that was at the harbor.   They went to test the Africans on board for “savagery,” – that is 
still “native” in appearance and mannerisms--  and if they showed any sign of not being savage 
then the shipment was to be refused.318  The implication here is that it was not the savagery, or a 
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supposed base nature of the African that was feared but evidence of contact with rebellious 
slaves or exposure to the ideology of freedom.   
Bans on the importation of Africans limiting import to only the “savage” or “brute” 
periodically recur.  There are reports in the Cabildo records on July 16th, 1792 of suspicion of the 
introduction of African slaves from Guarico in violation of the February 10th laws forbidding any 
but “brutes” to be brought in.  Similarly there was a motion put forward in the Cabildo to ban the 
introduction of Africans from any place where there had been a revolt.  The resulting ban 
prevented the importation of some slaves that were already on ships at New Orleans, causing 
considerable loss to the slave trader involved.  Indeed the financial risk of importing slaves into 
the colony could be quite high.  The penalty the Cabildo proposed for the importation of 
undesirable slaves was a 200 pesos fine as well as the cost of returning the slaves to their point of 
origin, and of course, the acceptance of responsibility for any damage or detriment caused by the 
slaves.319   
June 20 of 1795, the Cabildo discussed the possibility of blocking the importation of 
slaves into the colony who were not completely illiterate for the duration of the war with 
France.320  The fear seems to be that there would be a spread of revolutionary propaganda to 
slaves as the new imports were introduced into the slave populations of the colony’s plantations.   
In short, any literate slaves were being viewed as potential carriers of an infectious revolutionary 
sentiment in much the same way that slaves from the Caribbean islands where slave revolts took 
place were. 
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The value that the slaves had for the merchants and planters was a mitigating factor in 
how far the restriction on slave importation was enforceable.  Planters were able to, and 
frequently did, petition to have the embargo lifted for them.  These cases were examined by 
members of the Cabildo under orders of the governor, reported on, and accepted or denied.  For 
example, on June 17, 1796, Don Alejandro Baudin petitioned to import so-called “savage 
negroes”.  His grounds were that Baron Carondelet had allowed certain individuals to do the 
same on January 1st of 1796, and as Spain was no longer at war with France, there would be little 
risk in allowing him to do so as well.  Attorney General Gabriel Fonvergne argued against the 
petition.  In his words “peace with the republic of France neither diminishes nor removes the 
dangers when the criminal intention of negroes is not destroyed and annihilated.”  The petition 
was judged to be “against the interests of the King and colony.”321 
Carondelet did not stop his reforms with restrictions on the importation of slaves.  He 
also sought to move the colony into compliance with newer Spanish laws governing the 
treatment of slaves.  The slave laws of prior administrations – based on the French Code Noir  - 
were less restrictive to the planters than Carondelet’s new regulations.  His deviation from the 
French laws proved the basis for some of the resentment he suffered at the hands of the New 
Orleans planters and merchants.   
There were two major sets of laws that formed the Spanish policy during the colonial 
administrations before Carondelet’s: the Recopilacion de leyes de los reynos de las Indias 
(Summary of the Laws of the Governance of the Indians)322 and the Real Cedula de su majestad 
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sobre la educacion, trato y ocupaciones de los esclavos (His Majesty’s Royal Decree on the 
Education, Treatment, and Work of the Slaves).323   
 The Code Noir, as it was practiced in French Louisiana, was to the slave, in many ways a 
harsher and more restrictive system with fewer protections than the systems introduced later by 
the Spaniards.324  Under French rule, the authorities only enforced those sections of the code that 
were found favorable by the large planters.  One example of this is that while the Code Noir 
technically allowed the freeing of slaves with permission of the Superior Council, in practice the 
Superior Council rarely gave permission to any planter seeking to free a slave, and there was no 
incentive under the code for a planter to do so.  Thus the Code Noir stood in stark contrast to the 
Spanish system of slave management with regard to manumission – a component the Spaniards 
felt was necessary as a “safety valve” to allow slaves the hope of freedom and thus reduce the 
chance of slave revolt.  Slaves could purchase their own freedom if they had the money and a 
record of good conduct.325   Another example of the relative restrictiveness of the Code Noir, is 
that while the slave had the right to complain against his/her master under the Code, it forbade a 
slave’s testimony against the master, which rendered that complaint practically useless.326  Nor 
was education of slaves (religious or otherwise) a concern of the typical French Louisiana 
planter, though religious indoctrination was given lip service in the Code.   The Spanish system 
was, again in theory, much more lenient to the slaves. 
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However, the implementation of the Spanish laws of slave ownership was not immediate 
when the Spaniards gained control of the colony.  The planters operated more or less under the 
Code Noir until Alejandro O’Reilly began attempting to enforce the laws of Castille, the 
Recopilacion de leyes de los reynos de las Indias.327  The Spanish system recognized that slaves 
possessed identities within the law, as opposed to being mere property.  Therefore the Spanish 
slave laws provided many more rights to slaves, including a process for coarticion (self 
purchase).328   
While O’Reilly was keen to bring the French planters into compliance with the Spanish 
slavery laws, his successors were not effective at doing so for a number of reasons.  In the earlier 
years of the Spanish regime, remaining relatively lax on slave regulation was a necessary step.  
The French habitants already feared a tight and controlling Spanish rule, and the local 
administrators did not need planters agitating again for retrocession or revolt.329  Because of that 
laxness, the planters became more entrenched in their own customary methods of slave control.  
Also the Spaniards, even at the height of their military presence in the colony, simply did not 
have the resources and manpower to properly police the plantations for violations of the slave 
laws.  Furthermore, the plantation owners were the elite of the colony.  The Spanish regime 
needed their cooperation if not their consent to govern effectively.   This need for the cooperation 
of the planters continued to inhibit the strict enforcement of slave laws until the administration of 
Carondelet.  Carondelet’s fear of rebellion caused him to risk alienating the large planters by 
meddling more directly and persistently in their affairs.  Moreover, he had new legislation on 
slave rights to guide him. 
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In 1789 king Carlos IV of Spain issued the Real Cedula de su majestad sobre la 
educacion, trato y ocupaciones de los esclavos, superseding the Recopilacion de leyes de los 
reynos de las Indias.330  This decree dictated that the plantation owners provide chaplains for 
their slaves, permit slaves to marry, and allow them days of rest on holy days.  The decree also 
allowed slaves recourse against abusive masters.  They could file claims against them with the 
governor of the colony who would come to judgment and potentially enforce a settlement of 
some kind.331   
The Real Cedula arrived in Louisiana by 1790, but was not strictly enforced for some 
time.  One reason that it wasn’t immediately enforced was a fear at that time that strict 
enforcement would drive the planters to yearn for the “old ways” and sympathize more with the 
French, eventually causing problems in the colony.  As a measure to prevent this kind of 
thinking, in the early years of the French revolution the Spanish administration played on the 
planters’ fears that the revolution, if it spread to the colony, would cause the slaves to rise up.332  
The planters needed the assistance of the Spanish government to control the slaves and prevent a 
slave revolt.  To a large degree that was effective and the large planters became valuable allies in 
governing the populace. 
However, in 1791 Baron Carondelet, contrary to the practices of his predecessor Esteban 
Rodriguez Miro, began to enforce the Cedula.333  The planters of Louisiana were uncomfortable 
with the requirements of the Cedula and wrote letters asking for it to be rescinded.  They argued 
that the new regulations were a danger and would encourage slaves to file false claims against 
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their masters.  Furthermore they argued that the costs of providing chaplains for the slaves would 
be prohibitive, as would requirements that male and female slaves be segregated from each other 
unless they were married.  Planters also contended that the idleness of slaves on the rest days 
allotted in the Cedula was a danger, as hard work left the slaves too fatigued to conspire against 
them.334   
Planters and peers on the Cabildo attempted to influence Carondelet to believe that the 
slaves were constantly threatening to revolt.  The influence of the planters heightened his fear of 
rebellion, but did not immediately sway him to their way of thinking on the issue.  Thus the 
goodwill between Carondelet and the planters was damaged by what they viewed as his insistent 
and dangerous leniency toward the slaves.335  Carondelet was cognizant of the coolness in 
relations between the government and the planter class, and had cause to fear that some of the 
habitant planters might have been driven to sympathize with American adventurers, or the 
republican French.  However, regardless of any attempt to sway him to their point of view, and 
the threat of driving his old allies to become new enemies, until 1795 Carondelet remained 
determined to provide the slaves the rights granted to them by Spanish law.  Carondelet did not 
oppose the planters out of altruism, but because he felt that more complacent slaves would be 
less likely to revolt.  The Point Coupee slave rebellion of 1795 changed his mind about that.  In 
the aftermath of the Point Coupee rebellion he cracked down heavily on slave rights and 
freedoms.336  However this reversal of position did not re-endear him to the large planters, many 
of whom blamed him for the unrest. 
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After the 1795 slave revolts at Point Coupee, Carondelet believed, perhaps even more 
strongly, that he was besieged by “enemies of Spain” who “desperate because they could not 
defeat [Spain] in open in Ohio and along the Mississippi river mouth…slander Carondelet and 
claims he keeps slaves against master and wants a slave revolt.”337  While the propaganda in 
question may not have necessarily been American it would most likely travel from an American 
port – entering the Louisiana colony either down the Mississippi River or from Philadelphia into 
the port of New Orleans.  Thus it appeared to the Spaniards that the mode of entry, if not the 
origin of the materials, made the propaganda problem at least in part an American one.  Because 
this was the case, Baron Carondelet knew he had to control the American border to effectively 
control his populace.  The baron also recognized a need for internal controls, as has been noted. 
Carondelet restricted travel and required visitors to check in with local commandants, 
receiving passports to travel on.  Travelers would be stopped on the roads and if they did not 
have the appropriate passports for themselves, their transport and their servants they could face 
arrest and interrogation.338  Spanish travel restrictions were infamous to the point that when one 
American traveler experienced a journey with few troubles, he found the event noteworthy 
enough to write a letter for publication in a newspaper.339  Ships, likewise, were searched for 
printed materials which may have been against the interests of the crown.  Such a search brought 
the arrest of Thomas Mitchell, who possessing drawings of the Mississippi, was suspected of 
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being a spy and sent back to Spain – but only after Baron Carondelet gave consideration as to 
whether or not Mitchell could be used as a Spanish agent. 340   
These restrictions were not without some cost.  The reinstitution of the old French syndic 
system and the strict control of travel must have served as a reminder of the restrictions that 
living under a monarchy imposed.  This may have chafed the sensibilities of the relatively liberal 
French colonists in New Orleans, as well as potentially discouraging the immigrants that 
Carondelet eventually wished to lure from the relative freedom of America. 
Perhaps the key step Carondelet took to limiting revolutionary zeal was to play up the 
fear of slave revolt.  Carondelet made efforts to convince the planter class that once the 
revolutionary spirit was spread amongst the white citizenry, it would catch on with the slaves and 
cause a bloody uprising.341  By alienating a majority of the planters from the more radical 
merchant class of New Orleans, Carondelet kept the French ‘habitants’ from consolidating a 
power block which could be used against him.  By the time of the 1795 Pointe Coupee revolt, 
fears of slave revolt had largely convinced the planters to fear, rather than sympathize with 
Jacobin demonstrators. 
Carondelet was capable of shrewd displays of force as well.  On April 5th 1793, there is 
mention in the Cabildo records of an order forcing the Butchers of New Orleans to move their 
slaughterhouses away from their then current position on the outskirts of the city to make way 
for new fortifications.342  Those new fortifications must also have been a reminder to those living 
in the city of Spanish authority.  The same order also called for the forest around New Orleans to 
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be cleared.  This would allow the cannon that were to be placed in the new fortifications to fire 
on open ground.  As an added benefit the removal of the woods would take away a hiding place 
from the “savage negroes” and “men of bad character” who were thought to congregate there at 
night.343  The clearing of the woods around New Orleans would also allow for better defense of 
the city against an Indian, American or the French invasion, thus easing tensions by removing 
sources of unease and doubt about the effectiveness of the Spanish protection of the colony.   
Defensive measures against the French were of particular importance to Carondelet 
because since the French Revolution rumor of French retrocession travelled through the 
colony.344  The outbreak of war with France was announced in June of 1793, shortly after the 
Baron’s appointment, along with a notice that it was expected of the citizenry of the city to 
contribute to Spain’s efforts to defend and secure the colony.345  Following the declaration, in 
July, Carondelet ordered the Cabildo’s administrative staff to attend masses for the success of the 
King’s army to be held on Sunday, August 11th, arguably in part as a display of public loyalty, 
and ritual reassurance of belonging for the people. 346   
Native tribes played an active part in Carondelet’s plans to harden the border between 
Spain and the United States.  In a letter of 1795 to Don Louis de las Casas, Baron Carondelet 
directly cites the assemblage of a force to invade Louisiana by “Monsieur Genet” as his reason 
for seeking an alliance with the Osage Indians.347  Such an alliance would prevent Genet and 
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Clark from using the 1,200 Osage warriors against Spain as well as provide those warriors for 
Spain’s use against invading Americans.348  Building such Indian alliances was central to 
Carondelet’s plan for the defense of Louisiana.    On his eastern frontier, Carondelet actively 
courted Indian tribes both to build a buffer between Louisiana and to counter American Indian 
agents.349  In October 1793, He called together the Choctaw, Creek, Chickasaw and Cherokee to 
Nogales to form a defensive alliance – the “Indian confederation”.350  At the time he encouraged 
his Indian allies to act aggressively toward the American frontiersmen – keeping them from 
moving further toward Spanish holdings.   
Though it must have seemed a necessary activity for defense early on, Carondelet’s 
Indian alliances eventually came to be recognized as a strategic misstep.  Carondelet’s Indian 
policy ultimately proved fiscally untenable, as the cost of Indian allies proved too large a drain 
on Spanish coffers.  By 1794 gifts to Indian allies was costing Spain 55,000 pesos annually, an 
amount that was roughly 10% of the annual budget for the colony, and very nearly the equal to 
the annual customs house earnings.351   This money could have found other uses to help control 
the growing unrest in New Orleans.  At the same time the Indian raids that Carondolet’s policy 
fostered lessened the ability of Americans to transport goods that were desperately needed in 
New Orleans, damaging both the colony’s financial well being and the morale of those in the 
city.  Finally, Carondelet’s Indian allies also proved to be an embarrassment in diplomacy 
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between the United States and Spain.  The need Spanish diplomats felt to distance Spain from 
aggressive Indian actions may have contributed to the ease of which the US obtained its terms 
with the Treaty of San Lorenzo, in 1795.352 
Important as he felt they were, Carondelet did not rely entirely on native alliances for 
defense.  He also recognized the importance of securing the Mississippi River to prevent 
contraband as well as any potential transport of invading troops.  By 1793, Carondelet, receiving 
reports that the Americans would use the Spanish war with France as an opportunity to seize the 
Mississippi river, took actions to fortify both the river and the north of the colony.353  A thorough 
and revealing summary of his defensive plans can be found in his November 24, 1794 letter to 
his excellency Manuel Godoy, the Duke de la Alcudia.354  Carondelet’s plans for securing the 
north called for creating a number of new fortifications as well as repairing many of the current 
Spanish fortifications along the river.  To man these fortifications, he wished to increase the 
Spanish defense of the north with at least an extra regiment of soldiers.  Carondelet recruited 
men from Mexico, though those recruits were unreliable and many deserted.  Such was his need 
that Carondelet was not above using conscripted prisoners from Cuba to serve in infantry 
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regiments along the northern frontier of the colony (usually after those conscripts served time 
building fortifications in the south of the colony).355 
Carondelet also found the colony’s defenses lacking in the south.  In 1792, the total 
number of Spanish regular troops in New Orleans was 766 men - 297 from Louisiana and 469 
from Havana.  During times of stress, Carondelet requested additional troops from Havana.  This 
was the case in June of 1793 when he used Cuban soldiers to reinforce New Orleans in the face 
of rumors that French sympathizers might move against the government.  Despite 
demonstrations earlier that year, and the recent signing of a petition asking France to retrocede 
the colony, the Cuban soldiers helped assure that the June announcement of war with France was 
met with little opposition.356   
As valuable as his regular troops were, Carondelet recognized that his permanent forces 
were not sufficient to defend the city, and so increased the militia in New Orleans.357  He also 
raised a kind of auxiliary militia with citizens from “Baton Rouge, Point Coupée, Opelousas, 
Feliciana, Galveztown and Attakapas”, who were instructed to be ready to report to New Orleans 
within five days of notice.   He valued these militias for their knowledge of the local terrain and 
communities and skill with guerilla tactics.358  Carondelet may have intended these troops 
primarily for defense from external enemies (if Carondelet made such distinctions).  Nonetheless 
these are characteristics that Claude E. Welch Jr. found highly advantageous to combating 
rebellion. 
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Carondelet constructed a freshwater fleet to defend the Mississippi river.  He organized a 
small fleet of gunboats under the command of Captain Pedro Rousseau for that purpose in 
January of 1792.359  By 1793, Carondelet grew “His Majesty’s Light Squadron of Galleys” to 
include seven galleys, four galiots, and one lancha.360  The largest of these vessels (the Leal) 
patrolled the Gulf of Mexico.  The next two in terms of size (the Victoria and Louisiana) sailed 
the lower river from New Orleans to Nogales.  The galleys Filipa, Vengenza and Castilla were 
deployed to the upper Mississippi.  The lancha (launch) el Reyo patrolled near the mouth of the 
Ohio.  Of the three galliots (Flecha, Activa and Vigilante), the Vigilante served as Carondelet’s 
personal transportation.361  The squadron served to adequately control access to the Mississippi, 
and served as a means of troop transport, but at a cost.362  None of this could be done without 
significant expense to Spain for the sake of a colony that was not producing a tremendous return 
on the investment. 
Despite Carondelet’s measures, he could not keep Jacobin propaganda from spreading.  
Jacobin songs, like La Marseillaise, became popular in the streets of New Orleans and cabarets 
there were ordered closed to keep order and limit Jacobin demonstration (at the expense of lost 
license revenue and taxes).363  This Jacobin sentiment seemed to feed a number of 
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demonstrations in the colony.364  Carondelet, recognizing that a display of authority was needed 
to keep order in the city, requested help.  In November 1793, to pacify the crowds of 
discontented that demonstrated in New Orleans, Baron Carondelet called upon Governor Gayoso 
de Lemos of Natchez to send him aid.  Governor Gayoso sent 300 Anglo-American monarchists 
who had immigrated to Spanish Louisiana after the American Revolution.  Lilijegren attributes 
Carondelet’s ability to maintain order in late 1793 and early 1794 to these “Tory Volunteers”.365  
In some ways the sparse population of the colony helped to contain radical sentiment.  The effect 
distance had on containing rebellion should have been heightened under the Syndic system when 
news of disturbances in other parts of the colony had to travel through official channels which 
were not adverse to censorship and propagandizing news – though such an effect would be 
extremely difficult to prove with evidence. 
Wars with Britain and France, as well as the specter of slave revolt or invasion of 
“Kentuckians,” hindered Baron Carondelet attempts to resolve a number of important local 
sources of discontent. So too did the turbulent economy of Louisiana, which fell even further 
into decline during the years between the fall of indigo and tobacco exports from the colony and 
the rise of sugar and cotton.366  But Carondelet did not let these problems prevent him from 
seeing to matters of local control.  Carondelet actively pursued measures such as slave reform, 
enhancement of security, inclusion of locals into the government and a propaganda program to 
ensure the safety of the colony, and its viability to Spain through physical force, regulation, and 
information control. 
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CONCLUSION 
Looking at the rebellions under Ulloa and Carondelet through the lens of Claude E. 
Welch Jr.’s model of popular collective action one is able to see threads of continuity between 
the two.  Many of the physical setting requirements for popular discontent were present in the 
colony, from geographic marginality caused by distance from Spain and frequent opportunity to 
natural disasters, and the shifts in methods of production and transport of commercial and 
agricultural goods that occurred during the Spanish transition.  Social and economic tensions, 
exacerbated by a minority and alien rule led in both instances to a tighter sense of  both 
perceived inequality and self ascription for the “indigenous groups”, be they the original French 
and German colonists, Afro-creole slaves or American immigrants. 
Both administrations had to contend with the physical distance of Louisiana from the 
mother country.  The colony lay some 4,500 miles from even the southern Spanish ports.  
Louisiana was only 700 miles away from the large Spanish colonial center at Havana, but even at 
that distance the journey across the Gulf could take weeks and was fraught with dangers of storm 
and attack from privateers.  Governor Ulloa found this distance to be more of a factor because he 
did not possess enough resources in terms of money or manpower to install himself in New 
Orleans as a suitable surrogate presence (in terms of majesty, or authority) for the Spanish 
crown.  Even after O’Reilly more firmly established Spanish law and authority in the colony, 
turning New Orleans into a colonial administrative center in its own right, distance from the 
support and guidance of the Spanish court remained a problem.  Delay waiting for orders from 
the central government lessened the habitants’ perception of Spanish authority.   
In addition to the remoteness of the colony, Louisiana also suffered from relatively 
inhospitable terrain, which acted to separate the settlement into dispersed locations, favorable for 
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agriculture or trade.  The terrain also hindered the kind of rapid transit that would be necessary 
for patrolling the land and keeping order.  Hurricanes, outbreaks of Yellow Fever, and years of 
poor conditions for the growing of food staples created or complicated many of the colony’s 
other problems.  Those disasters also helped to foster the appearance that the Spanish 
government was unwilling, or incapable of protecting the citizens.   
From the perspective of the Spanish crown, Louisiana’s proximity to British colonies, 
later the United States, and its close cultural and periodically economic ties with France also 
proved to be a problem in terms of colonial management.  The porous borders of the colony led 
to an endemic weakening of Spanish authority there, as laws meant to control the border had to 
be modified,  or in some instances could not be enforced at all.  The constant interaction with 
foreigners also contributed to a sense of independence and prevented the creation of any kind of 
Spanish cultural hegemony in the colony.  Methods to control the borders, whether Ulloa’s 
attempts to settle Acadian immigrants near the British border or Carondelet’s formation of the so 
called “Indian Confederation” and the Mississippi River forts and patrol fleet led to economic 
and public relations strains.  These strains furthered the social tensions within the colony.  When 
judgment compelled the respective governors to abandon those programs, colonists perceived the 
abandonment as a potential weakness of the administration.  This was particularly evident under 
both the administrations of Ulloa and Carondelet when they attempted, and to varying degrees 
failed, to limit smuggling operations on the Mississippi river. 
Not all of Welch’s physical factors were issues for all the Spanish administrations.  Land 
scarcity was not a large problem; however, one is able to see resource scarcity.  Also, when 
considering slavery as a means of production, the limitation on slave imports effectively limited 
the use of land.  This was felt particularly strongly under Governor Carondelet’s administration 
124 
 
when he restricted (though never halted) slave imports.  Likewise, the limits on trade put a 
hindrance on the ability of German and Acadian farmers to profit from their lands through 
foreign export during Ulloa’s administration.  In a similar vein, the trade restrictions limited the 
amount of food and staple goods able to reach the colony.  In a relatively isolated colony, subject 
to frequent disaster, artificial limitations on the citizens’ available food were not popular.    
Capitalization of agriculture was not an issue because the agricultural system was already 
commercialized to an extent.  Louisiana farmers practiced a mixture of subsistence and 
commercial farming.  Therefore the loosening of social ties that Welch claims accompanies the 
capitalization of agriculture had already taken place to a degree.   
Given the relative dominance of entrenched French society in the Superior Council, 
military, and all other governmental forms, it is hard to see perceived inequality being a factor in 
the 1768 revolt.  Yet for the Acadian or German farmer, positioned away from the colonial 
center of New Orleans, it may have indeed seemed so.  Given that there were so few Spaniards in 
the colony with whom to compare, it would have been easy to claim that they would be immune 
to the hardships suffered by others, especially because the most visible Spaniards were officials.  
Some members of New Orleans high society saw Governor Ulloa’s trips to Balize as elitist.  
Likewise, in the 1790’s there was no real system of formalized material or status inequality 
between the colonial government and the elite citizens, though increased opportunities allowed 
officials (and elites) access to greater material goods and comforts.  However anti-monarchical 
language had made its way to the street of New Orleans, infecting the rioters there with a general 
sense of somehow being aggrieved by the Spanish monarchy. 
The same strands of Francophile ethnic ascription played a large role in the revolts under 
Governor Ulloa and Governor Carondelet.  This ascription is evident in the appeals to the French 
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government to take the colony back from Spain which occurred in both periods.  The colonists 
showed French ascription through displays of French culture.  In 1768 the rebels bonded around 
the “good wine of Bordeaux”.367  In the 1790’s agitators sung La Marseillaise in the streets.  In 
the 1760’s, the Germans and Acadians had their own ethnic ascriptions and traditions of 
independence, but they were pulled into ascribing with the French Creoles through economic and 
social ties – perhaps in the process adopting the larger ascription of “Louisianan.”  Those same 
social and economic ties existed between the merchants and planters who opposed Carondelet.   
The demand for a return to the French “laissez faire” system united the rebels. 
The coming of the Spaniards in 1766 began a strain on the French influenced social order 
of the colony.  New regulations meant a shift in the established commercial patterns that the 
social hierarchy relied upon for their position and status.  Likewise the threat of implementing 
Spanish governmental systems hung over the head of those sitting in the Superior Council.  
However, that danger must have seemed far off, given the glacial pace at which Spain was 
moving to establish its presence in the colony.  This presented to the discontented a window of 
opportunity to prevent looming detrimental social change.  By the 1790’s the Spanish 
governmental system was well established – O’Reilly’s governmental changes saw to that -- and 
social change due to Spanish rule should not have been a threat.  However economic and 
regulatory changes provided the potential for social change and social friction. 
Years of colonial neglect had already preconditioned the Louisianans to independence, 
and a certain amount of disrespect for strong authority.  The same can be said even more so 
about the Acadian immigrants, many of whom had resisted the British in Nova Scotia.  This 
independence, distrust, and even hostility to being governed left the Louisianans a legacy of 
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discontent and a strong tradition of resistance.  The rampant smuggling, border crossing, and 
display of traits which were perceived as indolence, sloth, or recalcitrance give some evidence to 
support a more independent atmosphere in the colony.   
Even though the 1768 revolt was stopped short by the arrival of O’Reilly, it became a 
part of the cultural narrative and indirectly acted to legitimize future acts of rebellion.  Thus 
Louisianans were in a way primed for resistance before the strong messages of republicanism 
coming from French cultural ties in the 1790’s acted to underscore the independence felt in the 
colony and prompted the discontented to riot in the streets.  Theories of discontent hold that once 
a people resort to popular protest, it becomes part of their cultural lexicon and they are likelier to 
return to protest in the future.368   
This author has discovered no documents explicitly citing the 1768 rebellion as cause, 
basis, or justification for the protests of the 1790’s.  However a tradition of willingness to resort 
to popular protest is revealed somewhat in the repeated attempts of merchants to petition the king 
of France for retrocession, first in 1768 and again in 1793.  It is shown again through the 
constant willingness of the populace to accept smuggling in the colony.  Attempts to find a 
protest tradition among the working classes is a little more difficult.  There may be a dim 
reflection of the German Coast and Acadian popular protests in the New Orleans street 
demonstrations that occurred in 1793, and perhaps in rural protest exemplified by the 
Nachtitoches tumult.  Shifts that occurred in the nature of the working class make the attempt 
harder.  Between the 1760’s and 1790’s slaves performed an increasing amount of the colony’s 
labor.   
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Attempts to find any kind of continuation of popular protest between the farmer protests 
of 1768 and the slave revolts of 1793 is even more difficult still.  In Africans in Colonial 
Louisiana: The Development of Afro-Creole Culture in the Eighteenth Century, Gwendolyn Milo 
Hall attempts to create a connection between lower class white workers and the rebellious slaves 
of the 1790’s through their shared Jacobinism (that is, a desire for freedom from the legal and 
social restrictions that governed their lives).369  If that is the case, then one may begin to trace the 
intersection of Afro-creole protest traditions and Euro-creole protest traditions (including the 
1768 rebellion).  Gilbert C. Din raises serious concerns about whether there is evidence to back 
Hall’s assertion.370  Din contends that several of the rumors of free/slave cooperation were 
proven false by area Commandants, and that Spanish records lack references to such 
cooperation.371  For the time being at least, there remains the possibility of, but no compelling 
direct proof of, a connection between the popular protest of the 1760’s and the slave revolts of 
the 1790’s. 
The Spanish administrations themselves played a large role in determining whether the 
French Creole colonists would, or could revolt.  Through integration, or superiority, they could 
have denied the colonists the impetus to enact a revolt.  A lack of co-option of French creoles 
into the system was never a source for discontent in the populace.  The French Superior Council 
and Governor were in power during the first revolt in Louisiana, and after the re-institution of 
Spanish rule half of the sitting members of the New Orleans Cabildo were French creoles.  
Governor Ulloa could hardly have included the French more in his government.  But he may 
have been including them at the wrong level.  Ulloa succeeded in creating a layer of French 
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administration under him that had no upward mobility in the Spanish system.  Governor 
Carondelet, in an attempt to stave off rebellion, re-introduced the syndic system of appointed 
“best men” spread throughout the colony, men whose positions in society were enhanced by their 
relations and service to Spain.  The Spaniards had no superiority myth to justify their position of 
dominance.  Rather they had the well established tradition of European monarchy as a basis for 
their ownership of the colony.  This proved somewhat difficult as throughout the history of the 
Spanish regime in Louisiana the French Creoles felt umbrage and a certain amount of disbelief 
that they would be “traded away” and would not give up hope that he French monarch (or 
eventually Republic) would accept them back – though the plantation owners that made up the 
colonial elite in the 1790’s developed serious reservations about the abolitionist tendencies of the 
Republic.  
The mounting sense of relative deprivation, driven by economic policies instituted by the 
Spanish government, was capitalized upon in both periods by parties interested in fomenting 
revolution.  Ulloa’s decision to implement the Cedula of 1768, limiting trade to approved 
Spanish ports, provided the impetus for the rebellion against his administration.  The Creole 
merchants, guided in their perception of the policy changes by agitators like Lafrénière, saw 
themselves as being denied what they considered to be customary, or “ancient rights and 
liberties”.372  The new sense of deprivation caused by the trade restrictions compounded the 
anxieties felt by colonists over the weak trade and lack of specie in the colony.  In the Carondelet 
administration there were also unpopular trade restrictions, brought about by wars with 
customary trade partners – perhaps most notably the trade cessation with France in 1793.  Again, 
as Governor Ulloa did before him, Baron Carondelet tried to police and reduce illicit trade.  And 
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again this act was politicized as evidence of the Spanish interests running counter to the interests 
of city merchants, and evidence that the Spanish regime wished to strip the colony of its ties to 
France, and thus its French heritage.  Likewise, Baron Carondelet’s attempts to enforce the 
Cedula regarding the education and treatment of slaves of 1789 caused a great unease among the 
colony’s large planters, giving them cause to see themselves as victimized by the Spanish 
regime. 
The presence, or lack thereof, of military forces useable for coercion was important to not 
just the success of a rebellion, but of one’s occurrence.  At the time of the 1768 rebellion 
Governor Ulloa did not have sufficient military forces in the colony to resist the rebels.  That was 
an undeniable factor in the decision to rebel against the governor.  The militias that he did have 
to keep order were used sparingly, as Governor Aubry did not wish to provoke the discontented.  
In the 1790’s Governor Carondelet also used his military sparingly, so as not to stretch his 
limited forces too thin, or provoke the colonists into a greater spirit of rebellion.  However, 
Carondelet had forces to use, and the ability to call for reinforcements. In 1793 he displayed 
those forces by mustering them at New Orleans.373 Carondelet also had the benefit of the 
memory of the impression that O’Reilly made on the colony upon his arrival.  Since O’Reilly’s 
arrival, Spanish force was never in doubt.   
O’Reilly’s administration also demonstrated how the colony could be controlled and 
order restored in case of widespread active discontent.  O’Reilly showed a mastery of all four of 
Welch’s maxims of control.  O’Reilly used criminal charges and the granting of pardons to 
separate the rebel leaders from the base.  By pomp and ceremony O’Reilly restored a degree of 
faith in the majesty and authority of the Spanish crown, which was the justification of the 
                                                 
373 Feihrer, 482-483. 
130 
 
Spanish occupation of the colony.  He incorporated leading creoles into the Spanish system of 
government, and in doing so involved them with government in a way that offered a more 
permanent station.  Finally, O’Reilly possessed the capability to coerce the creoles if need be, 
and made sure to display that force prominently, but restrained from using that force unless it 
was necessary.   
Baron Carondelet also attempted to cast the actions of political actors in a purely criminal 
way.  In doing so, and later in trying to use the threat of slave revolt to scare planters into 
supporting the Spaniards as their assurance of order, Carondelet was able to somewhat divide the 
discontented.  Through the Syndic system, and the appointment of local judges, he further 
integrated the creoles and vested them into the success of the colony.  Perhaps because of his 
tendency to overreact to dangers, Baron Carondelet did all he could to ensure that he had ample 
soldiers to contain a rebellion.  In spite those tendencies, he also recognized that open hostilities 
would cause a great many problems and refrained from using his men except at Natchitoches. 
The weak Spanish presence in Louisiana greatly aided the politicization of discontent.  
This is most radically evident when one juxtaposes the actions and stance of the Superior 
Council in October 1768, with itself in August of 1769.  The rebels knew they had little to fear 
with Governors Ulloa and Aubry due to the lack of forces, weakness, and desire to accommodate 
when confronted.  Even with Aubry’s aid Ulloa did not have the man-power to intercede in the 
rebel actions, even had he been aware of them earlier.  For his part, Aubry contented himself to 
issue stern warnings with little ability, or possibly even intent, of backing them up.  The 
administration failed to successfully enforce policies and regulations, particularly with regard to 
smuggling.  While this was arguably necessary to the survival of the colony, it greatly weakened 
the perceived strength of the joint government. 
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By contrast, Lieutenant General O’Reilly brought with him an overwhelming force, and 
used it sparingly.  In doing so O’Reilly maximized the benefit of a force as deterrent to rebel 
action while minimizing the use of force as a contributing factor to discontent.  O’Reilly 
enforced the vast majority of his regulations and laws, creating the appearance of Spanish 
authority.  The only notable exception to O’Reilly’s success with enforcing regulation was the 
non-enforcement of slave regulations.   
The inability of the Spaniards to decisively regulate slavery from 1769 onward set the 
stage for the troubles Baron Carondelet would have with slave regulation in the 1790’s.  Baron 
Carondelet struggled to improve the quality of slave care enough to prevent a slave insurrection.  
The reluctance of the planter class to adopt his reforms, and impact of Jacobin ideology as well 
as rumor of potential abolition or uprising on the slaves themselves thwarted the Baron’s efforts.  
In the wake of the Point Coupee revolt, Carondelet’s tactics regarding slave pacification turned 
toward stricter control, and in doing so brought the interests of the Spanish authority and the 
planter class into closer alignment. 
With regard to effective mobilization of his small forces, displays of force, and rapid 
enhancement of his forces through loaned troops, as well as incorporation of well placed 
colonists into the control structure as Syndics, Carondelet succeeded in preventing popular 
revolts from capitalizing on a perceived weakness of Spanish authority.  However the success of 
popular unrest in France and the frequent threat of invasion from out of the colony allowed 
agitators to use the possibility of a future moment of Spanish weakness as propaganda.   
A greater threat to Spanish authority was the lack of police enforcement.  This was seen 
in both the inability to prevent popular demonstrations and to catch the arsonists that moved 
about in New Orleans, and even more prominently in the lack of Spanish authority in the more 
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remote rural villages.  Nonetheless, Carondelet used the mostly adequate forces at his disposal 
(and imported forces when necessary) to enforce most regulations in the colonial center, and 
maintained enough control over the city to prevent that city from ever falling completely out of 
his control.  In doing so, Carondelet maintained the perception of a fairly strong Spanish 
authority in the Louisiana colony. 
Baron Carondelet was lucky in that he never had to face a united opposition behind a 
character such as Nicolas Chauvin Lafrénière.  Lafrénière’s strength of personality, powerful 
oratory, personal connections and relatively high status and authority allowed him to become a 
strikingly effective leader in the 1768 rebellion.  These qualities allowed Lafrénière, and the 
other coup leaders, to reach across large sections of the colonial community and organize a well 
put together rebellion.  Lafrénière’s contacts put him in position to disrupt the Spanish 
government through Foucault, block payment to the Germans, and convince the Acadians that 
Governor Ulloa was hording money meant to pay off their paper currency.  They damned the 
Spaniards and celebrated French culture, thus beginning the ideological indoctrination of the 
rebels by drawing a sharp division between the interests of colonial Louisiana and the interests of 
the Governor Ulloa.   
Once the militias were gathered in New Orleans, the rebellious members of the Superior 
Council printed circulars through which to present the militias, and the rest of New Orleans, with 
the formal ideological foundations of the rebellion.  This ideology combined a criticism of the 
Spanish regime, outlined a set of immediate actionable points, and hinted at their vision of a new 
colonial future without Spain – though they were ultimately unable to accomplish much after the 
expulsion of Ulloa.  This, as well as their already prominent positions in society, allowed the 
Superior Council members to effectively position themselves as a desirable and effective 
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replacement for the Spanish administration.  The participants of the 1768 rebellion exercised 
remarkable discipline in secrecy, time management, and self restraint.  An organized and 
disciplined force reveals good management skills on the part of the rebel leadership.  Likewise 
the ability of Lafrénière and company to reach across ethnic and economic gaps testifies to the 
communication skills and persuasiveness of the coup members.  The leadership of the rebellion 
displayed some tactical skill, no doubt from the militia captains, in organizing the street patrols, 
and spiking of the New Orleans cannons.   
In the 1790’s no such strong organizing leadership, capable of uniting the disparate 
interests of the discontented, emerged to challenge Carondelet’s authority.  Rather Carondelet 
faced a period of rebellious behavior, with small demonstrations – harrowing, but lacking the 
coordination and skill that contributed to the danger and effectiveness of the 1768 rebellion.  
New Orleans saw no shortage of revolutionary ideology entering from France and the United 
States.  However a galvanizing leadership did not present itself.  The closest thing New Orleans 
saw to such effective leadership was in the organization of merchants who signed petitions to the 
king of France to retrocede the colony.  However, they quailed in the presence of Carondelet’s 
reinforcements from Havana.  Likewise, in rural Nacthicohes Padre Delvaux proved effective in 
organizing a small group of discontented to cohesive action, but that resistance did not last long 
in the face of the relatively small Spanish force sent to disband it.   
But effective pacification of a rebellion relies on well thought out concessions as well as 
repression by coercion.  Governor Ulloa never really had a chance to confront the Superior 
Council conspirators.  Had he spent time developing stronger channels of information, he might 
have.  The authority’s response to the 1768 rebellion fell instead to Lieutenant General Alejandro 
O’Reilly.  O’Reilly approached the colony with a mixture of overwhelming force, restraint, 
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magnanimity, reform and aid.  Using criminal proceedings for the leadership, combined with a 
general amnesty, O’Reilly created a split in the rebellion – cutting the head off of the body, so to 
speak.  The Spanish funds he took with him and the economic reforms that ultimately benefitted 
the colony lessened the discontent felt by the citizens, as did a sense of security from knowing 
that the colony once again had the attentions of a European power.   
But even Alejandro O’Reilly could not return the colony to a pre-rebellion state.  Once 
the rebellion occurred, the memory of the rebellion entered into the collective consciousness and 
became an internalized part of the citizen’s dialogue with the ruling administration.  Not only 
would rebellion, once the colonists had some experience with it, be considered more of a viable 
outlet for discontent, but the act of rebellion itself would act as a form of ascription.  Opposition 
to the entrenched power ties together the elements that participated in the revolt, possibly for 
generations.  Thus by the 1790s the Creoles of Louisiana had a tradition which included rebellion 
as a form of dealing with relative discontent. 
Baron Carondelet used the revived French syndic system both to incorporate creoles into 
the Spanish system and to act as a highly effective communication network.  This gave 
Carondelet’s administration local agents to report what was happening in the more remote parts 
of the colony and an avenue to control information going out to the colony – thus controlling 
how events were perceived by releasing “official” versions of news, esp. via the Monituer.  This 
not only allowed Carondelet some ability to prevent the spread of discontent, it also allowed him 
the opportunity to isolate any rebellious persons by criminalizing them in released news.  
Carondelet also capitalized on the there being two different strains of rebellious persons in 
Louisiana during his administration – slave and free.  He argued successfully that any 
movements toward French republicanism would lead to a slave revolt.  This scared many of the 
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large planters into allying with the governor for the early years of his time in the colony and 
prevented that powerful faction from allying with other discontented groups.  Not until he 
decided to implement slave reform did the relationship between Carondelet and the planters sour.   
Carondelet made a number of defensive improvements to the colony as well as civil and 
administrative ones.  However mounting economic troubles due to the wars, trade restrictions, 
and anxiety over slave unrest built discontent, which was ignited by an influx of Jacobin and 
republican propaganda which incited demonstrations in the streets of New Orleans.  Likewise the 
failure of Carondelet to successfully prosecute demonstrators led to a serious challenge to his 
authority in the city of New Orleans, and even more so in the remote countryside where his 
presence was considerably less felt.  But the Governor was able to stave off large scale revolt.  
Carondelet paired media control with a reinforced police and military force that he was able to 
bolster with troops from Havana or Natchez when he needed them.  Carondelet’s fear of large 
scale revolt and lack of a sizeable military presence prevented him from overreacting with 
military force in masse. The need for Carondelet to reserve his military forces for external 
defense, which he had been bolstering with questionable alliances, also limited the extent to 
which he could commit soldiers.  Ultimately this forced moderation of commitment was 
appropriate. 
Compared against each other with Welch’s model as a guide, the two rebellions do reveal 
certain commonalities.  The distance of the colony from Spain played a large role in the relative 
inability of the Spanish crown to regulate and control her.  It also bred a sense of independence 
in the colonists which was compounded by the decades of French “laissez faire”.  Spanish 
attempts at regulation, and bringing the colony into the Spanish mercantile system caused fear 
and anxiety amongst the colonists who were already suffering from a continually depressed 
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economy.  Ethnicity was used to unite the colonists against the Spaniards, and in both instances 
so was collective political violence in New Orleans alongside attempts to persuade the French 
king to retrocede the colony.  The ideology of both periods contained references to free trade and 
natural rights – though the 1768 conspirators were no Jacobins. 
The rebellions differed on a number of points.  The degree of external influence, in terms 
of ideology, was much higher in the 1790’s.  The leadership of the 1768 rebellion was much 
stronger, and the rebellion itself much more organized.  By contrast the turmoil of the 1790’s 
was scattered, and no strong leadership unified the multiple discontented groups into a cohesive 
opposition.  During the 1760’s the colonial government was organizationally divided, 
unfocussed, weak, and only nominally aligned with its Spanish head.  There was no apparatus for 
the gathering or dissemination of intelligence, which allowed the rebels to catch the governors 
unaware.  The government in place during the 1790’s was stronger, more organized, and 
extremely active in terms of seeking out potential rebellion.  In the later years of the colonial 
government a lot of energy was invested in gathering intelligence, disseminating propaganda and 
incorporating the creoles into the colonial administration. 
The differences are less pronounced in the conditions of relative deprivation that started 
organized unrest.  This reveals a continuity of problems that were almost systemic to the 
Louisiana colony.  Chief among these was the economic woes of the colony.  The economy of 
the Louisiana colony was perpetually weak due to an imbalance in imports versus exports.  This 
led to a “bleeding out” of specie, wild inflation and a damaging dependence on foreign trade.  
These conditions, compounded by natural disaster and disease, produced an environment 
engineered for discontent.  With weak authority and poor governance this discontent easily 
manifested itself in collective political violence as members of the discontented agitated against 
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Spanish changes to systems they developed to survive in Louisiana.  However, with strong 
governance the colony was able to endure these conditions. 
The study of these revolts together and against the “model” of revolt presented by Welch 
suggests that they are different manifestations of popular discontent caused by systemic 
economic, geographic or physical, and social problems.  This suggests that they also fit the mold 
of a “peasant revolt” as defined by Welch, as does the tendency for the agitators to seek limited 
change in government to address specific and local ills.  This indicates that perhaps, though the 
Spanish regime is known to have implemented successful social and commercial reforms which 
are widely thought to have begun Louisiana’s ascent toward being a profitable and stable land, 
important problems could not be addressed in the context of a colonial system.  Spaniards 
adopted, and adapted various methods of control over the course of their administration of the 
colony, but never managed to address the deeper causes of discontent in a fashion that would 
have allowed them to keep the colony without future demonstrations.  This was compounded by 
the relatively rapid expansion of the Americans into their shared border space. 
There remain a number of questions that were raised during the research of this thesis, 
but were beyond the scope of this study, or for other reasons not fully explored, and a number of 
avenues open to further investigation.  It would be interesting to see how the results of these 
rebellions can be compared to other rebellions in the Spanish new world over the length of 
Spanish colonialism in America.  Perhaps Welch’s models could be compared with the models 
presented in William B. Taylor’s Drinking, Homicide and Rebellion in Colonial Mexican 
Villages.  Such lines of inquiry may shed light on Spanish methods of control, and how they 
adapted to face changes in subjects from native tribes to European colonists, as well as any 
impact of the eighteenth-century enlightenment on Spanish colonialism.  Using Welch’s methods 
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to compare the Spanish rebellions with North American rebellions that occur throughout the 
second half of the eighteenth-century, particularly those in the British colonies and the United 
States may, likewise, yield interesting results. 
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